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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
USE IT OR LOSE IT: CANADIAN IDENTITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
ARCTIC SECURITY POLICY
by
Michael P. McCormack
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
This dissertation investigates the specific factors that drive state action in Canadian
Arctic security policy, particularly in relation to securitization of the Arctic region and
historical factors that influence decision-making. The purpose of this research is to
develop stronger linkages between securitization processes and actual policymaking.
When studying the Arctic as a defined geographical space, we see considerable
differences between Arctic states when it comes to how cultural and historical attachment
to the Arctic region may serve as a selling point for the ability of national governments to
justify allocation of defense resources to their respective publics. Using the Canadian
case, this research illustrates the strength of identity factors when compared to day-to-day
bureaucratic politics and the influence of public opinion. This dissertation does not
follow the ideas of one particular theoretical paradigm, but instead utilizes eclecticism to
better illustrate the depth of the various factors that may contribute to policymaking.
Additionally, the effects of policymaking and securitization processes are measured
through public opinion. The ultimate findings of this research support a hypothesis of
linear identity factors as a major influence on Canadian Arctic security policy, but also
suggest that research on securitization theory needs to better connect rhetorical
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securitization processes to actual policymaking. Through this, the research not only
provides value in using this case as a test for the strengths and limits of securitization
theory, but also emboldens understandings of security policy as being driven by a
combination of domestic policy, foreign policy, endemic historical factors, and
government strategic communication practices.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In August 2007, a group of Russian scientists studying the extent of the Lomonosov
Ridge used a submersible to plant a Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole.
While the event proved to be little more than a publicity stunt, Western media outlets
were quick to see this as a harbinger of a new “resource race” in the Arctic,1 particularly
in the context of the general relationship between Russia and the West at the time. 2 In the
end, this relatively minor incident created greater public attention to the Arctic as a
source of “threat” that required action on the part of Arctic states. This is not to say,
however, that the impact of climate change in the Arctic was not previously understood
and planned for by various governments prior to this incident. Instead, the Russian
“claim” on the North Pole opened up more questions regarding the geopolitical
significance of the region and the various issues that Arctic states ought to address in
developing a strategy for responding to Arctic climate change. Scholars and practitioners

1

This tone was seen in news pieces by major media outlets in covering the Lomsonov Ridge expedition,
both during the expedition itself as well as after the “flag-planting.” Examples of this can be found in Jung
Hwa Song, “Cold War at North Pole?” ABC News, July 31, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=3432208; Jamie Doward, Robin McKie, and Tom Parfitt,
“Russia leads race for North Pole oil,” The Guardian, July 28, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/29/russia.oil; and Doug Struck, “Russia’s Deep-Sea FlagPlanting at North Pole Strikes a Chill in Canada,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2007, accessed April 19,
2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/06/AR2007080601369.html.
Seemingly even-handed descriptions of the event nonetheless contained a suspicious tone of Russian
intentions. As seen in CNN, “Russia plants flag on Arctic floor,” August 4, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/02/arctic.sub.reut/index.html?eref=yahoo, expedition leader
Arthur Chilingarov is described as “pro-Kremlin” while also discussing Russian media descriptions of the
event as potentially “[raising] tension with the United States in a battle for Arctic gas.”
2

Earlier in the year, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech critical of American foreign policy at
the Munich Security Conference that would later be seen as a turning point in souring the RussianAmerican relationship. See Rob Watson, “Putin’s speech: Back to cold war?” BBC News, February 10,
2007, accessed April 19, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm. Just days after the North
Pole flag-planting event, Russia resumed a Cold War practice of undertaking long-range bomber patrols
which included flights over the Arctic.

1

have provided answers to many of these questions as of late, although full understanding
of the political, economic, and social issues facing the region are still under development.
As conceptions of security began to evolve beyond hard materialist concerns
following the end of the Cold War, scholarship tying the natural environment to ideas
about security also began emerging. This, in turn, increased attention to the study of
specific cases in which the effects of climate change could be tied to measurable impacts
on human populations. This has precipitated academic work on developing theoretical
conceptions of the Arctic space and its relationship to real-world security issues. While
the challenges faced by Arctic states have received greater attention on the parts of
governments, non-governmental organizations, and think-tanks, academic communities
devoted to Arctic issues have also begun forming. As such, academic work that addresses
potential security problems in the Arctic in a comprehensive manner has been attempted,
although there are still some areas in which even comprehensive approaches to Arctic
issues are lacking. This is particularly evident when it comes to understanding the more
discursive elements of the issue, such as the ability of governments to draw attention to
and prioritize Arctic security issues within their respective bureaucracies and justify
expenditure of resources on Arctic issues to their national populations. Additionally,
academic work on Arctic security issues has, ironically, straddled the line between “nontraditional” conceptions of security that brought the natural environment into the
discussion in the first place and more “traditional” conceptions that focus on powerbalancing in the region. The manner in which scholarship about the Arctic is taking shape
in many ways mirrors ongoing discussions about how best to frame our understanding of
security and what constitutes “threats.”

2

The particular areas of this issue that this work takes interest in concern the
specific factors that drive state action when it comes to Arctic security matters. In
studying the Arctic as a defined geographical space, we see considerable differences
between Arctic states when it comes to how cultural and historical attachment to the
Arctic region may serve as a “selling point” for the ability of national governments to
justify allocation of defense resources to their respective publics. As such, more
investigation of how national governments promote the allocation of resources to Arctic
security issues both within their respective Arctic regions as well as on a national level
may yield interesting conclusions in explaining government behavior on this issue.
Rather than addressing the Arctic space in its totality, my approach will focus on the
Canadian case. Although several interesting issues could still be discovered by looking
across the Arctic space in general, there are also notable reasons for why I am choosing
this case in particular. Firstly, a narrower focus helps to mitigate the possibility of falling
into the trap of “re-packaging” existing work on the subject matter, even if work on
security issues in the Arctic remains relatively limited in general. Secondly, this case
creates an interesting methodological framework from which we can perhaps draw larger
conclusions about the factors driving state behavior in national security decision-making.
In this dissertation I will approach this subject through three main research
questions. Firstly, how much does Canada identify with the Arctic space on an overall
cultural level? Secondly, how does Canada conceive the region in the context of its own
strategic outlook, and what steps is it taking to address political, economic, and
environmental changes in the Arctic? Thirdly, how does overall national identification
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with the region serve as a driving factor to prioritize Arctic security issues versus simply
acting to protect sovereign territory and natural resources?
The Arctic in Brief
Seen as a region of strategic importance during the Cold War period, the Arctic
Ocean has received increased attention in policy circles in recent years due to recognition
of the potential economic impacts of the region’s warming climate. This has raised
notable areas of concern for states with direct stakes in the region: First, a general
decrease in Arctic ice extent is expected to lead to an increase in available shipping
routes in the coming decades; second, the Arctic seabed is believed to contain an
abundance of key natural resources, which has raised concerns about the potential for
competition and/or conflict in the region. Although states and energy corporations have
paid increased attention to the potential of the Arctic region as a source of oil and gas
wealth, the true extent of this potential still remains under study. An oft-cited 2008 study
by the United States Geological Survey estimated that the region holds approximately
13% of the global share of undiscovered oil, 30% of the global share of undiscovered
natural gas, and 20% of the global share of undiscovered natural gas liquids. 3
How do we define the Arctic region? The simplest answer would be to point to
the territory lying above the Arctic Circle, which sits at roughly 66º 33’N latitude. Some
climatologists, however, favor a definition that better envelops the distinct climatological

United States Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas
Assessed in the Arctic,” 23, 2008, accessed April 19, 2015,
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home#.VTQzrcmtzxQ.
3

4

factors that constitute the Arctic region.4 The differences in opinion about this particular
definition are of little use to this analysis, however. Instead, the main focus of this work
actually rests on the idea that the conception of what the Arctic “is” and “is not” can vary
considerably among the different Arctic states. It is, therefore, more important to
understand who the relevant actors in the region are and how they are responding to the
prospect of Arctic climate change. The variance of actors giving serious attention to the
Arctic as an area of strategic importance range from the eight states with territorial claims
in the region (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the
United States) to non-Arctic states interested in potential resources in the region (China)
to intergovernmental organizations (particularly the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization). Because of this, a true idea of the region’s importance is
still very much a matter of debate.
Of the eight states with territorial claims in the Arctic, we can further distinguish
a group that is often referred to as the “Arctic Five”: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia,
and the United States. What differentiates these five states from the other three is their
holding of both maritime territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Arctic
Ocean.5 Because of mutual interests in addressing climate change in the region, the
Arctic states have increasingly worked through institutions such as the Arctic Council to
develop multilateral, concrete agreements regarding responsible governance of the Arctic

4

An illustration of these two definitions can be found courtesy of the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data
Center at: https://nsidc.org/sites/nsidc.org/files/images//arctic_map.gif (accessed April 21, 2015).
5

Although Iceland technically has a small piece of maritime territory north of the Arctic Circle as well, it is
excluded from this group due to its distance from areas of greater concern found at higher latitudes.

5

space. The most impactful agreement governing use of the Arctic Ocean was agreed to by
the Arctic Five in 2008. Known as the Ilulissat Declaration, the document expressly
dismissed the possibility of developing a standing legal regime regulating the use of the
Arctic Ocean.6 The impact of this document was important for two reasons. First, it set a
tone of cooperation in addressing territorial disputes and in preventing competition over
territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean. Second, it recognized the supremacy of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the supreme legal regime in
dealing with maritime legal issues in the region. This implicitly recognized the Arctic
Ocean as a space generally open to the international community, a precedent that was a
departure from the division of Antarctica under the stewardship of a handful of states in
1959.7
Beyond the resource potential in the Arctic region, the general trend of melting
ice has also led to the likelihood of the increased viability of shipping through the Arctic
Ocean. The opening of such routes would theoretically reduce travel time and costs on
routes from Europe to East Asia and western North America. As such, Arctic states have
begun formulating plans for increased infrastructure development, disaster management,
and facing challenging search-and-rescue operations in order to prepare for an expected
Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans, “The Ilulissat Declaration,” May 28, 2008, accessed April 22,
2015, http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.
6

7

Antarctica is often cited when discussing legal framework development in the Arctic Ocean, not least of
which due to the fact that some commentators have called for a similar regime to the Antarctic Treaty to be
established in the Arctic. Nonetheless, some notable differences—particularly in the fact that Antarctica is
a landmass—make the reversal of the Ilulissat precedent unlikely in the near future. Further discussion on
this comparison can be found in Oran Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the
circumpolar north,” The Polar Record, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2009), p. 73-82, and Rüdiger Wolfrum,
“The Arctic in the Context of International Law,” in, New Chances and New Responsibilities in the Arctic
Region, Georg Witschel, Ingo Winkelmann, Kathrin Tiroch, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Eds. (Berlin: BWV,
2010), p. 37-48.

6

increase in maritime traffic. Although such issues have allowed Arctic states to focus on
practical matters resulting from climate change in the Arctic Ocean, there are also
broader contentions about the status of the shipping lanes that may see increased traffic in
the coming years. The two main routes of note are the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along
Russia’s Arctic coast and the Northwest Passage route that traverses Canada’s northern
fringes (see fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route8

Hugo Ahlenius, “Arctic sea routes-Northern sea route and Northwest passage.” UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Maps and Graphics Library, 2006, accessed April 23, 2015, http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arcticsea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage_f951.
8
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While the NSR falls within Russia’s sovereign territory and EEZ—and thus is not a
matter of dispute—there are disagreements between Canada and other Arctic states about
the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada has had recent disputes with Denmark
and the United States in areas where small islands or resources stand in between
territorial waters recognized under international law.9 Canada has furthermore argued to
the United Nations that its continental shelf extends underneath these areas, which would
give it sovereignty over the Northwest Passage under the UNCLOS.10 Conversely, the
United States has argued that the Northwest Passage constitutes an international
waterway that must remain open to all foreign-flagged ships. These disputes have
remained relatively benign, however, given the shared commercial and security interests
between the involved states.11 Having stated the reasons why the Arctic has gained
greater international attention in recent years, outlining the reasons why the Arctic has
been seen as a matter of international security can now be better understood.
Security issues in the Arctic: Problem or opportunity?
In the past decade, security and defense organizations within Arctic states have
paid increased attention to the Arctic as a potential area of future operations. Despite the
role that the Arctic played during the Cold War in military planning, 12 current political,

Natalia Loukacheva, “Nunavut and Canadian Arctic Sovereignty,” Journal of Canadian Studies 43,
(Spring 2009), p. 87.
9

10

Ibid.

This is outlined in detail in Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde, “Who Controls the Northwest
Passage?” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 2009), p. 1133-1210.
11

12

The impact of the Arctic space on military strategy was seen both in great power tensions (e.g.
adversarial submarine operations by both the U.S. and Soviet Union in the Arctic Ocean) as well as in how
land forces were trained to potentially operate in Arctic conditions (this latter aspect was indeed a mainstay
of defense planning in Scandinavian countries during the Cold War).
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economic, and climatological conditions—not to mention technological advancements in
the last two decades—have nonetheless required security agencies to re-think their
approach to operating in the region. This has raised two questions that often guide
debates about the Arctic security issues: first, is an increased focus on military operations
in the Arctic creating conditions for future conflict, and second, what are the motivations
and priorities that guide Arctic states in creating plans for operating in the Arctic?
The first question is especially important to consider in the context of which
countries constitute the Arctic sphere. Of the eight Arctic states, five are members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while two—Finland and Sweden—were
officially neutral during the Cold War while also generally acting as members of the
Western European sphere. Ultimately, this means that seven of the Arctic states were
strategic adversaries during the Cold War to the eighth state, Russia. As discussed earlier,
such events as the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident made it particularly tempting to
paint the situation in the Arctic as a growing point of contention between Russia and the
other Arctic states. Proponents of this argument point to an apparent increase in Arctic
military exercises as evidence that military tensions are on the rise in the region. 13 These
exercises have taken place across the Arctic space and have been undertaken both
individually and in concert with other states. Russian exercises are often highlighted in

13

This argument is perpetuated more by media and policy research organizations than in traditional
scholarship, as seen in J. Michael Cole, “Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russia Takes the Lead,”
The Diplomat, December 6, 2013, accessed April 25, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/militarizationof-the-arctic-heats-up-russia-takes-the-lead/. Nonetheless, some traditional scholarship has also purported
this viewpoint, particularly in the context of national sovereignty. See Robert Huebert, “Renaissance in
Canadian Arctic Security,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2005-06), p. 17-29.
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Western media as a bombastic sign of Russian intentions to militarize the Arctic space.14
Reporting on Canadian exercises will often note that the operations are undertaken in
order to “assert sovereignty” over the country’s Arctic regions.15 Multinational exercises
such as Cold Response, which has been conducted in Norway on several occasions since
2006, are, unsurprisingly, billed in more muted terms.16 Denmark’s establishment of a
major Arctic-focused military command in 201217 and Russia’s establishment of its own
in 201418 only added to the perception that Arctic states are on a course to conflict.
A deeper investigation of the situation, however, casts doubt on the strength of
this narrative. Despite the attention to Arctic military exercises vis-à-vis the generally
poor strategic relationship between Russia and other Arctic states, activities within
intergovernmental organizations such as the Arctic Council have proven to be generally
positive and productive.19 Moreover, the tremendous challenges posed by operating in the
Arctic have made the idea of military conflict in the region almost unthinkable in the near

Isabelle Mandraud, “Russia prepares for ice-cold war with show of military force in the Arctic,” The
Guardian, October 21, 2014, accessed April 28, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/russia-arctic-military-oil-gas-putin.
14

David Pugliese, “Arctic exercise kicks off today involving Canadian Army, RCN, RCAF, Canadian
Rangers,” Ottawa Citizen, April 1, 2015, accessed April 28, 2015,
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/arctic-exercise-kicks-off-today-involving-canadianarmy-rcn-rcaf-canadian-rangers.
15

Norwegian Armed Forces, “Cold Response: About,” last updated March 7, 2014, accessed April 28,
2015, http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse/Pages/about.aspx.
16

Defence Command Denmark, “Arctic Command,” last updated February 13, 2015, accessed April 28,
2015, http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/ArcticCommand/Pages/ArcticCommand.aspx.
17

TASS, “Russia’s Defense Ministry establishes Arctic Strategic Command,” December 1, 2014, accessed
April 28, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/russia/764428.
18

This argument is outlined in Ekaterina Piskunova, “Russia in the Arctic: What’s lurking behind the
flag?” International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 851-864, and Michael Byers, “Cold Peace:
Arctic cooperation and Canadian foreign policy,” International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p.
899-812.
19
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future. This is already an issue that has been acknowledged by governments in budgetary
terms20 as well as by military officers who have participated in recent Arctic exercises.21
Former Canadian Chief of Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk perhaps summarized it best: "If
someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.” 22
Why, then, is there still a reason to focus on the Arctic as a security problem?
Understanding the threat
Though the analysis laid out here thus far has questioned the idea of a brewing
conventional conflict in the Arctic region, this does not mean that the Arctic is free of
threats or security issues worth addressing. Rather, we must think of the Arctic space not
only on a transnational level, but also on a human level. Although estimates of when the
warming trend in the Arctic will reach a tangible point of significance—such as an icefree summer—are still under debate by climatologists, the reality is that we are likely to
see an increase in human activity in the region in the coming years while also seeing a
change in the environment that people living in the region must endure. Whereas states
must deal with issues such as improving search-and-rescue and law enforcement
functions in the region to meet this expected increase in human activity, they also must
prepare for the probability of significant environmental degradation and a decrease in

David Pugliese, “Polar Challenge: Extreme Conditions Put High Cost on Arctic Operations,” Defense
News, June 10, 2014, accessed April 28. 2015,
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140610/DEFREG02/306100030/Polar-Challenge-ExtremeConditions-Put-High-Cost-Arctic-Operations.
20

Nathan Fry, “Survivability, Sustainability, and Maneuverability: The Need for Joint Unity of Effort in
Implementing the DOD Arctic Strategy at the Tactical and Operational Levels,” Military Review,
November-December 2014, p. 54-62,
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art012.pdf.
21

22

Remarks made to Halifax International Security Forum, November 21, 2009.
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food security for native populations due to the negative impacts of climate change on
animal populations that the natives rely on for subsistence. Ultimately, it may be that
state security is intrinsically linked with the level of actual human security in the region.
One debate in the field of human security is whether international law favors the
security of individuals or the security of states. As Gerd Oberleitner argues, these two
concepts are not mutually exclusive. 23 This argument previously appeared in the 1994
Human Development Report, which sees the security of individuals—regardless of
nationality—as interdependent across borders.24 What this means is that the security of
the state and the security of smaller groups within the state can necessarily intertwine:
regardless of how a smaller group feels about its own status within the larger state, it may
see it necessary to subsume itself within the state’s security apparatus in order to remain
secure against threats external to the state. As Joseph Parent argued, the ability to use the
state as a “protection racket” against outside threats can prove to be a significant
incentive for groups to hold an agreeable position with the state on issues of security. 25
What are the implications for native groups residing in the Arctic space when we
think of the region’s security in these terms? The first issue is one of state protection.
Because of the aforementioned implications of maintaining a presence in Arctic affairs,
states with a stake in the Arctic issue undoubtedly would include protecting citizens in
their Arctic regions as part of their Arctic policies. Not only do they do this out of the

Gerd Oberleitner, “Human security and human rights,” European Training and Research Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy Occasional Paper Series, Issue 8 (June 2002), p. 8.
23

24

1994 United Nations Human Development Report, p. 22.

Joseph Parent, “Institutions, identity, and unity: The anomaly of Australian nationalism,” Studies in
Ethnicity and Nationalism Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 2007), p. 8.
25
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responsibility to protect their own citizens, but it also gives states a legitimate means to
remain engaged with the issue. By directly addressing the concept of the individual (or
relatively small groups within their borders), the state can justify political posturing,
bolstering of security forces in these regions, and other acts of sovereignty through the
internationally-sanctioned right to protect one’s citizens. The second issue is how the
day-to-day lives of individuals will be affected with an increased focus on Arctic
protection activities. On the one hand, military build-up in the region can serve as a
means to bolster rural villages that are otherwise devoid of major economic investment. 26
On the other hand, the environmental impacts of increased activity in the Arctic can have
detrimental effects on these regions in the long-term. Increased activity in the Arctic
regions—be it commercial or government—would undoubtedly affect the natural
environment that many Arctic residents rely upon either through over-fishing or
environmental degradation from industrial activity. 27 Though the Arctic is not alone in
these issues, a variety of meteorological phenomena make the Arctic particularly
susceptible to environmental degradation. The exponential effects of pollution in these
regions have also been measured to affect the build-up of certain toxins in residents’
bodies.28 These implications create a mixed view as to whether significant state
investments in Arctic sovereignty activities will be positive or negative in the long-term.

26

Barry Scott Zellen, On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty, (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), p. 59.
David Balton and Kjartan Hoydal, “Policy Options for Arctic Environmental Governance,” Arctic
Transform, March 5, 2009, accessed April 29, 2015, http://arctic-transform.org/download/FishEX.pdf.
27

Melissa A. Verhaag, “It is not too late: The need for a comprehensive treaty to protect the Arctic
environment,” Georgetown Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 2003), p. 559-61.
28
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Bridging the gap: The purpose and value of this research
What are the merits of choosing the Arctic as the subject of analysis in the first place?
From a pragmatic standpoint, academic research on policies related to climate change is
emerging as a popular topic within the field of international relations, due both to the
increasing relevance of the topic in policy circles as well as increased attention to nontraditional aspects of security. The Arctic also serves as one of the best cases for
understanding the real-world consequences of climate change and how they relates to
security studies.
In order to serve as an original contribution to the field, there must be some
understanding of how my research differs from other aspects of research on Arctic
security issues. Although recent scholarship taking a comprehensive approach on Arctic
security issues has been attempted,29 much of this has focused primarily on real-world
aspects of the issue while giving only superficial attention to the relationship between
identity and security. In effect, current scholarship on the region has served as a solid
foundation for understanding the main issues facing the Arctic states (as I summarized
above) while leaving room for more theoretical development on understanding the factors
that drive action in addressing these issues. Additionally, my work will help to build upon
literature that has connected the role of general discourse about the Arctic to
prioritization of Arctic security issues specifically. 30 Unlike existing literature, however, I

29

Recent examples include James Kraska, Ed., Arctic Security in An Age of Climate Change (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 2013), and Zellen, The Fast Changing Arctic.
An example of this can be seen in Leif Christian Jensen, “Seduced and surrounded by security: A poststructuralist take on Norwegian High North securitizing discourses,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 48,
No. 1 (March 2013), p. 80-99.
30
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will provide a bridge to how discourse may drive action rather than only explain its role
in raising the issue as a potential priority for governments.
This work also has applications to the field of international relations in general
that go beyond the Arctic case or the two countries being studied here. While cultural and
identity-based explanations of national security decision-making have received
significant attention since the end of the Cold War,31 this work will also highlight how
seemingly regional issues within states can be brought to the attention of the national
populace as a significant matter of national security. Given differing opinions between
regions within a state on how to prioritize various issues of national importance, greater
understanding of the dynamics that drive security issue prioritization based upon the
amalgamation of these preferences on a national level may prove particularly interesting.
My research will therefore place significant emphasis on balancing how cultural issues on
both a regional and national level influence larger decision-making.
Ultimately, one of the main goals of this project will be to develop better
understandings of agenda-setting in the context of Arctic security. By this I am referring
to identifying how key players in Canada on this issue—be it political leaders or
particular aspects of the bureaucracies themselves—have managed to raise the security
issues facing the Arctic to a higher level of prioritization in national decision-making.
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Existing international relations literature does provide some tools to work with along
these lines, although it also makes the temptation to answer all questions regarding the
strategic value of the Arctic region stronger. The problem with taking such an approach is
that it would likely result in vague answers to many questions rather than theoretically
strong answers to a handful of questions. As discussed above, I have identified three
questions to be addressed in this research. Additionally, applying major paradigms of
international relations to this case leads to a complex theoretical intersection that appears
to speak to all perspectives. I do not approach this topic with the goal of trying to explain
behavior through the tenets of a single paradigm. Indeed, this analysis will intertwine
several components of competing paradigms to holistically explain behavior among
involved actors, particularly when it comes to issues of power and interest (realism) and
having a national identity that is strongly connected to the region (constructivism). This is
not to say that the conclusions reached here may not arguably fall more within the bounds
of one paradigm rather than others; instead, the approach taken here is cognizant of the
fact that explanatory power on this subject matter may lie more with eclecticism than
with a single paradigm. Such an approach is influenced by existing work on eclecticism
in international relations32 as well as in security studies specifically. 33
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This work is also influenced by the securitization approach advanced by the
Copenhagen School. Because of this work’s focus on the role that elite interests play in
framing the Arctic as a significant security issue that requires the immediate attention of
the national security bureaucracy, the securitization approach will prove rather useful to
further understanding how national governments “sell” the idea of an Arctic security
“problem” to their respective publics. Furthermore, this will open up our discussions of
Arctic security issues to include more investigation of the range of voices that actually
precipitate action on Arctic matters in the form of security practices. Although I have
given brief mention to the human security angle that is most immediately threatened by
climate change in the Arctic, this work will serve to demonstrate how government
prioritization of Arctic security issues in the two case countries is actually more of a “topdown” phenomenon than vice versa. While several factors play into the creation of this
dynamic, it also must be understood that some of the terms that scholars have used to
categorize the interactions that influence thinking about security are very much fluid
concepts: that is, we are still developing understandings of what these concepts actually
mean and encompass. By incorporating existing literature on securitization and other
approaches, this work will not simply regurgitate a line of dogmatic thinking about
security, rather, it will seek to enhance how these terms are employed.
Understanding securitization and the rise of “environmental security”
The quintessential work on securitization theory came at a time when the
expanding definition of the term “security” created much consternation among those who
favored more “traditional” understandings of security. In contrast to traditionalists who
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saw the expansion of security as problematic at the end of the Cold War,34 the
development of the securitization approach by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde was guided
by the view that security studies needed to evolve beyond explaining security only in
terms of military force.35 In constructing securitization, the authors moved beyond seeing
security issues as being the targets of politicization, and instead wanted to describe the
process that occurs when politicized security issues are elevated to a level of importance
that supersedes normal political rules. The crucial point here is that for a securitization
process to occur, there must be an actual speech act (or series of such) that elevates a
given referential object to a position of existential threat.36 This is an important
distinction to make as securitization theory speaks to how a problem is elevated to a
position of threat, but not necessarily to the means that the government will use in order
to respond to this threat. When understanding how securitization theory applies to this
analysis, it must be recognized that the key point is to understand how the respective
governments frame the issue, rather than how successful they are in taking coherent
action on the issue when having to operationalize their security agenda within the
national bureaucracy. 37

See Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35,
No. 2 (June 1991), p. 213, and Robert Jervis, “Security Studies: Ideas, Policy and Politics,” in The
Evolution of Political Knowledge, Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International
Politics, Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson, Eds. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 2004), p.
106-107.
34

35

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner:
Boulder, 1998), p. 4.
36

Ibid., 23-26.

37

Rita Floyd refers to this problem by extending the logic of securitization to understand why a referent
object is securitized in the first place and who, if anyone, benefits from doing so. See Rita Floyd, Security

18

The natural environment was also given specific attention in constructing the
securitization approach.38 What separates the natural environment from other aspects of
securitization is the relationship between scientific communities and the political actors
that result to securitizing moves. Because of their ability to analyze complex sets of data
in a way that most of the political establishment or general population cannot, the
scientific community is theoretically given significant power in state decisions on
environmental matters. This has particularly been the case in recent years, according to
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, given a higher standard of proof required by international
actors. Interestingly, increased demands for this level of proof are actually the key source
of strength for the scientific community, who are given the task of “reducing uncertainty”
in the face of increased political attention on environmental matters.39 This theoretical
explanation, of course, does not always prove true in the realms of normal political
operations.40 The equilibrium between theory and reality when looking at this in
securitization terms therefore lies in how political actors (and, indirectly, the scientific
community) are able to raise the natural environment as a referent object for a

and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy (New York: Cambridge
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securitizing move both in the case of significant disasters (e.g., the 1986 Chernobyl
accident) or in longer-term threats to the overall human condition (i.e., the question of
whether human civilization itself must alter its activities in order to mitigate the threats
posed by climate change).41
Additional work on the securitization concept has also expanded the ways in
which we can apply securitization across levels of analysis that in turn helps to clarify the
transnational impact of the Arctic issue. Although the development of securitization
theory opened the door to a number of interesting modes of analysis for understanding
how political leaders shape discourse on security issue prioritization through the use of
speech acts, it also became evident that further comprehension of the contexts created by
these initial definitions was necessary. Constituting climate change as an overarching
threat brings the securitization process to a higher level of analysis (unlike the original
conception, which existed as a “middle-range” construct between policymakers and their
domestic audience42), which can be described as “macrosecuritization.” The
distinguishing factor here is the ability of the threat to be universalized across a portion of
the global population rather than just by the citizens of a single state. Although
macrosecuritization refers to the overarching process of constituting the threat,
acceptance of the threat across regions is also aided by the existence of trans-regional
“security constellations” that can build commonalities between otherwise disparate
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regions.43 This may prove especially useful given the scope of analysis here: The Arctic
“threat” is trans-regional but how states respond to the issue is also guided by how their
own territory or region is impacted. The macrosecuritization and security constellation
frameworks thus offer a possible route to comprehending the sometimes difficult problem
of traversing multiple levels of analysis within the securitization concept.
Beyond the securitization angle, the field of environmental security itself began
receiving greater attention following the end of the Cold War. Much of this was due to a
general shift toward greater understandings of “non-traditional” security studies during
this time, but it was also representative of real-world events that caused scholars to
wonder how the natural environment fit into the realm of security studies, if at all.
Influential works that laid the foundation for environmental security during this time,
such as those by Thomas Homer-Dixon44 and Robert Kaplan,45 were very much
influenced by armed conflicts within and between lesser-developed countries during the
1980s and 1990s. In these terms, environmental security was not only framed as the
means by which climate change and environmental degradation affected the basic needs
of individuals, but also how such changes—and the expected worsening of these
conditions—would ultimately lead to scarcity-driven conflicts at the state level.46 Kaplan
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would go as far to refer to the natural environment as a “hostile power” that would
become “the national-security issue of the twenty-first century.”47 Such framing of the
issue in these terms is interesting for two reasons. First, it was largely—although not
exclusively—tied to the lesser-developed world. This was understandable given the
abundance of inter- and intrastate conflicts in poorer states around the end of the Cold
War, although the threat was also quickly understood to be a “civilizational” problem that
affected the developed world as well.48 The second, and more pressing issue, however,
was how the actual “threat” from the natural environment was constructed. Although the
initial foundations of environmental security departed from traditional security studies in
describing the threat to individuals—rather than the state—the argument quickly circled
back to how states needed to respond to this threat, or even how changes in the natural
environment would increasingly serve as a catalyst for conflict between states.
Differentiating human security from environmental security may indeed speak to this
dynamic: whereas human security conceptions focused on the individual as the referent
object, environmental security began to be a matter of threat to the state. 49 This
distinction is important as it helps to recognize the importance of political actors pointing
to threats emanating from the natural environment in the first place.
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Identity-building and the Arctic security community
When considering the impact of identity and cultural factors on decision-making,
it is worth discussing exactly how the term “identity” applies to the case at hand. From a
paradigmatic standpoint, identity as a causal factor is generally associated with the
constructivist approach. Superficially, some constructivist literature would be relevant to
this analysis in that it discusses the state feeling the “need” to uphold a given identity
construct.50 At the same time, better connections between identity, interest, and foreign
policy development can also be found in neo-classical realist literature in being described
as a “cartelization” process.51 The diversity of theorizing about the power of identity does
provide this analysis with many existing concepts on which to build, but it also confirms
the use of analytical eclecticism as the best frame of reference for this case. Because of
this, it is also best to determine the specific manner in which identity constructs are
applicable to this analysis, rather than delving into the complexities of the term “identity”
at large.
Incorporating identity concepts here requires understanding the term at two levels
of analysis. First, there need to be understandings of how identity is developed at the state
level. Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” concept is relevant here as it
identifies how concepts of nationhood based upon a given set of political borders are
continually reinforced through societal identification with a “deep, horizontal
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comradeship” regardless of individual social status. 52 The crux of the “imagination” of
this community, however, is the means by which the development of the community
takes place through language. The modern state was, in many cases, imagined through
the development of a given set of vernacular understandings that were mass produced to
develop ideas about what the national community stood for. 53 If we apply the “imagined
communities” concept to this case, we can develop ideas about how society in each state
develops understandings of what the nation “is” and “is not.”
The second level of analysis is found at the transnational level. The first work to
give attention to the political ramifications of a changing Arctic after the Cold War
generally focused on the development of discourse, regimes, and institutions that helped
to bring attention to the issues facing the Arctic.54 The habitual use of the word regimes
in this literature, I would argue, also created some interesting precedents in how the
Arctic was analyzed further. Rather than using this word interchangeably with such
words as “norms,” viewing Arctic politics as a “regime” implied that the Arctic was a
coherent space that required substantive governing. As such, the Arctic was increasingly
viewed as a transnational community that was in need of regular, cooperative caretaking
from the Arctic states. Despite positive ideas about Arctic regimes and governance
emerging during this period, it was only very recently that more specific attention was
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given to the security aspects of the issue.55 When envisioning how Arctic states approach
their own Arctic territory, we therefore must be considerate of the fact that this territory is
also part of a larger, transnational space that has been managed with an evolving set of
multinational regimes.
Along these lines, it is also quite possible that Canada is on the verge of forming a
distinctive Arctic identity that is representative of how the Arctic specifically contributes
to its national fabric. The impact of this idea is in how states effectively use the Arctic as
a means to further larger foreign policy goals. In the case of Canada, the Arctic is used as
a vehicle for emboldening national conceptions of sovereignty. This goal then elevates
the Arctic to a level of significant importance in how Canada develops its overall security
and foreign policy priorities. As such, the Arctic could ultimately become a cornerstone
of the country’s holistic identity. Identifying the potential existence of such a construct in
the course of this analysis would prove to be an interesting addition to our understanding
of how national-level factors work intersubjectively with transnational factors in creating
a conception of the Arctic space.
The final framework that is of particular application here is the notion of security
community. The most significant definition of the term “security community” was
undertaken by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s as a means to describe a social dynamic
between groups in which there were mutual understandings of the need to avoid physical
conflict between each other. Contrary to a realpolitik explanation of the absence of war
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between groups—or more commonly, states—members of the community were bound to
avoid violence by some underlying set of core values. 56 Adler and Barnett built upon this
concept by seeing the security community framework as a means to move past the divide
between political realists and institutionalists.57 What is most interesting about recent
work on security communities, however, is how it frames the concept of peace within a
given security community. Although peaceful security communities such as post-World
War II Western Europe were built around shared norms and institutions, “peace” in this
context must also be understood as “absence of war.”58 This understanding of security
community has interesting applications to the Arctic space given the players involved. On
the one hand, Arctic states have proved to be generally cooperative on Arctic matters and
have put significant energy into creating institutions that address shared problems across
the Arctic space. On the other hand, the general geopolitical tensions between Russia and
other Arctic states does leave open the possibility of a decline in the otherwise positive
dynamic that exists in Arctic political spheres. As such, the cementing of the Arctic as, at
the very least, a permanently “non-war” security community would protect the region
from the generally negative dynamics that underline the relationship between Russia and
the West. While interstate relations in the Arctic region may not provide cause for worry
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in the short-term, seeing the region as falling within this version of security community in
the future is certainly something worth considering.
Connecting theory and practice
Having outlined the theoretical constructs that influence this research, it is worth
considering how my research will add further to these discussions. As noted earlier, one
of the more problematic questions for the Copenhagen School is connecting rhetoric to
action. That is, what is the purpose of giving thought to how governments or other
influential actors frame a security issue if they ultimately do not precipitate tangible
action on said issue? This question is perhaps best answered by understanding the idea of
security practices, which bridges the movement from discourse to action on a given
issue. Lene Hansen has offered useful discussion along these lines in explaining how
policy and identity are constructed as mutually constitutive when it comes to developing
foreign policy. This does not mean that identity and policy cannot be separated; instead,
“adjustments” to stabilize the equilibrium between the two occur if the identity or group
of policies begin to drift away from the norm.59 Unlike policy, however, there is less of a
conscious process in defining identity. As such, the extent to which identity influences
policy cannot truly be understood as a direct process, but rather as a factor that combines
with external constraints (e.g., material capabilities or bureaucratic dynamics) to
ultimately influence policy decisions. 60
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A problem that arises with this is how we quantify the role of agency within
structural processes when it comes to foreign policy development. As noted by Vincent
Pouliot, rational processes have not always offered adequate answers to how actors solve
practical problems when forced to act immediately. 61 Subsequently, there is also the
question of where a sense of “practice” comes from in the first place: Is it simply another
word for norms or do we need to give more thought to whether the process of enabling
policy is something distinct in itself? Pouliot sees the key as being the degree of “implicit
learning” that is regularly replicated by those in positions of power. In other words,
practices are built because they are shown over time to work, which, as Pouliot argues,
has led to the sustained dominance of realpolitik thinking among practitioners.62 What
this focus on security practices means for the purposes of this analysis is understanding
how influential identity factors are to actual policy outcomes in light of the existence of
other processes. The goal here is, therefore, not to make the argument that other factors—
such as economic pressures or even material security concerns—do not play a noticeable
role in policy processes. Instead, the argument presented here is expected to explain how
agenda-setters in the country studied have played upon identity factors in order to raise
the profile of Arctic security issues. Although significant attention to Arctic security
issues has only been ongoing for less than a decade, sufficient time has nonetheless
passed in order to be able to evaluate whether discursive attention to the issue has
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resulted in tangible results in action (and even to determine what factors have driven this
action).
In addition to the factors discussed above, the methodological value of this
particular case selection offers interesting opportunities to understand the development of
identity factors within a given state as they relate to security matters. The selection of this
case not only gives us the ability to demonstrate how a regional issue has arguably
become enveloped within national identity but also to dig deeper into the nuances of how
these identity factors are reified and guided by national policymaking.
Aside from incorporating previously discussed theoretical literature, analysis of
relevant literature related to the case country will remain focused on government policy
documents (particularly their respective national Arctic strategies) as well as relevant
news reporting of recent events related to the case. In order to build better understanding
of how identity plays a role in how Canada approaches the issue, there will also be
incorporation of historical analysis of past policy and attitudes that may give insight to
present-day behavior. Beyond simply tying the Arctic region to modern conceptions of
security, there first needs to be a deeper understanding of how Arctic-identity formed in
the country over time. This understanding goes beyond the security aspect of the Arctic
and points to how Canada raised the issue of the Arctic as a space needing attention,
albeit for environmental or social reasons.
Plan of research
The next three chapters will serve as the empirical basis for this study. In the
second chapter, I give a detailed overview of the evolution of Canadian Arctic policy
since major Arctic expeditions began taking place in the late 19 th century. This chapter
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also shows how Canadian agenda-setters—particularly senior government officials—
have used the Arctic as a means to reinforce Canadian conceptions of national
sovereignty in modern times. This includes discussion of the region’s critical role in
Canadian security and defense policy during the Cold War. Overall, this chapter makes
the argument that the Arctic has been consistently intertwined with Canadian ideas of
sovereignty to build up the region as being an existential part of national identity.
The third chapter discusses how Canada’s post-Cold War Arctic security policy is
representative of and guided by these underlying notions of national identity. Of
particular interest here is to give further insight to the degree to which recent policy is
actually a representation of underlying identity factors rather than an agenda being
shaped only by current agenda-setters or short-term interests. This is a particularly
interesting notion to address given political disputes about who is actually driving
Canadian security policy in the Arctic.63
The fourth chapter analyzes public opinion and media responses to Canadian
Arctic security policy during the Stephen Harper era. This chapter provides additional
empirical weight to measuring how the securitization process resonated in Canadian
society and also shows how the media acted as a significant player in the securitization
process in itself. Additionally, this chapter helps to highlight how Arctic politics fit into
Canadian politics generally, and whether this period of time showed new trends in how
the issue will be prioritized in the future.
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The fifth and concluding chapter evaluates the conclusions reached in the three
empirical chapters and offers possible connections between this research and further
scholarship on security discourse and security practices.
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Chapter 2: Building a Canadian Arctic identity
Identifying early influences in building the Canadian conception of the Arctic
includes recognition of the social and economic dynamics in Canada in the 19 th century.
As Canada was still colonized under British rule during this time, it meant that attempts
to traverse northward were guided by European beliefs of limitless economic potential in
the largely untouched frontiers of the known world. This further introduced two
important factors that guide our understanding of the exploration of the Canadian Arctic:
first, the general wonderment of the pristine frontier that presented itself to those willing
to explore it, and second, the impact on native peoples and the natural environment that
were affected by British Canada’s increased presence in the region. The combination of
these two factors created a strong sense of otherness in the early Canadian psyche when it
came to envisioning the Arctic, a tradition that was ultimately passed down to “southern”
Canadian society as it achieved sovereign independence. To this day, the understanding
of the North as a distinct entity is not only recognized in current societal rhetoric and
government policy, but also shares the sense of awe that captivated the early explorers of
the region.
Although exploration of the Canadian Arctic did not begin in earnest until the
mid-1800s, European colonization in Canada over the two centuries prior had already
created a burgeoning trading regime based upon competition for the colony’s vast
resources. The interests of British and French fur traders led them to continually seek out
new areas of resources via the territory’s seemingly endless network of rivers and lakes.
By the 18th century, traders had effectively wiped out certain animal populations along
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the east coast and St. Lawrence River.64 Because of this, European merchants
increasingly came into frequent contact with native tribes as they ventured further into
previously unexplored lands. The relationship with native peoples during this time was
dichotomous: on the one hand, their knowledge of the geography in regions previously
unexplored by Europeans proved invaluable as British explorers pushed closer to the
Arctic in the early 19th century. On the other hand, elements of the Royal Navy were less
aware of the natives’ expertise, instead utilizing their own methods in exploring the
region.65 The main goal during this period was to discover the possible existence of the
long-theorized Northwest Passage route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As a
result, the means of exploring the Arctic were driven both by a rivalry of sorts amongst
the different British interests themselves—particularly between fur traders and the Royal
Navy—as well as larger British goals of controlling trade in the region in contrast to
other countries.66
Under the direction of Sir John Barrow, the second secretary of the Admiralty,
Britain ambitiously worked to ensure maritime dominance of the Arctic. Although
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historians consider Barrow to be the grand architect of Arctic exploration during this
time,67 the explorer who would gain the most fame for his exploits would be Sir John
Franklin. While Franklin would participate in the initial 1818 expeditions that set the tone
for British Arctic exploration in the coming decades, it was not success during that time
that brought him to the forefront of the public eye.68 On the contrary, Franklin’s
expedition from 1818-21 proved disastrous, as did a second expedition from 1825-27.
Franklin’s fame, interestingly enough, was buoyed by these failures: as it turned out, the
idea of an explorer bumbling his way through a forbidding landscape provided for an
entertaining narrative back home.69 Such failures would only foreshadow what was to
come for Franklin as attempts to map the Arctic coastline continued during the 1830s.
Although much of the Canadian Arctic was explored and mapped during this time,
expeditions failed to find the final link that would prove the existence of a true Northwest
Passage. Seeking to remedy this, the Admiralty called upon Franklin to undertake what
would be his final mission.70 Launched in May 1845 using the ironclad vessels Erebus
and Terror, Franklin’s expedition was tasked with the mission of finding the missing link
that had bedeviled European explorers for centuries prior.
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After failing to hear from Franklin’s expedition by the summer of 1847, British
officials became concerned about the welfare of the crew. By the end of the year, the
Admiralty was convinced that Franklin and his crew were in dire straits, and began
preparations to send a search party the following summer. 71 It was not until 1854 that the
fate of Franklin and his crew was finally discovered: an expedition led by John Rae made
contact with Inuit villagers who had come across possessions and remains of Franklin’s
crew, even alleging that the longest surviving crewmembers may have resulted to
cannibalism to head off starvation.72 Further investigations during the 1850s and onward
slowly pieced together what transpired during the doomed expedition. Franklin himself
was discovered to have died in June 1847.
Franklin’s expedition was ultimately befallen by becoming lodged in ice while
seeking the connecting piece in the Northwest Passage—and thus resulting in the crew
eventually succumbing to sickness or starvation73—with the drama of piecing together
the story of the expedition taking on a mythical character in itself. As the details of
Franklin’s ill-fated mission emerged over time, the legend that developed around
Franklin during his first forays into the Arctic—that of a man taking on the harshest
conditions on Earth for the sake of human exploration—transformed into a sort of
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martyrdom for the cause. This was certainly helped by the saga of finding the remains of
the expedition in the first place—his wife’s pleas to authority and financing of her own
expeditions to find him, not to mention the adulation of such high-profile figures as
Charles Dickens, created this image almost immediately74--and also by the role that the
events of 1845-47 would take on as a heroic narrative in the early formation of modern
Canadian identity.
The initial emergence of a nationalist interpretation of the Franklin expedition in
the 20th century was likely due to Canadian desires to assert sovereignty over its Arctic
frontiers. Unlike during the time of the Franklin expedition, Canada’s transition to the
status of British dominion in 1867 now meant that it been developing its own attitudes
relative to the world around it. This is an interesting point when we compare what had
transpired over the previous century: whereas the British Admiralty’s failures in the
Arctic were often pointed to as being a result of an imperial culture that chose
expansionism over caution,75 Canada now had the opportunity to establish an Arctic
policy that was independent of the whims of the British Empire. This did not mean that
Canada at the turn of the 20th century was any less tenacious about the need to stake its
claim in the Arctic, however. Following the election of Wilfred Laurier to the office of
Canadian Prime Minister in 1896, the Canadian government showed increasing concern
about its assertive American neighbor, whose expansionist ideals included looking
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northward toward the Arctic.76 This was also coming at a time when renewed interest in
the Arctic was occurring at a global scale, not least due Norwegian Roald Amundsen’s
1905 transit of the Northwest Passage, the first successful maritime navigation of the
entire route. The Canadian perspective at this time was therefore more driven by concerns
about the geopolitical threats to the country’s sovereignty that were posed by this new
period of Arctic exploration, rather than being driven by any attachment to the region on
a historical level. It was as a result of this time period, however, that conceptions about
Canadian Arctic sovereignty began to take shape.
The chief concern for the Canadians was the possibility of American incursions in
Hudson Bay and the Arctic archipelago. Beginning in 1906, the government sent Captain
Joseph-Elzèar Bernier to enforce fishing and whaling tariff regulations in the region as a
means of demonstrating Canada’s commitment to protecting its sovereignty in the Arctic.
Bernier demonstrated a particular zeal for the mission, and began claiming Arctic islands
under the Canadian flag in several trips through 1911. Although these expressions of
sovereignty went mostly unchallenged, there is some debate as to how receptive the
government was to Bernier’s “island-hopping” method of enforcing sovereignty. 77
Regardless of this, Bernier’s voyages created a precedent demonstrating that Canada was
willing to enforce its Arctic claims.
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The more famous embodiment of Canadian Arctic sovereignty would come soon
after under the direction of Vilhjalmur Stefansson. Born in Manitoba and raised in North
Dakota by Icelandic parents, Stefansson was influenced both by the intellectual curiosity
of his parents as well as the frontier lifestyle that he experienced as a child. Although
entering Harvard at the turn of the 20th century as a divinity student, Stefansson instead
switched to study anthropology, following a budding interest in the works of Herbert
Spencer and Charles Darwin.78 Stefansson’s desire to investigate his ancestral homeland
led him to Iceland in 1903. Despite losing interest in Arctic pursuits following this trip,
an offer to take part in the Anglo-American Polar Expedition in 1906 would lead him to
rediscover the possibility of satisfying his intellectual curiosity in the region. 79 Originally
expected to link up with the expedition’s ship at a seaside village in the Yukon following
an overland journey, Stefansson instead found himself stranded among Eskimo villagers.
This experience led Stefansson to live among the Eskimos and adapt to their way of life.
Having become disillusioned with the Anglo-American expedition during this time,
Stefansson left in August 1907. 80
The importance of noting this element of Stefansson’s experience not only sets
the tone for understanding the value of his more famous expedition in the ensuing years,
but also to demonstrate how his individual experiences would impact the legacy that he
left on Canada’s northern experience. Stefansson’s major expedition on behalf of
Canadian interests was launched in 1913. The irony of this was that Stefansson’s personal
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identification as a Canadian was unclear. After all, his family had moved to the United
States shortly after Stefansson’s birth, something that was not lost on Stefansson in his
adult life.81 Stefansson additionally needed to reclaim his Canadian citizenship as an
adult, as his father’s naturalization as an American citizen in the 1880s had nullified the
younger Stefansson’s ability to claim Canadian citizenship through birth.82 Stefansson’s
previous forays into the Arctic—both as part of the Anglo-American expedition as well
as a second trip from 1908-12—had also received financial support from American
institutions as a result of his academic connections in the United States.
Regardless of Stefansson’s personal inclinations about his nationality, 83 the
Canadian government sought to give Stefansson financial backing in return for an
expedition that would be unquestionably Canadian. Having been granted some funds
from American institutions for an ethnological expedition in 1913, though still falling
short of the total needed, Stefansson turned to Canada for additional help. The Canadian
government agreed to fully fund the expedition provided that Stefansson drop his
American backers and instead pursue the operation as a Canadian expedition. This also
shifted the purpose of the mission, which now included claiming newly discovered lands
as Canadian territory. 84 Though the Canadian government may have demonstrated a
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mixed reaction toward Bernier’s expeditions a few years earlier, concerns about foreign
incursions in Canada’s Arctic claims had not wholly withered. The outbreak of major war
in Europe the following year only further bolstered general Canadian anxiety about being
able to protect its claims. The context of the war was not lost on Stefansson. Ending his
expedition and beginning a series of lectures in the fall of 1918, the explorer built on the
victorious feelings occurring in Canada at this time to shape his travels in the Arctic as
being part of a Canadian “destiny” to further develop its northern lands.85
The five-year expedition itself would end up having a tremendous impact on how
Canadian views of Arctic sovereignty were shaped going forward. Although the
expedition experienced early trauma,86 Stefansson’s expedition was ultimately successful
in answering a number of questions about unknown geographical features in the Arctic as
well as generally asserting Canadian sovereignty interests.87 Stefansson’s work was not
completed in 1918, however. Stefansson was increasingly concerned about Denmark’s
intentions in the Arctic, seeing recent actions near Greenland as evidence of a concerted
Danish effort to challenge Canada’s sovereignty claims. Stefansson’s viewpoint was
initially shared by bureaucrat J.B. Harkin, who pushed this concern in government circles
in 1920. However, Harkin would become increasingly suspicious of Stefansson’s actual
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motivations for raising the alarm against the Danes.88 Stefansson had also long wanted to
annex Wrangel Island under Canadian control, a fairly dubious idea given its proximity to
the Soviet Union. Following a failed attempt to establish a presence on the island,
resulting in the death of four members of Stefansson’s team, the Canadian government
was ready to be finished with the explorer.89 Despite this, Harkin and others concerned
about the potential Danish threat were able to convince new prime minister Mackenzie
King, who came to power in 1922, that Canada needed to reinforce its sovereign claims
over areas that might be of interest to the Danes, particularly Ellesmere Island. The
importance of this moment was less about the actual policies and players and more about
their impact. As the government instituted a series of summer Arctic patrols from 192225, public perceptions were soon shaped into the idea that there was, indeed, a significant
threat from Denmark to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. In reality, this was not actually the
case. Nonetheless, the perception that Canada’s Arctic interests were constantly under
threat from outside actors had taken hold.90
What should be clear by this point is the that the legacy of these expeditions not
only helped to create a national narrative for Canada as it moved toward independence
from Great Britain in 1931,91 but that the narrative also took on a life of its own beyond
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the actual events of various Arctic expeditions. Although the expeditions were able to
make an immediate impact on their future legacy in some respects, the weaving of the
Arctic into the Canadian national fabric was also not something that necessarily occurred
immediately. Instead, the process of bringing more understanding to the Canadian Arctic
was indeed intertwined with attempts to better define the meaning of Canadian
nationhood. The first comprehensive work that addressed the Franklin expedition came
through Richard Lambert’s 1949 book Franklin of the Arctic. In this book, Lambert did
not shy away from criticizing Franklin per se, but nonetheless continued the theme of
building the Arctic as a forbidding environment that would not have been understood if
not for the courage of explorers such as Franklin. In short, Franklin was understood to be
a hero because he attempted to brave the Arctic, regardless of his various follies along the
way that, as later historical analysis would show, arguably could have been foreseen prior
to his disastrous final expedition.92 Although Lambert’s book was by no means the first
to build a heroic mythology around Canadian expeditions in the Arctic,93 his book reintroduced the potential value of the Arctic as a foundation on which to build a positive,
nationalistic Canadian ideal.
As previously touched upon, there was a parallel narrative occurring at this time
as well. The championing of the Arctic within the Canadian cultural narrative also caused
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its proponents to highlight the divisions between Canadian accomplishments in the Arctic
and the British interests that had initially undertaken them. This resulted in a narrative
that acknowledged the British role as being a key part of the Canadian Arctic chronology
while also seeking to highlight a distinctive Canadian understanding of the region. As
such, the British were commended for taking the initiative of exploring the region, but the
Canadian approach to the Arctic was seen as more appreciative of the expertise of native
peoples in operating and surviving in the region’s forbidding elements.94 On a cultural
level, Canada was certainly finding opportunities to highlight the Arctic as an intrinsic
part of its young nationhood.
By the early 1930s, Canada’s efforts to assert its sovereignty over Arctic claims
had seemingly paid off. Other Arctic states began to accept Canada’s claims in the
region—the lone exception being the United States, which nonetheless did not mount a
substantive challenge to Canada in this respect. This acceptance also changed the way in
which Canada could approach its Arctic space,95 as well as causing some cognitive
dissonance on the parts of Canadian policymakers. No longer needing to publicize
perceived threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, there was some concern that continued
focus on the Arctic would make the country seem like nothing more than a frozen, barren
landscape to foreign economic interests. There may have also been declining interest on
the public’s part on the topic, although those with an interest in promoting Arctic
exploits—particularly those who had explored the region—continued to produce a variety
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of media and cultural products related to their experiences. As such, the issue of
Canadian Arctic sovereignty was not going unnoticed by the public, even if there was not
a conscious prioritization of the region in national political discussions.96 Such a dynamic
is important to note: although the public may not have placed significant weight to the
Arctic in terms of the political priorities that regularly affected them at this time, general
awareness of the issue nonetheless made it easier for government officials to point to
Arctic sovereignty matters as a grave threat when needed.
Having solidified its claims over the Arctic space, Canada was now faced with the
question of what to do with the territory. The focus on the Arctic was now moving from a
matter of sovereignty to a matter of responsibility. What this meant in practical terms was
increasing the level of access to the northern territories as well as the overall welfare of
Inuit natives living in the Arctic. In the early 20th century, the value of white fox fur pelts
rose significantly, setting off a new boom in Arctic fur trading. The largest trading
operation was run by the Hudson’s Bay Company, which had long been involved in the
region. The Canadian government soon realized that increased economic activities in the
region were having a potentially adverse effect on Inuit populations, not least of which
due to the potential for affecting their access to their food supplies. The Canadian
government responded by passing legislation limiting outside hunting activities, which
also resulted in an increased presence by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
during the 1920s.97 Part of the problem in simply cracking down on trading activities,
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however, was that some Inuit had become economically reliant on the traders. This was
evident when the government entertained the idea of limiting the areas where trading
posts could operate. As some existing posts had become vital economic hubs for the
Inuits, shutting them down left local populations without a consistent source for their
basic needs. This left the Canadian government in the position of having to find ways to
provide these populations with sustenance to make up for the shortfall.98 This period
demonstrated that the Canadian government not only had to deal with potential incursions
from non-native economic interests, but also how complicated the process of providing
for the basic needs of native peoples in this region would be.
By assuming sovereignty over Arctic territories with Inuit populations, Canada
was also responsible for creating a political status for the group. Policies for
administering relationships with the Inuit changed hands several times during the 1920s
and 1930s, with the chief issue being whether the group should fall under existing
legislation related to other native groups. 99 Although a permanent policy stating that the
federal government was responsible for the welfare of the Inuit was established in 1939,
the group was nonetheless deemed distinct from the First Nations groups that lived
elsewhere in Canada.100
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It was during this time that Canada was again faced with the prospect of major
war in Europe. Unlike during the First World War, Canada now had an independent
foreign and defense policy and was no longer bound to follow Britain into armed
conflicts. Mired in economic depression during the 1930s, public support for joining
Britain in the event of war was low. The country was also reluctant to repeat the
experience of the 1917 “conscription crisis” in which deep divisions between Canada’s
English- and French-speaking communities emerged over the country’s participation in
the war.101 The Canadian Parliament would ultimately declare war on Germany within
days of its invasion of Poland in September 1939, although there are some interesting
events to note as to how Canadian society moved from being generally against
participation in the European theater to, at the least, tacitly supportive. A visit by the
British royal couple in the spring of 1939 had not only been received warmly by the
public, but also seemed to trigger a sense of empathy for the British situation, even
among French-Canadians.102 Despite Canada’s relatively quick response in voting
whether to join the British war effort following the invasion of Poland, this was not as a
result of a wholehearted belief of the need to respond to Germany’s actions. Instead,
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s motivation was to ensure that Canada had the ability to
make an independent decision without seeming beholden to British requests for
support.103 An emergency meeting of Parliament to debate the measure saw most
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members supporting Canadian contributions to the war—much to King’s surprise—
although the government’s intent was to avoid a full-scale mobilization on the scale of
World War I. Ultimately, parliamentary approval to join the war appeared based around a
resigned belief that not supporting Britain would be an absurdity given the political
situation in Europe.104 This was also helped, of course, by the fact that King and his
cabinet were secure in the idea that Canada now had the ability to make independent
decisions on these matters.
With a relatively lacking industrial base and an underequipped and unprepared
military force, Canada’s initial contributions came in the form of producing war materiel
for Britain. It soon became apparent, however, that Canada would need to increase
investments in its defense capabilities and later use them in the European theater. By the
end of the war in 1945, the country had gone from reluctant ally to a country that had
offered legitimate contributions to the most intense aspects of the conflict, to include the
Italian Campaign, Normandy landings, and liberation of the Netherlands.105 Much in the
same way that Canadian participation in World War I fueled patriotic fervor in a time of
Canada staking its claims to Arctic sovereignty, the second iteration created a legacy of a
country willing to rise to global security challenges.
Despite Canada’s notable participation in the war, the Arctic was not seen as a
strategic issue even despite Canada’s concerns about homeland defense. Nonetheless,
wartime security preparations did lead to the creation of security institutions that continue
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to hold sway in the region to the present day. Although most of Canada’s foreign military
participation during World War II took place in Europe, there was also legitimate reason
to fear Japanese incursions on Canada’s Pacific coast. This belief was fueled by the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the capture of Britain’s Pacific
colonies soon after. There was also the fear of an “insider threat” from the large
population of Japanese immigrants who inhabited British Columbia. Popular fears of
Japanese-Canadians sympathizing with Japan during the war fueled internment and
relocation policies which resettled thousands of Japanese-Canadians away from British
Columbia—where most of them lived—in other parts of the country. Although the
resettled Japanese-Canadians were allowed to return by 1949, some had already chosen
to continue their lives elsewhere in Canada.106 This period was a black mark on Canada’s
democratic process, particularly as these policies had been undertaken with widespread
support from non-Japanese-Canadians.
Fears of a Japanese threat also led to demands to form a defense force in British
Columbia in 1942. Noting that citizens had already taken it upon themselves to defend
their homeland through coastal patrols and forming volunteer civil defense units, the
Canadian government determined that it was best to establish a formal citizens’ defense
corps in British Columbia.107 Because budgetary concerns constrained the formation of
more organized reserve units, the government favored the establishment of an auxiliary
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defense corps model, which took the name “Pacific Coast Militia Rangers” (PCMR) in
the spring of 1942. This name accomplished two goals: The model not only embraced the
practical aspects of Canada’s Pacific defense needs, but the name ranger also inspired
romantic images of patriotic citizens defending their local communities in a time of
war.108 PCMR units were given significant local autonomy in terms of electing leadership
and ensuring the readiness of their troops. The downside of this was not only the
possibility of local politics influencing unit readiness, but the expectation that PCMR
units would be self-reliant also left them receiving little tangible assistance from the
Canadian military beyond some spare rifles and ammunition.109 The expansion of the
PCMR into the colder climate of the Yukon only added to the organization’s mystique,
creating an image of courageous rangers willing to endure the frozen climate on dog sleds
to protect their communities and country. 110
Beyond these themes, the Rangers would ultimately evolve into a militia force
that was also representative of native peoples that inhabited Canada’s less-defended
regions. The recruitment of Aboriginal rangers proved particularly successful during
World War II,111 which would pay dividends for the ranger model after the end of the
war. Although the PCMR began to see reductions even before the end of the war—the
Japanese were on the defensive by the end of 1943, with Allied forces launching their
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final offensive against the Germans soon after—the success of the PCMR remained fresh
in the minds of defense planners at the war’s conclusion. Senior defense officials began
to discuss the possibility of expanding the PCMR model to a countrywide force that
would serve as the country’s cost-effective territorial militia, particularly in remote areas
in the north. The need for such a force was predicated not only by fears of future Soviet
incursions, but perhaps moreso by concerns that Canada would have trouble maintaining
its sovereignty as the United States developed plans for continental defense.112 In 1947,
the new Canadian Rangers organization was established. Its role was not only to be on
the lookout for outside incursions, but also to provide local expertise to the military
during exercises.113 This role was particularly important in the Canadian Arctic, where
the new Rangers served as a warning post in remote regions where it was unfeasible for
the military to maintain a regular presence. The Rangers program was also seen as a way
to accomplish the government’s goal of bringing modern society to the Inuit. 114 Although
the PCMR had been quickly raised as a means to meet an urgent threat, the new militia,
interestingly enough, proved to be an effective way to quell fears that Canada was not
actively aware of threats to its territory.
There are several important themes discussed thus far that are notable in
understanding the shaping of Canadian Arctic policy going forward. Because Canada’s
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relationship with the Arctic was a dynamic that moved alongside the country’s gradual
move toward independence, there is the question of whether ideas about nationhood and
sovereignty were necessarily predicated on the state itself being an independent entity.
That is, was Canada’s Arctic policy necessarily something that evolved out of the
country’s existing notions of its identity, or something that developed parallel to the
factors that influenced the creation of this identity? From the discussion above, it appears
that Canada’s views of the Arctic were indeed influenced by the country’s general
political and economic position at a given point in time. Nonetheless, the experiences of
Arctic explorers and their ability to impact Canadian society—particularly in that their
exploits would take on a life of their own at times—also played a significant role in how
the country viewed its Arctic frontiers. It must be understood, therefore, that the Arctic
had permeated the Canadian consciousness on both the political and social levels by the
end of World War II. As I have demonstrated here, this was not always a conscious
decision, but rather the result of a contingent set of processes and historical events that
led Canada to feel the need to assert claims over its Arctic territory.
The term that would take on special importance along these lines is “sovereignty.”
Superficially, it wouldn’t seem out of place for Canada to feel the need to protect areas
that it claimed as part of its sovereign territory. What is distinct here, however, are the
particular reasons why Canada felt the need to point out its willingness to protect its
sovereignty at different points in time. Though decision-making on Arctic matters up to
this point was often the result of various bureaucratic and domestic-level factors that have
been discussed here, the first half of the twentieth century also saw a latent Canadian fear
of American political and economic dominance. This was, of course, tempered by the
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desire—if not the existential need—to maintain positive relations with the United States.
As such, fears of American infringements in the Arctic (or in Canada at large) generally
provided the impetus for Canada to clearly assert sovereignty over its claimed Arctic
space. As the historical record shows, American interests in the Arctic were never solidly
expansive beyond the basic protection of Alaska. Nonetheless, the occasional unknowns
created by its southern neighbor were enough to motivate Canada to think clearly about
the worth of its Arctic territory and the resources that it was willing to invest in the
region. As we will see during the Cold War period, lingering fears of too much American
influence on Canada were instrumental in building the country’s modern security and
defense policies.
Finally, the Arctic served as a useful way in which to translate the experience of
early Canadian settlers to the modern day. Much as the 18 th century fur traders gradually
expanded their known world by exploring Canada’s wondrous terrain, the Arctic region
now served to add to the narrative of Canadians with a “can-do” attitude as stewards of a
vast country with tremendous natural beauty. Canadian identity would also shape itself in
terms of being decidedly “northern.” This was not only done as a means to contrast the
country with the American experience but also because, due to the country’s endemic
geologic formations and the way in which the country was gradually settled, it was hard
to argue that Canada was not of an intrinsically “northern” character.115 The focus on
developing Canadian identity in such terms only increased in the 1950s as Canadians
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sought ways to define Canadian identity outside of the country’s military history. 116 The
post-World War II period was therefore one in which Canada’s modern identity was
facing a fresh recalibration of values; its Arctic policy was no different.
Canada and the Cold War: The Arctic as a strategic problem
Beyond concerns about the strategic situation it faced at the advent of the Cold
War, Canada also faced decisions about how to orient its broader foreign policy. After
all, the country’s ability to conduct a wholly independent foreign policy was a relatively
new phenomenon and a considerable portion of that period had been consumed by the
impact of World War II. The birth of the United Nations offered a tremendous
opportunity for Canada to establish itself as an international player. Although its strategic
interests were undoubtedly aligned with the West, the country also could act as a force
moderating the growing international divide developing between the American and
Soviet spheres of influence. Canada’s early role in the UN not only supported the overall
development of the organization, but also established a key role for the country as a
reliable contributor to the growing number of international peacekeeping operations.
Such a role suited Canada well, as it maintained a relatively large military force while
also being free from the foreign commitments carried by well-equipped allies such as
Britain, France, or the United States. The commitment to international peacekeeping
operations proved to be a significant aspect of Canadian defense policy through the 1950s
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and 1960s.117 It also, arguably, created an apocryphal notion of Canada as being
altruistically and internationally driven when the country was simply seeking to develop a
foreign policy that both fit its capabilities and allowed it to retain a sovereign identity.
This idea continues to exist within the Canadian discourse to this day. 118
Canada was also preoccupied by the realities of defending its vast territory from
potential Soviet incursions or, even more worrying, American incursions to prevent the
Soviets from establishing a presence in North America. Realization of this latter reality
forced Canada to be proactive in establishing concrete linkages with the American
defense establishment early on while it was still in a position to work with the Americans
on an equal footing. The beginnings of the Canadian-American defense linkage actually
began in 1940 following a meeting between King and U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, New York. The result of this meeting was the establishment of
the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), a consultative body between the two
states that included senior defense and diplomatic officials. The push to meet at
Ogdensburg was precipitated more by the Canadians. Whereas the Americans were still
attempting to stay uninvolved in the global conflict during this time, Canada’s decision to
assist the British demanded engagement of the Americans on matters of coastal
defense.119 Though the PJBD only acted in an advisory capacity, the formation of the

117

Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 2010), p. 8-9.

The creation of a somewhat misleading, nationalist idea in Canadian society about the country’s recent
history in foreign affairs is discussed in Hector Mackenzie, “Canada’s Nationalist Internationalism: From
the League of Nations to the United Nations,” in Canadas of the Mind, Norman Hillmer and Adam
Chapnick, Eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University, 2007), p. 90-92.
118

C.P. Stacey, “The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945,” International
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1954), p. 108-113.
119

54

board was effectively the beginning of comprehensive defense cooperation between the
two countries.120
The continental defense relationship only strengthened following World War II
with operational defense capabilities being developed by the two countries. Although the
allied experience during the war and cooperation through the PJBD had strengthened
relationships between the two sides, the Canadians were still wary of giving too much
leeway to the Americans while negotiating the possibility of allowing American forces to
operate in their country. This was complicated by the fact that initial plans would base
American bombers at stations in Newfoundland and Labrador, which were moving
toward a referendum to leave British control for Canadian confederation in 1948.121
Following a Canadian victory in this referendum, the Canadians and Americans finally
came to agreement on the issue in 1952. Nonetheless, concerns about an increased
American presence in the country were never really quelled, but rather took a back seat to
the realities of the Soviet threat.122
The role of the Arctic in continental defense also became central to Canadian
foreign and defense planning at this time. The Canadians were left with a difficult
decision vis-à-vis their American counterparts: Now that the two countries were moving

120

The feeling that a coherent idea of hemispheric defense was emerging this time is represented in Walter
N. Sage, “The Historical Peculiarities of Canada With Regard to Hemisphere Defense,” Pacific Historical
Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1941), p. 27.
121

The Americans actually took advantage of the tension between Canada and Britain over
Newfoundland’s political status, often siding with the Canadians as a means of currying favor on the basing
issue. See Nathaniel French Caldwell, Jr., Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security (New York:
Praeger, 1990), p. 29-34.
122

Ibid., p. 34-35.

55

closer toward a unified system of continental defense, should the Americans be pressed to
officially recognize Canada’s Arctic claims? Although the Americans had given de facto
acquiescence to Canadian claims during the 1920s, there were fears that this policy would
change in light of feared Soviet incursions. The Canadians ultimately decided against
seeking formal recognition for the sake of maintaining harmonious relations with the
United States.123 Having established that the Canadians were on board with a stronglylinked continental defense, albeit with some reservations, the Americans began to
establish formal defense structures that would include the participation of the Canadians.
The chief defensive concern in the early Cold War period was to provide an earlywarning system to detect possible incursions by Soviet military forces. Planners had
envisioned a chain of radar stations that would stretch across the North American Arctic
space to serve this purpose. The formal agreement for the establishment of the Distant
Early Warning (DEW) Line across the Canadian Arctic came into being in 1955, with the
system coming online in 1957. The DEW Line was ultimately a diplomatic victory for
the Canadians. As part of the agreement, the Americans gave significant control to the
Canadians in operating the stations, which was also seen by the Canadians as further
(albeit unofficial) recognition of Canadian claims to its Arctic frontiers.124 Alongside
membership in the newly-formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949
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and the establishment of the bilateral North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) with the United States in 1958,125 Canada had secured a robust position
against the Soviet threat, although concerns about sovereignty within these structures
remained.
The Canadians also needed to prepare for the possibility of how to fight a war in
the Arctic if such an event occurred. Such preparations remained largely within the realm
of the hypothetical, however, with Canadian military planners more occupied by the
possibility of all-out nuclear war than a conventional war in the Arctic latitudes. As such,
the military did not put too much emphasis on Arctic warfare during the early Cold War
period.126 Instead, the new mission opened up a viable role for the Canadian Rangers.
This also created a number of questions regarding not only the role of the organization in
Canada’s territorial defense, but also how a force that was largely Aboriginal fit into
Canadian society at large. Ranger membership in the Arctic regions was largely
composed of local Aboriginals (with the exception of units in the Yukon, which were
predominately white), which has historically had a noticeable effect on the role of the
organization in their local communities.127 While Aboriginal members of the Rangers
may have identified with their given local community, they also served as representatives
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of the Canadian military in their role as Rangers. This created a dual conception of
citizenship that would be openly acknowledged by Aboriginal leadership.128
One of the long-standing points of contention that would develop during the Cold
War between the Canadian government and Arctic communities was the degree to which
the region was militarized. This was contentious for two reasons: first, the obvious
anxiety felt by Arctic residents over the prospect of their homeland becoming a
battleground; second, as discussed by Barry Scott Zellen in reference to the Inuit, a clear
distinction between friend and foe was not present in the Inuit mindset. Though many
Canadian Inuits did feel loyalty toward Canada—particularly as many fought in the
Canadian military during World War II—they also felt loyal toward the safety of other
Arctic indigenous groups outside of Canada (including in the Soviet Union).129 This was
an interesting point of reference in light of the Cold War context: Whereas Canadian
Aboriginals may have held a sincere sense of loyalty toward Canada, they also were not
tied solely to Canadian conceptions of the outside world. This dynamic may be natural in
any instance in which a state increases its presence in one of its sub-state units over time,
as was the case in the Canadian North. What this revealed, however, is that remote Arctic
communities may be indifferent about what is occurring elsewhere in Canada but would
perhaps be affected by what is occurring in another Arctic community on the other side
of the world. It is worth noting that Zellen’s example here did raise the question of this
feeling being one pushed by Aboriginal leaders—rather than being representative of the
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feelings of Aboriginal communities on the whole—in order to fulfill an ulterior
agenda.130 Even so, other historical facts surrounding Aboriginal conceptions of
community certainly make this construct potentially viable.
“Southern” Canada was also undergoing changes in terms of how it viewed the
North and its role in Canadian identity. Much as the Cold War Canadian narrative was
based on internationalism and responsibility in decision-making, cultural works on the
Arctic showed an increasing tendency to shift from the “heroic” stories of earlier
explorations to the importance of environmental stewardship by people inhabiting the
Arctic. This was seen as influenced by the idea that Southern Canadians not only sought
to build a safer narrative of how its country should operate in the Arctic, but also that
increased contact with the Inuit provided for the need to better understand their needs and
viewpoints.131 This was certainly influenced by a general trend toward cultural
postmodernism, but was also the result of the North, while still psychologically distant,
occupying an increasingly less forbidding position to Southerners. In short, the Arctic
still retained a sense of being a distinct wilderness while also being normalized as a
geographical feature.132 This was also then internalized as a part of the development of
Canada as a progressive state: Because the Arctic region was largely inhabited and
underdeveloped relative to the rest of the country, it was both an area that was either due
to be prioritized within economic and social development efforts or even a recognized
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wilderness that was purposely not developed in order to maintain the uniqueness of the
landscape.133 The national perception of the Arctic region was therefore co-constitutive
with the dynamics of the national understanding of the Canadian identity as a whole.
The next round of attention to this issue came after the election of John
Diefenbaker to the role of prime minister in 1957. Calling a snap election the following
year, Diefenbaker used the momentum of his political campaign to outline a new national
vision that specifically referenced the Arctic:
“As far as the Arctic is concerned, how many of you here knew the pioneers in
Western Canada? I saw the early days here. Here in Winnipeg in 1909, when the
vast movement was taking place into the Western plains, they had imagination.
There is a new imagination now. The Arctic. We intend to carry out the legislative
program of Arctic research, to develop Arctic routes, to develop those vast hidden
resources the last few years have revealed.”134
This speech was perhaps the most direct acknowledgement in modern times of the
Arctic’s place in the Canadian national identity. Not only did the tone of the speech serve
to benefit Diefenbaker’s subsequent electoral victory, but it also set the intention to
prioritize northern issues under Diefenbaker’s government.135 Diefenbaker appeared
highly influenced in this regard by the economist Dr. Merril Menzies, whom he brought
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in as a speechwriter and economic advisor during his 1957 campaign. As a result, the
idea of the “northern vision” took shape in the form of a regional economic development
program. More notably, the program was driven by a concerted effort to develop
potential energy and mineral reserves in the North, which was helped by the fact that
these areas remained under federal control. This not only resulted in actual energy
exploration activities, but also spurred the construction of roads, railways, port facilities,
and funding for social programs in the North.136 In retrospect, however, the actual impact
of Diefenbaker’s rhetoric in practical terms was decidedly mixed. Although
Diefenbaker’s discussion of the Arctic was considerable in tying the region to the larger
national fabric going forward, the successes of the northern development program in
terms of building infrastructure also did not completely live up to the government’s
plans.137
The reasons for Diefenbaker’s northern vision were also not wholly due to
domestic factors. Shortly after taking the helm in Ottawa, Diefenbaker’s government
faced an increasingly tense relationship with the United States over cross-border trade
regimes. What proved particularly problematic for the Canadians was an increasingly
tough set of protectionist economic policies by the United States, especially in limiting
imports of Canadian oil.138 From the American side, the early interactions with the
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Diefenbaker government also showed an increasingly nationalist tone from the
Canadians. This may have actually resulted in a moral win for the Canadians in the
bilateral relationship, as American concern over Diefenbaker’s campaign rhetoric caused
them to develop a more comprehensive set of policies when dealing with Canadian
concerns.139 Ultimately, the relationship between the two sides did not experience a major
rift despite the disagreements during Diefenbaker’s first years. Instead, this experience
showed that Diefenbaker’s domestic conception of the “northern vision,” while motivated
largely by internal factors, was also not wholly disassociated from the CanadianAmerican relationship at the time. Such a dynamic was only representative of the running
theme that was consistent of Canadian Arctic decision-making during the 20th century.
International law, controversy, and the sovereignty showdown
With the Canadian Arctic seeing increased access by the early 1960s—whether
because of government development programs or through supply of distant military
facilities such as those constituting the DEW Line—there were growing concerns about
the need to formalize legal claims over the maritime routes surrounding Canada’s Arctic
islands. At this time, there was not yet an international standard defining territorial
maritime limits, but instead a varying set of international customs that were under
codification discussions in international bodies. 140 The issue was further complicated
given the unique character of the Canadian Arctic archipelago: Even if Canada accepted
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an international standard limit from its coastal waters, how would this apply to the straits
between the numerous islands? Part of the later impetus for developing an official policy
on these distinctions was derived from increased incursions that tested the lack of official
policies. Initially, such policies were not seen as necessary because existing laws calling
for the application for permission to transit the Arctic archipelago were generally
respected by the largely American ships that provided supplies to the DEW Line
facilities.141 Nonetheless, various organs of the Canadian government had already been
pondering the territoriality question during the 1950s. Although the Canadians considered
imposing the 12-mile claim beyond the furthest reaches of the archipelago, strategic
concerns—be it recognition of the American submarine presence in those areas or fears
of stirring up a territorial rivalry with the Soviet Union—led the Canadians to be more
conservative in their actions. The safest bet was to instead claim the straits between the
Arctic islands, even though this was probably going to be met with protests from the
United States.142 This viewpoint was not actually put into official policy at this point in
time, although there was also little need to actually take a stand on this issue.
What would occur several years later would prove to be one of the most
controversial and defining moments in modern Canadian conceptions of Arctic
sovereignty. In 1968, an oil field was discovered near Prudhoe Bay on the Alaskan Arctic
coastline. The discovery led not only to increased interest in the potential oil resources
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that could be found in the region, but also the means of getting to and from extraction
sites. In October of that year, the American corporation Humble Oil began plans to send
an oil tanker through the Northwest Passage the following summer. There were a few
implications to this decision that affected the political landscape surrounding Northwest
Passage sovereignty. Firstly, the voyage itself would be historic: the ship Manhattan that
would go on to make the trip was the first commercial vessel to traverse the passage in its
entirety, and only the ninth surface vessel to do so.143 Secondly, the ship would require
the assistance of icebreakers to complete the voyage, which would require official
coordination with the Canadian or American governments in order to receive assistance
from their respective coast guards. In his first meeting with U.S. President Richard Nixon
in March 1969, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau asked that the Americans
submit an official request for the Manhattan voyage. Under the guise of seeing the issue
as a private business matter that did not concern the U.S. government—not to mention
understanding the potential precedent that would be set by agreeing to the Canadian
request—Nixon declined to ask official permission.144 The Manhattan nonetheless began
its voyage in August 1969 from Philadelphia, making the return to New York in
November. Along the way, the ship was escorted by both Canadian and American
icebreakers.145 Aside from demonstrating that a large commercial vessel could indeed
transit the Northwest Passage, the voyage did not appear to be particularly eventful.
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Yet in 1970, the Canadians were already seeing the Manhattan’s voyage as a
direct challenge to their Arctic sovereignty and were using the event to justify further
changes in how they defined their Arctic claims. How did it reach this point? We first
need to examine the discussions that were taking place following Humble’s 1968
announcement of its intention to transit the Northwest Passage. Canada demonstrated
immediate concern after Humble’s announcement, although there were competing
explanations as to why it did. One could fairly argue that the Canadian government was
concerned about the environmental implications of the transit of a large oil tanker
through the Northwest Passage, although previous research by Meren and Plumptre finds
that the Canadian concern was likely driven more by fears of sovereignty infringement
despite political statements to the contrary. 146 Allowing the voyage of the Manhattan
could also actually prove the difficulties of operating in the Northwest Passage,
bolstering Canadian arguments that the waterway was a unique geographical feature that
would be an exception to future international maritime agreements.147
Canadian consideration of the plan did not only involve how to approach the U.S.
on official terms—as was eventually done by Trudeau in March 1969—but also to
determine if some of the practicalities of the voyage could result in later precedents. For
example, this was seen in determining whether to formally request that the U.S. Coast
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Guard ask permission to transit the Northwest Passage while providing escort support to
the Manhattan. Although the USCG was not required to ask permission under previous
agreements, the Canadians submitted a permission request in this instance as a subtle
means of gaining effective sovereignty recognition. 148 Why was there ultimately no
strong stand taken by the Canadian government prior to the Manhattan’s voyage?
Internal discussions raised the possibility of setting an official policy on use of the
Northwest Passage, but it may have come down to the small window of time that Canada
had to develop a comprehensive legal justification to assert sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage. There were also a number of external considerations, not least of
which the general desire to keep the issue from rising to the point of major political
confrontation with the United States.149
As a result, the effects of the Manhattan voyage would be seen in subsequent
Canadian policy. Fearing that this crossing was the first of many, the Canadians unveiled
an official set of policies regarding sovereignty over the Arctic straits. Not only were
these policies enacted fairly quickly after the Manhattan’s voyage, but they were also the
culmination of the existing discussions that had been occurring both inside of Canada and
at the global level for over a decade. The first clear instance asserting Canadian
sovereignty over the Arctic occurred in April 1970 when Secretary of State for External
Affairs Mitchell Sharp noted in a parliamentary debate, “Canada has always regarded the
waters…of the Arctic archipelago as being Canadian waters…the present Government
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maintains that position.”150 Two months later, Parliament passed the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPAA), which asserted Canada’s jurisdiction in enforcing
against commercial dumping in the Arctic to a limit of 100 miles from the coast and
effectively subsumed the Arctic archipelago. Other legislation extended Canada’s
recognized territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles, in line with an increasing
trend in the international community. 151 Although the actual language of the legislation
referred to protecting against pollution and illegal dumping—albeit giving fairly wide
latitude to enforcement authorities in determining what constituted those activities152—it
was quite clear what this legislation signaled to the outside world. The United States was
quick to express its disappointment, as the Americans argued that the Northwest Passage
should be treated as an international waterway.153 Invoking Sharp’s statement and the
AWPAA, External Affairs legal advisor J.A. Beesley offered the assertion that the unique
nature of the Arctic archipelago resulted in Canada’s right to claim jurisdiction over the
islands.154 Although, the “unique nature of the Arctic” argument had been advanced
internally, it was through these actions that the Canadians staked their position officially.
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These positions were not accepted on the international level, however, with the notable
exception of the Soviet Union.155
Beyond legal mechanisms, the defense establishment also offered an official
position on the issue. The 1971 defense White Paper explicitly prioritized Arctic
sovereignty within the Canadian Forces’ strategic outlook;156 this was a notable departure
from the previous White Paper in 1964, which did not directly address the issue. 157
Language on the Arctic not only discussed bolstering defense capabilities in the region,
but also spoke directly to the mission of assisting civil authorities in social development
efforts in the North.158 This language was representative of some of the issues facing
Canada and its security policy during this time. The problems faced in combating the
Québec separatist group Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), which culminated in the
taking of hostages during the 1970 October Crisis, demonstrated that Canada indeed
faced security threats aside from the Arctic and Cold War fronts. Furthermore, the
détente policies that would come into effect regarding relations with the Soviet Union
eliminated the temptation to boost defense spending during the 1970s. 159 Thus, the shifts
that occurred in Arctic policy from 1968-71 were perhaps the most significant on the
issue in the modern era. Nonetheless, it was also clear that Canada had other priorities
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during this time—such as social spending, facing the 1970s economic crisis, or even just
within the realm of security and defense spending—that left the Arctic competing for
attention.
Such was the issue facing Brian Mulroney upon his election as Prime Minister in
1984. Mulroney and his Progressive Conservative party not only sought a departure from
the roughly two decades of Liberal governance previous, 160 but also emphasized the need
to devote more resources to a defense establishment that had been put on the bureaucratic
backburner by the Trudeau government in the 1970s and early 1980s. 161 Over the course
of Mulroney’s tenure, which lasted until 1993, there was also a desire to foster warmer
relations with the United States.162 For Mulroney, this was an economic necessity
following the problems faced by the country during the 1970s. Mulroney’s attitude
toward the United States resulted in a number of tangible policy achievements during his
time in office, most notably the signing of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in
1988.163 Interestingly, Mulroney’s approach to U.S. relations was also noticeably
different from that of John Diefenbaker, the last notable Progressive Conservative prime
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minister, which demonstrates the evolution that took place in the bilateral relationship
over the previous three decades.
Mulroney’s views toward the United States would nonetheless be tested through
another contentious incident involving use of the Northwest Passage. In August 1985, the
U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea traveled from the Pacific coast via the Panama
Canal on a resupply mission to a U.S. base in Greenland. On the return trip, however, the
ship instead traversed the Northwest Passage. Although the U.S. Coast Guard informed
Canadian authorities of its intention to travel through the route, it did not explicitly ask
for permission. The Canadian public was furious. One activist group even went so far as
to hire a plane to drop Canadian flag-wrapped leaflets on the ship’s deck as it traveled
through the Arctic archipelago.164 Although the Americans claimed that the decision to
travel through the Northwest Passage was simply a matter of taking the shortest route
back to the Pacific, the Canadians could not help but see this as an affront to Canadian
sovereignty in the same vein as the events surrounding the Manhattan’s voyage. Much as
was the case in that incident, the Canadians were quick to react. In September, Secretary
of State for External Affairs Joe Clark spoke in Parliament regarding a series of
initiatives to further assert sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago, which included the
possibility of bringing the issue to the World Court if necessary. 165 The most notable of
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these was establishing a Canadian claim to a “straight line” around the archipelago.166
The issue was further complicated by the fact that the U.S. had rejected adherence to the
UNCLOS in 1982, which created the possibility that the two countries did not have a
basic foundation by which to understand each other’s position should the Northwest
Passage dispute be presented in front of an international tribunal.167 This mindset also
influenced the 1987 defense white paper, which discussed the Canadian intention to
procure nuclear-powered submarines as a recognition of Canada’s inability to protect
itself from maritime threats under its present organization. 168 The Canadian position
influenced the signing of an agreement between the two countries in 1988 that brought a
sense of closure to the issue. While the agreement did not set binding terms governing
use of the Northwest Passage by U.S. ships, it did state that the U.S. would make an
effort to act in a cooperative nature with Canadian authorities when American ships used
the route.169 Much as had been the case with previous instances of potential American
infringement on Canadian claims in the 20th century, the Canadians had managed to win
tacit acknowledgement of their position from their neighbors while stopping short of
receiving official legal recognition of their claims. Although this did leave the door open
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to future American incursions, the historical record showed that the Americans had little
energy to match the Canadian response when controversies over Arctic claims occurred.
Therefore, the Canadians had managed to mostly maintain their Arctic claims simply by
showing the willingness to expend effort to match challenges to those claims.
The systemic power balance between East and West during this time was also
having an effect on policy toward the Arctic. As part of the thawing of relations taking
place alongside Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union, there were also efforts
to establish cooperative understandings between the two sides regarding the use of the
Arctic space. A key moment came during a Gorbachev speech in October 1987 in
Murmansk. In this speech, Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic states agree to
establishing an Arctic nuclear-free zone as part of a phased demilitarization in the region,
as well as suggesting the need to develop cooperative programs on energy production,
scientific exploration, and environmental protection.170 Initial diplomatic
communications between the West and the Soviet Union on this issue soon left NATO
states skeptical of the motivations behind this announcement, however, as Soviet
proposals on the demilitarization issue actually appeared to give them the military
advantage.171 Still, there was value to Gorbachev’s speech, particularly if we look at it in
the context of larger Soviet reforms and the effects that the influence the policy had
following the Cold War. Although the speech marked a clear turning point in Soviet
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Arctic policy, the non-military factors highlighted in Gorbachev’s speech may have also
been a culmination of the direction in which Soviet Arctic policy was already moving,
rather than responding to more recent events preceding the speech.172 A focus on nonmilitary factors also had an impact going forward despite the failure to establish clear
agreements on the military aspects of a potential Arctic demilitarization program. By
emphasizing these factors, Gorbachev helped to shift the conversation about the Arctic
from one of strategic rivalry to one of international cooperation focused around energy,
economic development, and environmental matters.173
Conclusions: The Canadian Arctic identity
The historical review of Canada’s Arctic policy tells us of a few key factors that
can guide our understanding of present-day Canadian Arctic policy. Firstly, Canada’s
particular history during the colonial period significantly contributed to the importance of
the Arctic later on in constructing the Canadian identity. As the country’s geography
proved ever-forbidding and captivating to early settlers, early influences on the Canadian
identity were guided by a sense of frontierism and appreciation for the country’s natural
environment. Even as the country had mostly been explored by the 20 th century, the
handful of corners in the Arctic space that remained unexplored only reinvigorated this
tradition. What is especially interesting in constructing the idea of the Arctic is how the
region took on a life of its own in the Canadian psyche. As evidenced by Franklin’s final
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expedition, even hasty attempts to explore the Arctic were spun as generally positive
examples of the region’s unique and forbidding character. Such narratives were
instrumental in building a sense of uniqueness in the Canadian identity as the country
moved toward independence in the 20th century.
Secondly, the historical record has shown that Canada’s identity was largely built
with an eye toward the United States. As its southern neighbor also built its national
identity within the New World construct—as well as having its own brand of frontierism
and territorial expansion—Canada regularly found the need to identify the characteristics
that made it especially unique. The country was able to do this by emphasizing its
“northern” character, something that the United States could only claim halfheartedly
following its acquisition of Alaska. Although the two countries have managed to develop
a close sense of kinship over cultural similarities and mutually beneficial economic
relations, Canada has shown itself to be especially sensitive to any hint of American
incursion. As Canada began to pepper strategic defense documents with specific
references to “sovereignty,” it did so especially with attention to fears to growing
American influence in the country at a given time. The Arctic therefore served two
purposes in helping to Canada distinguish itself from the United States. First, the
distinction of “northern character” helped to create a sense of Canadian uniqueness that
could remain exclusive of American influence. Secondly—and on more practical terms—
Canadian ownership of a vast Arctic territory gave it more of a stake in hemispheric
defense discussions, particularly as the two countries’ defense structures established
closer links during the Cold War.
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Finally, the Arctic has shown to be an enduring issue in Canadian identity
formation that has been met with similar responses when the country has felt that
sovereignty over its Arctic territory was threatened. Although this analysis has certainly
highlighted how certain individuals, external security issues, and domestic politics have
had a significant impact on individual government actions, the historical record
nonetheless shows a clear trend over time toward defending the notion of Canadian
Arctic sovereignty. Additionally, the Canadian public has often found itself engaged on
the issue when the government raises it, regardless of its opinion of the Arctic as a dayto-day national priority. Why are these findings important? As I will discuss in the
following chapters, the discursive raising of the Arctic as a priority for the Canadian
government in recent years is less influenced by the actions of individual leaders as it is
by historical and cultural attachment to the region. Instead, current policies are merely the
modern iteration of a Canadian legacy of sensitivity to the sovereignty of its Arctic
territory. As demonstrated in this historical analysis of the issue, the deep roots of the
Arctic in the Canadian character continue to serve as the primary motivating factor in
how Canada conducts its modern-day Arctic policy. The paradox of this, however, is that
rhetoric and substantive policy changes have not always resulted in significant economic
investment in the Arctic, regardless of whether the government makes a concerted
attempt to undertake such a program. This dynamic may be reflective of the reality of
domestic politics, but also guides our understanding of the gap that remains between
raising the discursive alarm over an issue and actually committing resources to address it.
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Ch. 3: New dimensions of security in the Canadian Arctic, 1993-2015
When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, there was little need for sustained tension in
the conflict between East and West. Instead, the possibility of positive relationships
centered on non-security issues seemed like the more attractive option for working on
issues pertaining to the Arctic. Canada welcomed this development as the country sought
to eliminate the need to focus its defense and security policies on the possibility of a
territorial threat. This was particularly suited to the post-Cold War foreign policy
developed by Jean Chrétien’s government following its election in 1993, which sought a
politically “safe” set of policies that could guide Canada into the next century.
The emergence of high-profile humanitarian crises during the 1990s also allowed
Canada to promote peacekeeping operations as the cornerstone of its defense policy. As
Sean Maloney discussed, participation in peacekeeping missions allowed Canada to
achieve four objectives that directly impacted its national interest: pushing global threats
away from North America; the ability to use a larger coalition (mainly NATO) as a
support base; ability to use military contributions as political leverage; and ability to
participate in operations which were well-suited to the size and capability of the
Canadian military.174 It can also be argued that the Canadian focus on humanitarian
concerns was for the purposes of political expediency on the part of the Chrétien
government (in power for the majority of the 1990s), which did not develop a distinct
vision for the Canadian defense and security establishment after the Cold War. 175 T.S.
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Hataley and Kim Nossal’s study of the Canadian response to the 1999 crisis in East
Timor also supports this viewpoint. Whereas Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy
showed particular zeal for the human security agenda, a combination of defense budget
cuts and political indifference left the Chrétien administration initially hesitant to
contribute to the United Nations force in East Timor. Though Canada eventually did
make military contributions to the force, the delay in agreeing to contribute was
inconsistent with Canada’s supposed prioritization of peacekeeping operations in the
international arena to that point.176 The idea of Canada as a committed “peacemaker”
may therefore be a bit of a revisionist account of the country’s foreign and defense
policies during the 20th century. On the contrary, the analysis here thus far has
demonstrated that Canada’s foreign policy has historically been more attuned to
realpolitik than observers often realized. The notion of the Arctic as an integral part of
the national identity has only solidified this argument. Later in this chapter, this particular
aspect of the Canadian foreign policy tradition will be re-visited when discussing Arctic
policy under Stephen Harper’s government.
The 1990s nonetheless represented an opportunity to think differently about the
meanings of security in the Arctic, both due to growing recognition of the effects of
climate change as well as due to the en vogue status of global institution-building.
Expanding upon the rapprochement over the Arctic that took place in the latter stages of
the Cold War, Arctic states were quick to frame global understandings of the Arctic
within themes of economic development and environmental protection. The emerging
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concept of “sustainable” development as first popularized by the Brundtland Commission
in the 1980s was a particularly attractive idea to apply to the Arctic region. Under the
direction of former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, the United
Nations-mandated Commission developed a comprehensive document between 1983 and
1987 that outlined the tenets of sustainable development.177 With an explicit focus on the
relationship between human development and the lessening of armed conflict, the nascent
concept of sustainable development was seemingly the perfect experiment that could use
the Arctic as a model for future success. As such, the institutionalization of sustainable
development policies under the guidance of the Arctic Council was built in this image.
The Arctic Council was formed as a result of several ministerial meetings
between Arctic states beginning in 1989, with the organization itself being founded under
the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. Inspired by the sustainable development concept prevalent
at the time,178 it is no surprise that the formation of the Arctic Council avoided a hard
security component. Curiously, a footnote to the otherwise short Ottawa Declaration did
explicitly state that the Arctic Council was to avoid military matters. 179 Although such a
statement certainly was an act of foresight on the part of the Arctic Council’s framers,
this also helped to set an important precedent that the Arctic was not only to be conflict-
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free in the post-Cold War era, but a legitimately positive area of cooperation between
former strategic foes.
From the Canadian standpoint, the Arctic Council should have been a welcome
development in the Canadian foreign policy agenda, particularly in light of other global
discussions about climate change. The carving of the new territory of Nunavut, whose
population is largely Aboriginal, from the Northwest Territories in 1999 also was seen as
a victory for the human development agenda in the Arctic. Still, the practical difficulties
of increasing economic development in the Arctic regions were soon realized in the
course of these discussions.180 The Canadians were also not totally divorced from
approaching the emerging concept of “human” security through military force. It was
during this time that the “responsibility to protect” or “R2P” doctrine gained traction in
the international community as a result of mass humanitarian crises that were perceived
to have been exacerbated by international community inaction. Two schools of thought
developed regarding how to approach human security. Whereas Japan spearheaded a
human security approach known as “freedom from want”—which saw human security as
a concept that stemmed from development—Canada and Norway advocated for a
“freedom from fear” approach that put emphasis on protection from physical violence. 181
Canada was also instrumental in developing two international organs focusing on human
security in the International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the Human
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Security Network (HSN). The ICISS was disbanded following the release of its findings
in 2001, though its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect was undoubtedly the first
to give significant weight to the “R2P” concept.182
Canadian Arctic policy by the late 1990s, although seemingly setting a positive
tone for a sustainable future in the Arctic region, was thus attempting to incorporate a
number of emerging concepts that may have been too ambitious for Canada’s actual level
of capability. Although the Arctic may not have been the chief domestic concern for
Canada in light of Québec’s razor-thin failed secession referendum in 1995 and an
economic crisis that tanked the value of the Canadian dollar, the region was nonetheless
close to the heart of Chrétien, who had served as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development under Pierre Trudeau.183 In 2000, the Canadian government released a
report outlining its strategy for the Arctic. The report established four main “objectives”
for Canada’s Arctic strategy:
“To enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and
Aboriginal people; To assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty
in the North; To establish the Circumpolar North as a vibrant geopolitical entity
integrated into a rules-based international system; and to promote the human
security of northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic.”184
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At first glance, this would seemingly balance Canada’s then-orientation with its historical
emphasis on Arctic sovereignty. An analysis of the report, however, found it to be more
focused on themes in the former category: sustainable development, Northern institutionbuilding, and using the Arctic as a vehicle for international cooperation, particularly with
post-Soviet Russia. The concept of sovereignty only received a handful of passing
references, and was arguably out-of-place given the document’s focus on
intergovernmental cooperation.185 The confusion between the strategy’s stated objectives
and its actual recommendations were rather representative of the dynamic that puzzled
the Canadian mindset at the time. That is, how could Canada establish itself as a global
leader in sustainability and institution-building when it actually showed a historical
sensitivity to outside interference?
This confusion was also present in how Canada re-positioned its post-Cold War
defense policy, something that was further hampered by controversy in the military
during the 1990s. While participation in peacekeeping was a politically palatable use of
the military during this time, the incident that came to be known as the “Somalia Affair”
would expose the deep cultural problems that actually existed in the Canadian military. In
March 1993, a Somali teenager was beaten and killed at the hands of Canadian Airborne
Regiment (CAR) peacekeepers who suspected the teenager of stealing supplies. Public
exposure of the incident shortly thereafter not only shocked Canadian society, but also
exposed widespread discipline and organizational problems in the military that were seen
as key factors contributing to the event. Ironically, the urgency of the Cold War may have
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actually helped to mold this culture: Faced with a very “conventional” threat, the military
did little to foster professionalization or academic advancement for its future leaders
during the period. A public inquiry into the Somalia Affair found that the events that led
to the death of the Somali teenager were not simply undertaken by a handful of
miscreants, but were representative of a rough and insular culture that fostered such
actions.186 The Somalia Inquiry found that these issues were particularly exacerbated
within the CAR, which was not a separate unit in itself but instead a “skeleton”
organization composed of units from other parts of the Canadian military. The unit had
also undergone a reorganization from 1991-92, which the inquiry found to be detrimental
to the regiment’s ability to undertake its peacekeeping role in Somalia. 187 As a result of
the Somalia Affair, the CAR was disbanded in 1995. Although the controversy did spur
positive reforms in the Canadian military in many of the problem areas,188 the exposure
of such entrenched social problems in the Canadian military during the 1990s was
nonetheless among the most shameful periods in the history of the country’s defense
establishment.
The stressful combination of greater demand on the Canadian military to
contribute to worldwide contingencies and the general desire to reduce post-Cold War
military expenditures was not ignored in the 1994 defense white paper. The document
acknowledged the uncertainty of the international security environment while also
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discussing the difficulty of doing so amidst Canadian budget constraints. 189 The
document then struck a tone of multilateralism, aiming for a defense posture focused on
the ability to take part in peacekeeping missions. A section focusing on protecting the
Canadian homeland even struck this tone, focusing on using the military in such activities
as aiding civil protection, fisheries enforcement, and responding to environmental
disasters.190 The tone of this document was certainly not unwelcome given the apparent
easing of tensions at the end of the Cold War, but it did allow regular maintenance of
military readiness to be de-prioritized within the budgetary process. Particularly in
retrospect, it became evident just how misunderstood the complexity of responding to
international humanitarian crises really was. Although the Canadian focus on multilateral
peacekeeping during this time was a logical use of the military’s resources, the factors in
place needed to sustain these operations—such as efficient logistics chains and the ability
to deploy military units to far-away locations in short order—were not provided for in
both budgetary terms and strategic outlook. The tone of the 1994 white paper was a
representation of this flawed thinking in that it assumed a more stable international
outlook following the end of the Cold War.191 As seen in crises ranging from the former
Yugoslavia to sub-Saharan Africa during this time, the reality was anything but peaceful.
In light of this, it was clear that Canada was facing a crisis of being in its foreign
and defense policies. Although the politically palatable multilateralism that drove these
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policies during this period may have allowed for an element of stability in light of
domestic turmoil, it also helped to feed a certain amnesia about Canada’s own history
when it came to how its military was employed. While the country has had a reputable
history of peacekeeping under the United Nations flag, it also has a defense policy
beyond it. Yet the lull in strategic tension in the 1990s nonetheless allowed for a new
image of “Canada as peacekeeper, and only that” to become the image of Canadian
defense policy. There are a few possible reasons why this came into being, whether it was
societal relief over the end of the Cold War or a desire to distinguish the Canadian
national identity from the more militaristic United States.192 Interestingly, the
contribution of Canadian military personnel as a percentage of total United Nations
peacekeeping forces has actually fallen dramatically since 1991, when Canada was
among the top contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. 193At the very least, the idea of
Canadian peacekeeping being truly driven by altruism rather than by ulterior motives was
also a misleading notion that fed into this myth. 194 Public opinion polls since the end of
the Cold War on this issue have also yielded interesting results. Canadians have shown
consistency in expressing favorable opinions toward peacekeeping, but have also shown
themselves to be responsive to changes in the international environment. 195 Nonetheless,

Eric Wagner, “The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold
War,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 2006-2007), p. 48.
192

United Nations, “Troop and peace contributors archive (1990-2014),” accessed February 10, 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.
193

Wagner, p. 48-53. This is also explored at length in David Jefferess, “Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the
Myth of the Canadian Peacekeeper,” University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), p. 709727.
194

Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent world,”
International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 370-400.
195

84

a dichotomy developed when tying peacekeeping to specific operations: While a
favorable percentage of Canadians continued to show a “moral obligation” to assist
people suffering from war or poverty, support for Canadian participation in coalition
operations in Afghanistan beginning in 2002 was less enthusiastic.196 Canadians thus
showed a tendency toward internationalism, but were less enthusiastic about participation
in international military operations when the mission was more bluntly defined as
combat-oriented. In this sense, Canadian public opinion was shying away from the reality
of what peacekeeping actually entailed.197
The purpose of explaining Canada’s overall foreign and defense orientation
during this time is to better position our understanding of why the Arctic re-gained
rhetorical prominence when Stephen Harper took office in 2006. The political cycle that
led to a re-assertion of sovereigntist language was not only a product of the confused
policies of the 1990s, but was also a result of Canada having to face the aforementioned
difficulty of continuing to push the “peacekeeper” image while engaging in
unquestionably full-fledged military operations abroad. Following the terrorist attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001, the Canadian government was asked to join the
US-led coalition against Afghanistan and the larger global campaign against terrorism.
The Canadians were quick to respond, committing naval forces to the Arabian Sea in
October 2001 to support American military operations.198 The prospect of committing
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ground troops, however, was less enthusiastic. While discussing the issue in November
2001, Chrétien was quick to point out that any ground mission would last no longer than
six months, and would be halted should Canadian troops find themselves in a “fullconflict situation.”199
Clearly, the Canadians were having trouble getting past the prospect of
warfighters engaging in warfare. A six-month army deployment did eventually follow in
2002, although further Canadian contributions were not ironed out at this time. Canada
would later commit to a stable force rotation that lasted until the end of 2011. This was
likely due to several factors to include demonstrating commitment to Western initiatives
against terrorism and maintaining positive relations with the United States, particularly in
light of Canadian opposition to the 2003 Iraq War.200 From this period of time we can
draw the conclusion that Canada, while not refusing to keep its alliance commitments,
was also reluctant to fully commit to the internationalist position on which it had claimed
to base its post-Cold War foreign policy.
In Arctic policy terms, Canada was faced with a similar conundrum of
determining how best to address the security issues that may have been developing in the
region. Although the disappearance of the Soviet threat alleviated the need to defend the
Canadian Arctic on military terms, hard security issues did not completely disappear
from the region during the 1990s. Both the American and Russian navies continued to
operate submarines in the region in a mutually suspicious manner, raising concerns that
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the possibility of conflict still remained. The secretive nature of American submarine
operations also made it difficult for the Canadians to fully press the issue despite the
close defense relationship between the two countries.201 Despite the presence of “what-if”
scenarios, however, hard security issues were not prioritized given the low chance of
conflict. Instead, the focus of Arctic security policy remained in the realm of lingering
legal issues under UNCLOS and the basic maintenance of military forces that could
operate in the Arctic if the geopolitical situation changed in the future.202
The 1990s and first few years of the new century were largely free of major
concerns for Arctic security, although this was perhaps a refusal to attend to a problem
demanding imminent attention. Certainly, the establishment of the Arctic Council and the
work of other intergovernmental climate organizations helped to bring attention to the
real problems that were due to face the region. There was, however, a noticeable gap
between the end of the Cold War and the 2007 Russian flag incident in which the Arctic
was analyzed in hard security terms. There are several possible reasons for this, not least
of which due to the way that the Arctic was viewed in the respective Arctic states. Aside
from Canada’s views outlined above, Russia was in the process of regaining economic
and political momentum following the ascendency of Vladimir Putin to the Russian
presidency in 2000. Although the country did submit a claim to the United Nations
arguing for an extension to its recognized Arctic claims in 2001,203 the Russian

Rob Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era,”
International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1999), p. 215-221.
201

202

Ibid., p. 224-228.

United Nations. “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, Submissions to the Commission, Submission by the
203

87

government did not begin drafting an updated version of its argument until 2012.204 In the
United States, the issue of climate change had become highly politicized (and particularly
looked down upon by the George W. Bush administration), thus effectively removing the
possibility of significant action on Arctic policy.
Climate policy was nonetheless an area that was gaining increased momentum as
an emerging security issue in the new century. Although the feasibility of a liberal
international order was challenged in the Western world by the difficulties of the United
States’ military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the resigned recognition of the
continued presence of violent conflict also helped to inspire attention to the effects of
climate change on the human environment. This was especially present in areas such as
sub-Saharan Africa, where conflicts over scarce natural resources continued to plague the
continent. Even outside of armed conflict, major environmental events—such as the 2004
Asian tsunami that claimed the lives of over 200,000 people—gave greater weight to the
hypothesis that natural disasters and human security were not mutually exclusive. Paul
Martin’s government—which succeeded that of fellow Liberal Jean Chrétien in
December 2003—had already begun realizing the necessity of a more coherent Arctic
policy. In a 2005 strategy billed as the “International Policy Statement,” the government
explicitly defined the need to emphasize the country’s Arctic sovereignty as well as to
pay greater attention to northern issues.205 Still, assertions of Arctic sovereignty had not
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yet emerged as a foreign policy priority ahead of issues such as terrorism or broader
development concerns. As climate change began to gain more attention from
policymakers, however, this would soon change.
Stephen Harper and Arctic Sovereignty
In December 2005, the Conservative Party outlined an ambitious defense strategy,
known as “Canada First,” as part of its platform for the next month’s federal election. As
part of Canada First, the Stephen Harper-led Conservatives would increase defense
spending in order to procure new aircraft, ships, and increase the total number of military
personnel.206 In a speech that month to outline the plan, Harper did not focus on the
ongoing mission in Afghanistan, which was Canada’s biggest defense priority at the time,
in order to justify the call for increased defense spending. Instead, Harper used the
opportunity to tie the plan to a renewed emphasis on Arctic sovereignty. As part of this
renewed commitment, the new government would seek to utilize overall defense
procurements to commit further resources to the Arctic region as well as to build a new
naval facility in Nunavut that could be used for both civilian and military purposes.207
Harper’s statements were certainly reminiscent of past instances in which Canada held
anxieties about the status of its perceived level of Arctic sovereignty. As in past
instances, these anxieties did not appear out of thin air. The setting this time was Hans
Island, a small rock formation that lies about halfway between Greenland and Ellesmere
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Island in the Nares Strait and whose ownership is the source of a long-running dispute
between Canada and Denmark. In the years preceding Harper’s speech, a series of mostly
symbolic actions on the island had become the source of renewed diplomatic dispute
between the two countries.208 Although these disputes were benign in nature, public
attention to these actions nonetheless raised the profile of Canadian Arctic sovereignty
concerns.209
A curious dynamic upon Harper’s election in January 2006 was how these new
assertions of sovereignty fit into Canada’s relationship with the United States. In his first
press conference following his election, Harper directly criticized the United States for its
position that the Northwest Passage constituted an international waterway. 210 In light of
Canada’s previous history of asserting its Arctic sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States,
this could have been seen as an immediate attempt to signal to the Americans that Harper
would not be a pushover in the bilateral relationship. The context of what Harper sought
to change in the relationship, however, was quite the opposite. Owing to somewhat frosty
relations in the years previous that were particularly enflamed by the Iraq War, the
Conservatives were able to paint a latent anti-Americanism that existed in Canada at this
time as unproductive to the overall health of the bilateral relationship. Harper had thus
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actually prioritized the rebuilding of the Canada-US relationship, something that he was
successful in doing early in his tenure.211 This was also, arguably, an evolution of the
modern Conservative tradition in approaching U.S. relations. If we look at the previous
examples of Diefenbaker, who was more stubborn about his country’s interests in the
bilateral relationship, and Mulroney, who was warmer toward the United States while
also having to deal with the controversial Polar Sea incident, we see an interesting meld
of steadfast national sovereignty and committed concern about the strength of the
relationship. This may have only been possible because, as was the case in the century
previous, the United States was not eager to push the Canadians on Arctic sovereignty
matters. For Harper, being able to speak effectively to both the sovereigntist and
bilateralist positions early in his governing term was a major boon for his agenda.
During his first year in office, Harper would add further rhetorical weight to the
Canadian government’s focus on Arctic sovereignty. In an August 2006 speech in Iqaluit,
Harper described the “first principle of Arctic sovereignty” to be “use it or lose it;” 212 that
is, the country was required to constantly reinforce its sovereignty over its Arctic territory
to prevent it from being encroached upon by others. Such a statement not only reiterated
Harper’s focus on the Arctic, but also added a special urgency to the issue. On a
discursive level, this presented a certain irony: Rather than speaking to the global threat
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faced as a result of Arctic climate change—which could, in the most literal sense, result
in the decrease of landmass due to rising sea levels—Harper was actually speaking to the
need to bolster human activity in order to deter a hypothetical military incursion. As it
would so happen, Harper’s “use it or lose it” remark took place during the midst of a
Canadian military exercise whose magnitude had perhaps not been seen in the Arctic in
decades.213
Shortly prior to Harper’s assumption of office, the Canadian military had begun a
reorganization process that was completed in 2006. The result of this was the re-flagging
of the previous Canadian Forces Northern Area, which was responsible for military
operations in northern Canada, under a new command called Joint Task Force North. The
change was more than cosmetic: As part of the larger defense transformation, Joint Task
Force North was imagined as a flexible organization that would work more closely with
civil authorities to respond to emergencies and environmental disasters.214 Such a change
was particularly convenient for the practical aspects of the new focus on the Arctic, but
also allowed the government to present the impression that it was immediately
committing resources to the Arctic—even if the change was already forthcoming under
the previous government’s defense restructuring.
Defining the Arctic “threat” was also an evolving thought process during this
time. While the long-term threat came from the melting of Arctic ice and the subsequent
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negative effects on the natural environment, there were also questions of which manmade threats needed to be prioritized in strategic thinking. Although pessimistic thinkers
would offer the possibility of state-to-state threats if Canada did not assert its sovereignty
in the region, the likelier threat came from man-made environmental damage due to
resource exploitation, illegal dumping, or poaching of endangered species. The expected
increase in human activity would also cause a greater demand on search-and-rescue
resources, which tended to be handled by the military and civilian coast guard. Defining
the chief threats had importance beyond allocating budgetary resources. If the biggest
threats to the Arctic came through means that were usually dealt with by law enforcement
authorities, would there really be much point in increasing military forces in the region?
Even in an “aid to civilian authorities” capacity, it would not be necessary to increase the
military presence in the Arctic in the way proposed under the new strategy. For this to
happen, external forces would need to justify this presence.
Although it was due to circumstances that were not caused by Canada directly,
but instead the deteriorating manner of relations between the West and Russia, such an
opportunity presented itself in 2007. While Western media outlets saw the 2007 Russian
flag-planting incident as the latest evidence of a resumption of the Cold War given the
state of Western-Russian relations at the time, the Canadian government was also in a
position to showcase the incident as justification of its Arctic strategy. Foreign minister
Peter Mackay’s immediate response characterized the Russian action as harkening back
to the fifteenth century, 215 although it was the resulting actions that would prove to be
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more impactful. Shortly after the incident, Harper took the opportunity to make an
“important announcement” regarding Canada’s Arctic sovereignty in a speech at Resolute
Bay. Repeating his “use it or lose it” line from the previous summer, Harper formally
announced the government’s plans to construct a naval facility and Arctic military
training center as promised in the 2006 election campaign. 216 Although the language in
the speech was strikingly similar to language used in previous speeches on the Arctic—
particularly in emphasizing Canada’s Arctic heritage—the previous week’s events
provided for convenient timing for Harper’s message to be amplified.
By framing the incident as an extension of recent Russian prodding of the North
Atlantic security framework,217 Canada—and the United States, for that matter—
immediately established an image of Russian actions in the Arctic as being inherently
aggressive. This discursive tool did not just follow the immediate aftermath of the
incident, but was regularly utilized when accusing Russia of infringing on Canadian
sovereignty.218 Such a dynamic between Russia and the West also helped to add
legitimacy to the Harper government’s political agenda in the Arctic. Why then does a
deeper examination of the issue show that conflict was unlikely to arise? In the wake of
the flag-planting episode, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov visited Canada in
November 2007. During his visit, the two sides signed several agreements on matters of
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Arctic economic cooperation, agricultural relations, and energy policy. 219 It was clear that
any actual controversy over the August incident had abated on a government-togovernment level. The signing of the Ilulissat Declaration the following year only
strengthened the argument that, despite what media and the general public had been led
to believe in the months previous, there was indeed little chance of physical conflict
between the Arctic states.
Aside from what was happening in the public eye, work still needed to be done
for the Harper government in meeting the goals of its Arctic agenda. In 2009, the
government laid out a comprehensive “Northern Strategy.” While the strategy did not
present anything particularly new beyond what the government had previously stated
when discussing its Arctic agenda, the unveiling of the country’s first Arctic strategy
since 2000 did demonstrate renewed commitment to the region. The Northern Strategy
outlined four key areas of focus: Arctic sovereignty, protecting Canada’s “environmental
heritage,” social and economic development, and increasing political devolution to local
governments.220 As was evident by the use of these four pillars, the strategy balanced
both the sovereigntist aspects of the Arctic agenda with the softer, human dimension that
generally preoccupied day-to-day Northern affairs.
What was also notable here was the language used: It was not simply a matter of
protecting Canada’s sovereign territory, but also its “heritage.” In this line of thinking,
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Canadian government action to protect sovereign territory in the Arctic was, therefore,
preserving the most intrinsic root of Canadian nationhood. Also important to note here,
however, is how the tone of the document matched the dynamic observed in November
2007: Even while the relationship between the East and West was tense, Canada was
seeking to take a cooperative approach to multinational Arctic affairs. The presence of
the sovereignty pillar also proved a bit ironic as the document even went so far as to
downplay Arctic territory disagreements with Denmark and the United States, saying
“All of these disagreements are well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defense
challenges for Canada.”221 Never mind the role that these disagreements had in elevating
Canadian fears of losing Arctic territory in the previous century, now the government was
outright saying that such fears were misplaced!
A second document, billed as the “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy”
was released in 2010 and used similar tones in translating Canada’s Arctic strategy to the
international context. Even when discussing matters of Arctic sovereignty, the document
emphasized Canada’s intention to assure its sovereignty claims through legal channels. 222
The manner in which the Arctic agenda was shaped during this time was representative of
the duality that characterized Canadian Arctic policy at this time.
While Harper’s rhetoric demanded that Canada take stronger action to defend its
Arctic sovereignty, his government was actually taking a more passive approach in
policy. By following up on campaign pledges to coherently elevate the status of the
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Arctic in both domestic and foreign policy, Harper’s government had seemingly
conquered a major aspect of its political agenda. By the end of the Conservatives’ reign
in 2015, however, the operationalization of the Arctic agenda had become mired in
budgetary concerns, technical delays, and political controversy.
What follows is an interesting test of the gap that may exist between rhetoric and
domestic politics in applying securitization concepts to the real world. In doing this, I will
examine the two key areas of focus for the Harper government’s Canadian Arctic agenda.
First, the role that hard security structures—namely the military—played in the agenda
will help to demonstrate whether the Arctic was actually made to be a priority in the
defense agenda. Second, the “soft” aspects of the Arctic security agenda—those being
economic development and human security issues—will highlight how the government
actually worked against itself in getting to the root of the problem.
Preparing for the war that wouldn’t happen
As ambitious as the Arctic agenda was regarding a reinforcement of Canadian
defense capabilities in the Arctic, not even the most optimistic military planners could
argue that increasing the defense footprint would be possible without unique difficulty.
Fortunately, the government was able to call on a group of familiar faces, the Canadian
Rangers, to aid in its effort. Not only did the Rangers continue to offer an opportunity to
act as a low-cost “listening post” in the Arctic, but also offered invaluable expertise to a
defense establishment that was looking to increase its presence in a region in which it had
relatively little operational experience. Additionally, further attention to the Canadian
Rangers was a palatable way of selling the idea of an increased military presence in the
Arctic to the public, as the Rangers’ iconic uniforms consisting of red sweaters and
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baseball caps presented a familiar tone to “Southern” Canadians. 223 The Rangers’
expertise not only included valuable understandings of their local geography, but also
included training Canadian military personnel in basic survival skills endemic to the
harsh Arctic climate. Coupled with a pledge from Harper for additional funding to
increase personnel, add new Ranger units (or “patrols”), and modernize the Rangers’
equipment, the use of the Rangers as part of the new Arctic agenda seemed like a sensible
plan.224
Although the renewed role for the Canadian Rangers could be seen as a success in
basic terms, the actual reality of these plans did not live up to their rhetorical gusto. In
contrast, defense officials felt that Ranger patrols were already plentiful and at necessary
personnel levels across the Arctic, and that resources would actually be better suited to
patrols well south of the Arctic. In the end, it was actually the non-Arctic units that saw
the most growth as a result of the government’s plans to boost the Rangers’ size.225 The
more public controversy involved efforts to procure replacements for the Rangers’ Lee
Enfield rifles, which dated to World War II. The process did not even begin until the
summer of 2011, and it was not until four years later that the new rifles began making
their way to the Rangers in a disbursement cycle that was planned to last until 2019. 226
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Issues procuring rifles proved to be a microcosm for other problems that plagued
the defense establishment on more expensive systems. The one that would cause the most
political controversy—and even be a major factor in challenging Harper’s position as
prime minister—was the process surrounding the procurement of the Lockheed Martin F35 fighter jet. A joint development effort of eight countries—with the United States as
the largest investor—the F-35 was seen as a reasonably-priced option for countries
seeking a 21st century replacement for aging fighter aircraft. Canada joined the project in
1997—although it did not sign a binding agreement to purchase the future fighter227—and
did not face controversy over the decision for the first several years of the aircraft’s
development. Fissures began to appear in the program south of the border in March 2010,
however, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired the senior military officer in
charge of the program due to cost overruns and performance issues.228
Controversy over the program would strike Ottawa just a few months later.
Without first having parliamentary debate or seeking a competitive bid to replace its
current crop of F-18 fighter jets, the government announced its intention to purchase 65
F-35s. Although the government had stated its intention to buy that many fighter jets
under the Canada First strategy, the unilateral decision by the government to commit to
the F-35 specifically was immediately seized upon by the political opposition.229 The
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controversy was further inflamed when media reports suggested that the government was
misrepresenting the true costs of the program.230 The problems mounted for the
Conservatives in February 2011 when Canada’s elections board charged that the party
had violated electoral rules during the 2006 campaign. 231 This only fueled growing
criticisms about the government’s overall level of transparency—many of which
stemmed from the F-35 cost issue—resulting in the opposition presenting a vote of noconfidence in March 2011 and forcing another election. The no-confidence vote also
involved the first instance in Canadian history in which a government was held in
contempt by a parliamentary committee.232
Despite the tumultuous year the Conservatives had faced politically, they actually
increased their share of power in parliament in the election two months later, attaining a
majority for the first time since coming to power. The reason for this was not only a
fractured political opposition, but also the manner in which it split. The left-wing New
Democratic Party (NDP), which in previous years had served as second-fiddle
progressives behind the more established Liberals, emerged as the second-place finishers
in the 2011 election and captured the role of official opposition. The Liberals, on the
other hand, lost over half of their previous share of seats. Liberal leader Michael
Ignatieff, who resigned after an election in which he failed to even win his own
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constituency, was an accomplished historian who had argued for a hawkish,
internationalist foreign policy. 233 Perhaps Ignatieff’s foreign policy made him
indistinguishable from that of Harper, who was often accused by the political opposition
of being too bellicose by Canadian standards. Perhaps Ignatieff simply presented himself
as too aloof during the election campaign.234 Or perhaps, in some way, the Canadian
government had finally articulated a coherent set of policies that provided stability for the
Canadian electorate in a way that had not been realized since the end of the Cold War.
If this latter proposition was the case, it did not change the fact that the
government’s success at throwing rhetorical support behind its Arctic agenda
significantly outweighed its ability to actually successfully implement the agenda. As the
F-35 program continued to have problems outside of Canada’s borders,235 strategists
began to question the appropriateness of the jet for Canada’s particular needs. Some
questioned the logic of replacing the dual-engine F-18—which offered a safeguard in
case of the loss of one engine—with the single-engine F-35 given the expected use of the
jet over the vast Arctic territory. 236 There were also concerns that the first jets delivered
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to Canada would not include a satellite communications suite necessary to communicate
from distant points over the Arctic.237 The budgetary woes extended to other aspects of
the agenda as well, notably in the construction of the Nanisivik Naval Facility. Located at
the site of a former zinc mine on Baffin Island, the new naval facility would be used to
support deep-water maritime operations during the summer months. Harper originally
announced plans for the naval facility in 2007 with an estimated budget allocation of
$100 million as well as plans for an adjacent airstrip. When the Royal Canadian Navy
approved plans for the base in 2010, however, the plan’s price tag had ballooned to $258
million.238 The government eventually scaled back the project to reduce the cost to $116
million, which resulted in shelving plans for the airstrip as well as plans to keep the
facility running year round. 239 Ground was also not broken on the facility until 2015, with
an expected opening date of 2018.240
Ships that could potentially be docking at Nanisivik in the future were also
contributing to the budgetary woes. In 2010, the government unveiled plans to construct
several ships for Arctic operations under a program called the National Shipbuilding
Procurement Strategy (NSPS). The NSPS called for construction of new ships for both
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combatant and non-combatant roles (i.e., icebreaking). The program also served a role
beyond procurement for the robust Arctic agenda: while the Canadian shipbuilding
industry had been previously been driven by a “boom-and-bust” cycle that saw ships built
mostly during times of need, the NSPS provided a new dynamic that would see ships
built on a more regular schedule regardless of the international political situation. 241 As
such, the NSPS also incorporated the goal of establishing strong relationships with the
shipbuilding industry, to include a competitive bidding process for the task of building
the ships.242 The program began to experience problems over the ensuing years, however,
as it became apparent that the government had underestimated the true costs of the
program.243 The scope of the NSPS also showed itself to be too broad: as the strategy
called for the construction of several different types of ships, determining how to focus
budgetary resources may have effectively resulted in projects competing against each
other. Echoing criticisms of the F-35 project, commentators also began to see the ships as
ineffective in meeting operational requirements while creating a significant cost burden
for the government.244
In contrast to these setbacks, the government’s rhetorical support for its Arctic
agenda was in full swing. Harper used annual trips to the Arctic—he visited the region
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each summer between 2006 and 2015245—to lend legitimacy to the government’s agenda.
The visits eventually drew ire from the political opposition, not only due to public
revelations of the cost of the visits, but also due to perceptions of their contrived nature.
For Harper’s opponents, images of the prime minister donning Canadian Ranger apparel
and riding snowmobiles made the visits seem like less of a demonstration of national
sovereignty and more, as one Liberal member of parliament quipped, a “million-dollar
photo op.”246
Public knowledge of the difficulties in operationalizing the Arctic agenda also
could not prevent the development of a perception that a massive militarization campaign
was underway in the region. One example of this was during the 2011 election campaign
when Ignatieff accused Harper of choosing militarization of the Arctic over a focus on
improving the region’s social services.247 After all, the 2009 Northern Strategy did devote
attention to ensuring security in the region through “ground-up” social and economic
development. On balance, however, Ignatieff’s criticism of these aspects of Harper’s
Arctic policies was not unfounded; by that point, the perception was that Harper’s Arctic
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economic development programs put particular emphasis on natural resource exploitation
as an economic engine rather than diversifying the region’s economy. 248
As Northern socioeconomic issues received increased public attention,249 the true
depth of issues facing Arctic communities also became more apparent. Although
Harper’s economic programs may have provided short-term relief to Arctic communities
that struggled to maintain sustainable economies, critics did not see this as solving the
longstanding social problems—such as dealing with mental health and high suicide
rates—that plagued these communities. The emphasis on natural resource exploitation as
a vehicle for economic growth was particularly ironic to many given the potentially
negative environmental effects of these activities, which would harm subsistence
economies that were essential to providing for many Arctic communities.250 Scientists
were further skeptical of supposed scientific research stations as being heavily influenced
by the energy sector.251 In time, the tangible results of Harper’s ambitious Arctic agenda
had slowly unraveled on both the hard and soft security fronts.
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How can we explain the difficulties of turning the ambition of the Arctic agenda
into reality? There are three key areas that likely resulted in this. First, the difficulties of
ramping up human activity in the Arctic may have been underestimated. Although the
limitations posed by Arctic operations were expected, it was not until more coherent
plans were drawn up for these operations that the true costs began to hit home. While the
“not knowing without doing” phenomenon was not surprising, there were also cases of
simple shortsightedness: in the Nanisivik case, the government’s failure to communicate
with local authorities led them to begin plans for the new port facility without fully
understanding what resources would be available.252 Even energy corporations who
appeared quite keen on the Arctic’s untapped natural resources found themselves scaling
down operations after early difficulties operating in the region.253 The Harper
government’s nearly decade-long ambitions in the Arctic showed that the region was less
understood than previously thought.
The second problem in implementing the Arctic agenda was simple bureaucratic
politics. Of the near-decade that the Harper government held power, it spent over half of
it as a minority government. This made it more difficult for the government to win
parliamentary support for Arctic programs, particularly given the agenda’s emphasis on
boosting defense spending and increasing natural resource exploitation. Moreover,
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controversies over cost overruns in Arctic projects began to be seen by the political
opposition as further evidence of opaque government behavior that extended to the
broader political agenda.254 Although the fractured nature of Canada’s political
opposition255 may have aided Harper’s ability to grow his political coalition from 20062011 on numerical terms, this also created a growing discontent in opposing political
circles that would turn against Harper in the 2015 election.
The third problem may have simply been due to exogenous factors that negatively
impacted key aspects of the Arctic agenda. The most notable example was the budgetary
issues faced by the F-35 program. Although Canada had extended a tentative
commitment to procure airplanes from the program, it did not sustain the initial research
and development costs that were borne by the United States. While the source of the
controversy may have been the government’s failure to be forthcoming about the
program’s true costs, program delays which the government was helpless to prevent also
would have put it in a difficult political position. The decline of global oil prices, which
took a toll on the Canadian economy, 256 also made it difficult to sustain continued

254

This perception was not instantaneous, but rather built over the course of the Harper government. See
Sarah Boesveld, “Report gives Harper government a failing grade for transparency,” National Post, May
10, 2011, accessed March 20, 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/report-gives-harpergovernment-a-failing-grade-for-transparency and Tim Harper, “Stephen Harper quietly scraps a pledge of
transparency,” Toronto Star, November 30, 2014, accessed March 20, 2016,
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/11/30/stephen_harper_quietly_scraps_a_pledge_of_transparenc
y_tim_harper.html .
255

Though the Conservatives and Liberals have traditionally been the two largest parties in Canadian
politics, the NDP and Bloc Québecois also tended to constitute sizable minorities in the House of
Commons as well.
Kim Mackrael, “Falling Oil Prices Hurt Canadian Economy,” Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2015,
accessed March 20, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/falling-oil-prices-hit-canadian-economy1437002047.
256

107

investment in government infrastructure projects in the North. This was not unique to the
boom-and-bust nature of infrastructure investment, but the particular difficulties of
operating in the North made long-term infrastructure investment more difficult than in
other regions.
Having traced the Arctic legacy leading to the present, we have gained significant
insight into how the political processes that result in tangible action presented a different
challenge than the speech acts that are made to be central to securitization theory. The
second—and arguably more important—component of understanding securitization
theory comes from understanding how speech acts translate into public acceptance of the
given constitution of threat. In the next chapter, I will assess how public perceptions of
the Arctic agenda as an existential security matter developed during the course of the
Harper government, with particular attention to potential differences across regions and
ideological lines.
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Ch. 4: Measuring the impact of policy in media and public opinion
The final aspect of this analysis will look at how government Arctic policy from 2006 to
2015 was reflected in Canadian media reporting and public opinion. This will draw from
original research of media reporting as well as analysis of existing public opinion data
over this time period in order to evaluate the influence of government policy rhetoric on
the populace. In addition, public opinion and media reporting following key
flashpoints—particularly the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident—will be evaluated to
discern whether the national populace was energized on the issue by instances of possible
“threat.”
The more intriguing part of this analysis involves analyzing the effect of
government rhetoric not only on a national level, but also across provinces and between
“Northern” Canada and “Southern” Canada. The reason for doing this is to control for
other factors that may have influenced perceptions of government Arctic rhetoric and
policy, such as political party loyalty, economic and social divides, education levels, and
exposure to regular media on Arctic issues. The difficulty in doing so, however, is that
the potential resonance of the Arctic as a recent security issue is not something that can
be viewed in a vacuum. As has been argued here, rhetoric about Arctic securitization is,
in fact, the result of an evolution of Canadian identity since the 19th century. When
adjusting for perceptions of government action to address the “Arctic security problem,”
therefore, we cannot isolate the modern nature of the issue from other political lines that
may have influenced opinions on government action. Instead, research on media
reporting and public opinion across regions will help to demonstrate whether there was
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resonance on a national level that is clearly evident beyond other, regional-level factors
that may affect reception to government rhetoric on given issues.
The Canadian political landscape: A brief background
Isolating Canadian electoral politics as a potential variable in public opinion on the Arctic
may actually be relatively easy to achieve simply because the landscape has been so fluid
in the past fifty years. An analysis of electoral results from 1968 to 2015257 found it
difficult to identify consistent party loyalties over an extended period of time from the
1990s onward, with some exceptions. A large part of this had to do with the presence of
“political insurgencies” that would occur every few elections. Prior to the 1993 election,
the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties generally battled for the majority of
seats (ridings), with smaller proportions won by the NDP and Social Credit Party.258 In
1993, however, a victory by Jean Chrétien’s Liberals was also met by a Conservative
collapse—many areas of Western Canada that generally favored the Conservatives voted
for the Reform Party instead—and the emergence of the Bloc Québécois as a powerful
political force in light of growing tensions over Quebec’s political status. Conversely, the
2011 success of the NDP was aided by the wooing of Liberal and Bloc Québécois-
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leaning voters, resulting in massive losses for both parties. 259 Attempting to categorize
voting trends on a simple left-right ideological spectrum also would not capture the
various cleavages that exist between parties, nor would it represent the potential diversity
of opinions that could be present across issues. Nonetheless, we can make some
assumptions based upon the areas in which political trends have shown more consistency.
For example, we would expect less political support for Harper’s Arctic agenda in
metropolitan Toronto or Montreal, given the Conservatives’ flagging political success in
those areas in the last two decades. Conversely, we would expect stronger support in
Harper’s home province of Alberta, whose own economic interests in natural resource
development would only increase favorable views toward the government’s Arctic
economic program.
There is also the issue of how Northern Canadians view their interests within the
Canadian federal system. Each of the three northern territories holds a seat in the 338member House of Commons and 105-member Senate, although geographic factors—
particularly in the Nunavut archipelago—make intimate representation more difficult
than in more populated areas. In addition, Northern Quebec is located within a
geographically large electoral riding that extends into “Southern” Canada, which may
limit the resonance of that community’s needs at the federal level. Northern regions also
remain dependent on federal subsidies, potentially limiting the political position of
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Northern regions in the federal political process even further.260 Residents of Northern
Quebec also found themselves trapped in a difficult position when Quebec’s provincial
government began to assert greater control over the federal-provincial relationship in the
1980s, which may have further isolated the needs of the primarily Aboriginal population
from federal purview. Thus, even attempts to push Northern issues to the provincial level
may not always be fruitful.261 While political devolution giving greater autonomy to local
governance may be favored by Northern regions, particularly those with a large
Aboriginal population,262 the current reality is that decisions on Northern issues are
largely controlled by Southern Canada. This is not only due to a lack of influential
political representation at the federal level, but also the fact that many northerners live in
the three territories that hold less power vis-à-vis the federal government than do
Canada’s provinces. This is especially pronounced in Nunavut, whose geography has
provided the federal government with an argument to give the territory less power over
natural resource rights than in the Northwest Territories or Yukon.263 This also, arguably,
maintains a certain level of psychological distance between Northern and Southern
Canada in that the northern territories are still viewed as distant frontiers that can be
governed directly from Ottawa.
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On the question of how Northerners view an increased federal presence in the
Arctic, there is also a notable mix of rhetoric. Some perspectives were more welcoming
to increased resource extraction activities in the North as a means to boost the region’s
struggling economy, assuming that such activities were balanced by necessary
environmental protections.264 Other perspectives, such as those argued by former Inuit
leader and Canadian diplomat Mary Simon, were more concerned about the realistic
impacts of increased outside activity on the day-to-day life of Northern communities.265
There is some weight behind using the term “realistic impacts” here. Although resource
exploitation could provide short-to-medium-term economic relief for struggling Northern
communities, the likely effect would be the decline—if not eventual, total elimination
of—traditional subsistence activities that served as the lifeline for these communities. For
many Northern communities, having to face such a reality head-on creates a sense of
pause in the abstract rhetoric happening at the national level.
In the context of public opinion on the issue, there are also some methodological
factors to consider. Even aside from the above conundrum of geographic distance
between the majority of Canadians and the Arctic, there is also the issue of assumptions
about how much Canadians truly comprehend the Arctic. The difficulties of measuring
public opinion have been shown to be particularly present in Canada, not least of which
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are due to language divisions that can significantly alter the tone of poll questions. 266 Yet
it may also be possible that the elasticity of policy decisions to public opinion may be
overstated, particularly when the nature of Canadian parliamentary democracy has made
it difficult for single parties to consistently command strong majorities on a given issue.
François Petry’s study of democratic responsiveness in Canadian politics found that
public opinion was certainly able to influence policy outcomes on key issues, particularly
in cases in which the effects of policies were redistributive to the larger population versus
benefitting elite interest groups. This was made easier, however, when public opinion
already supported the government’s agenda.267 An interesting finding by Petry here also
has application to Arctic policy under Stephen Harper. Using the example of Brian
Mulroney pursuing free-trade agreements in opposition to public opinion, Petry notes that
Mulroney was able to overcome this opposition by intensifying communications
campaigns to meet intensified overall discussion of the free trade issue. 268 In short, the
government was able to win the argument by having the most prominent voice in a loud
discussion. Although public opinion may not have been steadfastly against Harper’s
Arctic agenda—as will be discussed below—there is some logical extension here. By
presenting a bold plan in the face of increased demand for bold action, the government
may have been able to gain significant momentum to implement its agenda.
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One also must consider where the Arctic stands as both a domestic and foreign
policy issue: socioeconomic issues fall within the former, whereas sovereignty and
climate policy, for the most part, fall within the latter. The intuitive assumption is that
domestic policy carries more weight between the two in public opinion, though Petry’s
analysis demonstrates that changes in government could also noticeably alter this
balance.269 Carrying this assumption forward, it would not be surprising to see such a
dynamic when Harper increased rhetoric about Canadian Arctic sovereignty in the
international sphere. In the previous chapter, I discussed the salience of the Arctic issue
in the late 1990s in the context of broader Canadian foreign policy. Yet there are also
some notable points to address when putting the Arctic in the context of foreign policy,
particularly when determining how opinions differ between across regions.
The most contentious example of this is how Quebec’s unique culture within the
Canadian identity shapes public opinion in that province, especially considering the
dynamics germane to French-language media. Public opinion in Quebec has also shown
itself to have notable differences from the rest of Canada on major foreign policy issues.
While Quebec showed higher disagreement than the rest of Canada with the United
States’ post-9/11 defense policy (to include the invasion of Iraq),270 Quebeckers were
more favorable than the rest of Canada toward the 1987 Canada-US Free Trade
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Agreement and subsequent 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.271 There are
some factors that explain the case of the former. Although Quebeckers’ views of the
United States have fluctuated over time, some commentators have noted the possibility of
a growing “anti-Americanism” streak in the province in the early 2000s. 272 This may be
due to less exposure to American media than English-speaking Canada and more
exposure to media from France, which was more critical of American foreign policy after
9/11.273 In trade terms, however, Quebec politicians were able to influence public opinion
in favor of free trade by linking the issue to politics surrounding Quebec nationalism in
the early 1990s.274 In both cases, we see examples of elites—be they political leaders,
media, or lobbying groups—playing a significant role in shaping public opinion.
Although concerted government campaigns existed to influence public opinion
regarding Arctic initiatives prior to Harper’s government—as outlined in the second
chapter—the ability of the government to engage in a comprehensive strategic
communications campaign was heightened over previous eras via technological change.
As such, the ability to produce mass communications campaigns that could be seen as
easily in Toronto as they could in Iqaluit allowed for the government to harmonize its
intended message. One must also consider, however, how Canadians viewed national
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security in the first place. In light of the political tumult of the 1990s, Canadian attitudes
were shifting on identity matters when it came to this issue. On matters of defining
Canadian national identity, opinion polling outside of Quebec found a significant increase
in support between 1995 and 2004 for factors such as “Speaking the Language,” 275
“Being Born in Canada,” and “Having Citizenship.” There was also an increase in
support for the Canadian military and national history as sources of pride. 276 Arguably,
this change in support was wedded to the evolving dynamics of the international arena
and their effects on Canada. Canadian participation in the American-led “War on Terror”
and further inward evaluation of Canada’s increasingly diverse population—as generally
harmonious as this latter phenomenon has been—may have contributed to a rise in the
more conservative notion of national identity. Furthermore, this would have helped
explain support for the Conservative Party’s 2006 electoral victory as well as continued
exploitation of identity-based factors by the Harper government to garner support for its
foreign policy and Arctic agendas.277
Corollary to these findings is how Canadians were responding to the notion of
internationalism. As noted in the previous chapter, controversial actions taken by
Canadian peacekeepers in the 1990s and public realizations of the difficult realities of
peacemaking in the Afghanistan conflict likely had an effect on public enthusiasm for
peacekeeping. This finding was also noted in the above polling regarding inclusion of
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“Democracy” and “Influence in the World” as sources of Canadian pride, which saw a
decline between 1995 and 2004.278 In this sense, any Canadian attachment to
internationalism may have come from a cyclical, “nostalgic” desire to attach something
distinct to the Canadian identity, a desire that became subdued when further inquiry into
the subject was presented.279
Pinning down the sources of Canadian foreign policy becomes further
complicated by the country’s relationship with the United States. While Canadians have
consistently shown an independent streak when it comes to the relationship, there is also
a general consensus that bilateral relations need to remain healthy. 280 Public opinion can
also go against certain issues that may put the government in a difficult position within
the bilateral relationship. An example of this was seen in 2004, when the Canadian
government backed down on its initial openness to joining an American ballistic missile
defense system as Canadian public opinion soured toward the United States due to the
invasion of Iraq and a series of protectionist actions by the Americans toward crossborder trade.281
These factors demonstrate that the Canadian public’s perceptions of foreign
policy are subject to regular change, but are also not irrespective of rational assessment of
the international scene. At the same time, evaluation of public attitudes toward foreign

278

Ibid., p. 15-17.

Don Munton and Tom Keating, “Internationalism and the Canadian Public,” Canadian Journal of
Political Science, Vol 34, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 532.
279

280

Ibid, p. 542.

Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, “Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-U.S. Security Relations,”
The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 2008), p. 79.
281

118

policy could lead one to believe that Canadians are, at times, subject to “crises of
confidence” between rhetorical national identity and their willingness to uphold the
values associated with that identity. Although that is not a trait unique to Canadians, it
does provide for an important foundation for understanding how the government can
influence public opinion on matters of national security.
The issue then becomes determining whether and, if it did, how the Canadian
government was able to “sell” the Arctic as a security issue to the general public.
Answering these questions of multiple facets of Canadian society will provide a strong
understanding of the government’s effectiveness in securitizing the issue. The first aspect
of this involves identifying trends and differences across the Canadian national spectrum.
As outlined above, we would expect differences across regions based upon predominant
political ideology, socioeconomic factors, and population density. The last aspect may
prove to be the most interesting. While we would expect differences in opinions when
comparing cities and rural areas, what would the dynamic be when comparing major
cities to major cities? The value of knowing this is not only in highlighting these
dynamics, but in determining if there are any potential variables affecting these dynamics
beyond predominant political ideology. Moreover, it is necessary to determine whether
the Canadian public has accepted the Arctic problem as a security issue as framed by the
government. In order to do this, I will trace how public opinion was affected by changes
in the international environment, most notably surrounding particular Arctic-related
events.
Beyond the attitudes of the general public, we can also view the potential
securitization of the issue through the lens of the media. Certainly, the media can be
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argued to be an extension of the securitization process rather than being the referent
object. At the same time, the relationship between the media and public opinion is
different from the relationship between the public and the government. Whereas the
government attempts to win public support for its agenda, the media can both influence
as an elite actor and serve as an effective bellwether of public opinion. This distinction is
important as it shows that the media’s influence is not constrained by one side of the
government-public relationship, but can instead serve the interests of either based upon
the circumstances. Measuring media interpretations of the Arctic security agenda can
therefore be valuable in determining if trends mirror or help shape public opinion over
time. Additionally, trends in media reporting and editorializing on the issue may help to
uncover identifiable preferences within the broadly defined media. If this is the case, then
it would possibly demonstrate a third actor that has a definable role in the securitization
process.
Methodologically, there are some issues to note in analyzing the securitization
process in this way. Data on Canadian public opinion in regards to this issue is not
extensive, and the data analyzed here was gathered by polling groups that remained close
to the issue. Although the polling methodology itself meets an empirical standard, the
relatively limited availability of polling data should be acknowledged as a byproduct of
the relative youth of the issue. On this note, the long-term ramifications of the Canadian
Arctic security agenda cannot yet be evaluated given that increased focus on the issue, as
defined here, has only been underway for a decade. This is especially important to note
given the October 2015 electoral defeat of the Harper government, which occurred during
the time of this writing. It is very possible that the current government under Justin
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Trudeau would choose not to continue the country’s Arctic security agenda along the
same lines. The value of this research, therefore, is to evaluate how the government
during a given period of time attempted a securitization process and to understand the
factors that allowed—or did not allow—securitization to take place. The subsequent
effects of these processes, while not possible to study at the present time, are certainly
worth further study in the future.
Canadian Public Opinion and Arctic Security
The main data sets used here were taken as part of a comprehensive joint initiative
by the EKOS Research Associates polling firm, the Walter and Duncan Gordon
Foundation, and the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs. Billed as
“Rethinking the Top of the World,” the polling initiative was published in two iterations
in 2011 and 2015. One stream of thought would find that this timeline doesn’t completely
capture the full securitization process that might have been taking place upon Harper’s
election in 2006. Conversely, this may have nonetheless been enough time for public
opinion on the Arctic to “settle” with less sensitivity to heightened rhetoric that takes
place during election campaigns. This latter assumption will guide the understanding of
the polling results here. Interestingly, the poll also sought opinions from the public of
other Arctic states in addition to analyzing Canadian public opinion on both the national
and sub-national levels. Although the results of public opinion outside of Canada are not
the subject of analysis here, they nonetheless do add some further context to the global
public picture regarding the nature of Arctic security.

121

On broad questions facing the Arctic, the 2011 opinion poll did show some
notable differences between Northern and Southern Canada.282 Although respondents in
both locales stated that the natural environment was the biggest issue facing the
Canada—with 33% of Northerners and 39% of Southerners expressing this opinion—
Northerners also put greater value on factors such as housing, the economy, and
education. The starkest contrast between the two, interestingly, was found amongst those
who stated that sovereignty was the biggest issue facing the region: whereas 19% of
respondents expressed this opinion in Southern Canada, only 6% expressed this opinion
in Northern Canada. What might account for this difference? Pollsters noted that focus
groups in Northern communities expressed a less developed understanding of the Arctic
sovereignty issue, particularly as this issue was not adequately presented by the media or
government. In Southern Canada, the highest response to the prioritization of Arctic
sovereignty was found in the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, although this
response was not significantly higher than the average in all of Southern Canada. This
aspect of the polling results is not particularly surprising given the socioeconomic
differences between Northern and Southern Canada as well as the focused resonance of
the government-driven Arctic sovereignty campaign toward Southern Canadians.
Nonetheless, the poll also found Northern Canadians to be more upbeat on opinions of
current quality of life, expected quality of life in the next 10 years, and current health.
This finding is surprising at first sight, although differences between Northern regions are
less surprising. Whereas 84% of Yukon respondents found their life to be “good,” 65% of
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respondents in more remote Nunavut stated the same. This finding is helpful in
demonstrating that even the “North” in itself is prone to differences on socioeconomic
and wellness matters.
Respondents were also asked to describe an unprompted view of their
understandings of the term “security.” A plurality of respondents in both Northern and
Southern Canada tied security most to protecting Canada’s borders from international
threats, with a smaller number of respondents highlighting sovereignty or environmental
protection. The wedding of security to international threats was most commonly found in
Alberta, with a third of respondents identifying security in this manner. When given
prompted definitions of security, however, a greater diversity of results was discovered.
Nine out of ten respondents in Northern Canada rated environmental and social security
as “important,” with 86% and 82% of Southern Canadians responding the same on each
category, respectively. When asked the question of whether the Arctic should serve as the
center of Canadian foreign policy, over half of respondents in both Northern and
Southern Canada responded affirmatively. More tellingly, Northerners were more likely
to see the Arctic as an intrinsic part of Canada than Southerners with a difference of 77%
to 63%. On its face, the difference is not surprising given the identity duality held by
Northern Canadians versus their Southern counterparts. However, should we read into
this statistic when considering the impact of securitization and the argument advanced
here? The fact that six out of ten Southern Canadians saw the Arctic as intrinsically part
of the Canadian whole does not necessarily debunk this argument, even if this statistic
does not represent an overwhelming majority. When combined with other questions
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asked in the polls, there was a clear statement of interest in giving definition to the
priorities that drove Arctic security.
When it came to hard security matters, however, 56% of Northern Canadians
rated national security as an important factor with 69% of Southern Canadians doing the
same. When asked about devoting military resources to the Arctic and away from global
conflict zones, a majority of respondents in both Northern and Southern Canada—59% to
56%—supported this idea. However, a significant difference was seen when given the
option of not shifting overseas military forces to the Arctic, with 32% of Northerners and
14% of Southerners expressing this opinion. On the question of building up military
forces in the Arctic, only 52% of Northerners expressed support for this, whereas 60% of
Southerners did the same. In Southern Canada, support for increased Arctic militarization
was highest in Alberta and lowest in Quebec. Even so, support for military and national
security factors ranked well below statements prioritizing quality of life and
strengthening the socioeconomic picture across Canada. This demonstrates that while
hard security factors were not rejected by Canadians, they were also not immediately
prioritized following the government’s increased rhetorical focus on hard security matters
in the Arctic. Such a finding, while intuitive, also demonstrates that public opinion
proved to be relatively stable on the issue during this time.
What key takeaways should be noted in this first round of opinion polls? Firstly,
the polls represented a consistent level of understanding of the issues facing the Arctic on
both the national and sub-national levels. Unsurprisingly, Northern Canadians prioritized
socioeconomic issues over hard security issues. The fact that Southern Canadians also
generally prioritized these issues—although not to as high of a degree—was also not
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surprising. The poll results also showed that, on a provincial level, Southern attitudes
toward the Arctic generally followed political trends: conservative-leaning Alberta
tended to show the highest support for increasing hard security measures in the Arctic,
whereas Quebec was generally the least supportive of such possibilities. Additionally,
such measures did not receive overwhelming support in the country at large, particularly
when given the option of instead focusing on socioeconomic and environmental
protection factors. These results would thus appear consistent with Canadian political
attitudes on domestic and foreign policy matters.
What do these results mean for arguments advanced about the impact of
securitization? As suggested in the first chapter, it is possible that “security” for the
Canadian populace could indeed refer to addressing the threats faced by Northern
populations on socioeconomic and environmental degradation matters. Thus, increased
government attention to the Arctic could very well be a means of providing security
around these issues. When looking at the poll results, however, the highest response to an
unprompted definition of security suggested that traditional notions of the term had not
entirely washed away. The rebuttal to this would be that the poll results also
demonstrated that Canadians had very diverse views on matters of security. Although the
government undoubtedly played up the sovereignty and hard security aspects of the issue,
it also clearly incorporated the “human” aspects into its Arctic agenda as well. This may
have created an open-ended securitization process, be it intended or accidental, that
caused the public to respond with a holistic understanding of what “Arctic security”
actually means. A parallel dynamic to this was how the shaping of Arctic security
dialogue was occurring on a transnational level.
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Could we not also argue that Canadian public opinion was responding not only to
their government’s framing of the issue, but also to how the issue was being framed in
global discussions? The poll’s engagement with respondents outside of Canada showed
that opinions on various aspects of the Arctic issue could vary considerably between
states, although Canadian public opinion was not an outlier on these issues outside of
questions regarding territorial sovereignty and the ownership of the Northwest Passage.
On both a national and global level, therefore, the 2011 poll shows that Canadians on
both the national and sub-national level did show significant interest in the Arctic issue.
Unsurprisingly, the views expressed in this poll did not significantly depart from
expected results given political norms and identities on security matters.
The 2015 version of the poll283 revisited a number of the same issues from the
first iteration, but also provided contexts regarding how Southern Canadians viewed the
Arctic space. While the timing of the 2011 version did allow for a more objective
evaluation of the Harper government’s Arctic agenda, the 2015 version would have
expectedly been of a more critical bent given the demonstrated problems that various
Arctic investment initiatives were facing. Would this create a more negative view of the
Arctic agenda, particularly among Southern Canadians? Or would we expect less focus
on ambitious infrastructure, resource development, and military spending while
maintaining support for health and education investments? The findings of the poll did
help to reveal some underlying discursive effects of the government’s agenda on
Canadian beliefs regarding the Arctic. To test this, the poll provided respondents with
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four true/false statements: Nunavut communities are not connected by road, nor is the
province connected to any other province via road (true); the majority of Inuit, First
Nations, and Métis in the Arctic live on reserves (false); Canada has several military
bases along the Northwest Passage (false); there is no cell phone service in any of the
three Arctic territories (false). In all, 37% of Southerners polled answered zero or one of
these questions correctly, with only 10% correctly answering all four. On the question of
road connectivity, the number of individuals incorrectly answering “false” slightly
outweighed those answering “true.” Slightly over one-quarter of respondents incorrectly
believed that Canada had several military bases along the Northwest Passage to provide
for territorial defense, which raises an interesting notation to this aspect of the poll. While
overall public knowledge of the Arctic proved to be underwhelming in this poll, could it
be argued that the government’s rhetorical focus on hard security matters actually stuck
in the minds of some Canadians? The totality of further results from the polls may help to
shed light on this question.
On matters of the greatest issues facing Canada and the Arctic specifically, there
was little change regarding the prioritization of economic issues on the national level and
environmental issues on the Arctic regional level. However, issues such as calling for
governance changes as well as perceived reductions in privacy and freedom of speech—
two categories that did not appear in the 2011 polling results—appeared above all issues
besides the economy on a national level. Certainly, it seemed that the controversies that
had plagued the Harper government’s public image in previous years were resonating in
public opinion. Canadians in both the North and South also demonstrated a slightly less
optimistic outlook on their quality of life compared to the previous poll, adding further
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weight to the assumption that the political climate at this time was sensitive to the
economic downturn and growing discontent toward the current government. When asked
to measure the importance of various issues facing the Arctic, there was not any
significant change in terms of how respondents ranked the various issues against each
other. However, there was a small decline in those respondents who assigned high
importance to most presented Arctic issues. Additionally, statements that expressed
support for increasing search-and-rescue and military capabilities in the Arctic saw more
noticeable declines in respondents who agreed to their importance.
On security matters, definitions favoring protection of the environment and
increasing social wellness received the highest number of respondents in seeing them as
important. The largest decline in support came for definitions that supported increasing
the national security apparatus in the Arctic, with less than half of Northern respondents
demonstrating that hard security definitions were not important toward their own
definition of security. The importance of economic security to defining security also saw
a noticeable decline, which was likely due to decreased support for natural resource
exploitation in the region. Opinions on the perceived level of rivalry in the Arctic
between countries also yielded some interesting results. While a clear majority of
Northerners felt that the threat of military conflict had decreased or stayed the same in the
previous year, 50% of Southerners answered in the same manner. This response can be
interpreted in multiple ways as respondents who answered that the threat was unchanged
may not necessarily be viewing the threat as absent. Nonetheless, outwardly optimistic
feelings on this subject were clearly lower outside of Northern Canada, even if the
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wording of this question did not provide for a clear delineation of the actual level of
perceived threat.284
Another interesting point to note was the decreased support for strengthening the
Canadian military posture in the North. In both Northern and Southern Canada, the
number of respondents expressing support for strengthening the military’s presence fell
to less than half. Although support for this remained higher in Southern Canada, there
was nonetheless a larger percentage decline as well. This could perhaps be as a result of
the national political situation resonating more outside of the North. There was similarly
a more pronounced decline in Southerners who rated a military presence in the Canadian
as “extremely important” vis-à-vis Canadian military operations elsewhere.
Some surprising results were uncovered when the poll turned to international
cooperation matters. Although a slight increase in support for a hypothetical nuclear-free
weapons zone in the Arctic was unsurprising given declining support for hard security
solutions to Arctic issues in Canada, a sharp decrease in awareness of the Arctic Council
among Southern Canadians was also observed. This was surprising not only because it
challenged the assumption that awareness of Arctic issues would remain at least constant
when compared to the 2011 poll, but it also so happened that Canada held the
chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2013-2015.
What would explain the decline of awareness of an organization in the country
that was meant to oversee the organization’s operations during this time? It’s possible
that tensions with Russia over its 2014 invasion of Ukraine or the government’s focus on
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hard security matters, neither of which fell within the purview of the organization,
overshadowed any attention the organization might have otherwise received during the
Canadian chairmanship. These factors might also explain similar declines in knowledge
of the organization in Finland and Norway, whose shared borders with Russia weighed
heavily on Northern issues from 2014 onward. On the other hand, the government’s
championing of Arctic economic development via resource exploitation would have
seemingly aligned with the creation of the Arctic Economic Council, which the Canadian
government touted as a successful byproduct of its chairmanship.285 Canadians also
showed increased support for allowing non-Arctic states to have a greater say in Arctic
affairs, which would not be indicative of a backlash toward multinational cooperation in
light of other geopolitical issues. There was also a decrease in those Canadians who
thought that their country should take a “firm line” on border disputes, with more
favoring peaceful negotiations over these disputes.
The broader conclusion that we can draw from the poll was the presence of a
general decrease in the resonance of Arctic issues across Canada from 2011-2015. When
asked specific questions about Arctic matters, Canadians now showed an even greater
tendency toward peaceful or socioeconomic-based priorities in the Arctic. If Canadian
public opinion surrounding Arctic sovereignty did hit an apex during the course of
Harper’s tenure as prime minister, it had seemingly diminished near the end of his tenure
in 2015. Could we then measure points in which public opinion did spike in favor of
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Arctic sovereignty initiatives in response to governmental influence? A study previously
undertaken by Mathieu Landriault and Paul Minard looked at exactly this. In order to test
the resonance of government initiatives in the public mind, Landriault and Minard looked
at responses to the annual Arctic trips taken by Harper and key Arctic military exercises.
The military operations in question were Operation NUNALIVUT, which typically took
place in the spring, and Operation NANOOK, which typically coincided with Harper’s
summer tour, and were well-publicized as a result. The level of support for these
operations was measured in the study by support for Harper’s Conservative government
between 2006 and 2014 during the times in which these trips occurred.286 The authors
found that the summer Arctic tour and Operation NANOOK did have a noticeable effect
in increasing support for the Conservative government—whereas NUNALIVUT did not
have a noticeable effect—suggesting that Harper’s personal emphasis on Arctic matters
did resonate with the public.287 While the effects of these operations did not have
longstanding consequences on attitudes toward the Tories, these findings did allow for
establishing consistency in a public opinion that favored both liberal internationalism in
its foreign policy and bolder displays of Arctic sovereignty. However, the study did not
achieve the expected result of finding greater support for the government in its first two
years, which showed that other factors indeed affected public opinion despite notable
events in the Arctic.288
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Even so, the apparent decline in national attention to Arctic issues was consistent
with a general decline in support for the Conservatives beginning in 2012. 289 Combined
with other aspects of the analysis of polling results, such as higher support for
government initiatives in Conservative-dominated Alberta, there does appear to have
been a clear connection between existing political beliefs and support for the
government’s Arctic agenda. This does not wholly explain levels of support for the
agenda at various points, however, as previously-discussed assessments showed support
that was higher than would be suggested by political lines. Landriault and Minard’s
analysis also suggests that the noticeable connection between Harper’s identity-driven
Arctic visits and brief increases in public support for the government was indicative of
the influence of identity factors. Nonetheless, this must be grounded in other aspects of
Canadian political culture and beliefs, which did not ultimately see a watershed increase
in support for hard security measures in the Arctic. Instead, identity factors were enough
to push the issue to a point of increased discussion and perhaps, for a time, a higher level
of support than would be expected given other political influences. This narrative can, of
course, become self-fulfilling. What does this prove beyond the idea that the government
can influence public opinion on a given issue for a period of time? And at what point—
and why—does the government eventually lose the ability to continually maintain
support on the issue? The answer to this goes beyond the elite factors that exist outside of
government control, particularly the role of media in continuing to shed light on the issue
(whether or not their views support the government’s position).
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The mass media dynamic in Canada is interesting given the relationship between
the country’s large size and geographic population spread. The Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC), the country’s iconic, government-backed television and radio
service, offers both national and regionally-focused programming throughout Canada.
Although this allows for consistent, high-quality programming regardless of local
population density, it also may result in coverage that still is under the editorial control of
a media corporation that is geographically distant from the issue. This could be especially
notable in the Arctic, where the company’s local branch, CBC North, covers the entirety
of Northern Canada. As such, the service provides a diverse array of content to serve the
populations of Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and northern Quebec.
When a “regional” network broadcasts in multiple languages and covers four time
zones,290 how “local” can it really be? Although a variety of online media resources exist
to fill the gaps in local coverage, they do not have the consistent reach of the more
established CBC. As noted in the earlier discussion on the relationship between Northern
residents and the government’s Arctic agenda, this may help to explain the distance
between the Southern and Northern perspectives, even with the apparent presence of
national mass-media in the North.
Toronto-based The Globe and Mail, the country’s largest national newspaper, is
also viewed as the bellwether of national perspectives. The paper, however, has faced
criticism in how it balances local and regional coverage. Despite its national focus, it has
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historically held conservative editorial leanings and has been perceived to privilege
coverage of metropolitan Toronto over other metropolitan areas.291 The Globe and Mail’s
chief national competitor, The National Post, has also been viewed as traditionally
conservative-leaning, albeit it has been noted to occasionally buck this trend in notable
fashion.292 Major metropolitan areas are also served by local newspapers, which can add
political and social balance to national-level perspectives. The Toronto Star, which also
happens to be the highest-circulation newspaper in Canada, has tended to support
progressive perspectives.293 As noted in a 2014 Globe and Mail editorial, however, the
left-right dynamic is not necessarily telling in terms of views toward the government.
Although major Canadian print media favored the Conservatives in the 2011 federal
election, this did not prevent newspapers from being routinely critical of Harper’s
agenda.294
As such, the media perspective in Canada must be recognized as nuanced in how
it represents both local and national issues. The inclusion of media perspectives here is to
not only help demonstrate how media organizations have presented Arctic security
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matters on the local and national level, but also to show how they have framed the debate
over time. Analysis of media perspectives here will focus on the presentation of events
surrounding three notable events related to the Arctic: the 2007 Russian flag-planting
incident (as well as preceding perceptions of Harper’s Arctic agenda following his
election in the previous year); media views of the various issues that became apparent in
the Arctic security agenda between 2010 and 2014; and “post-mortem” analyses in late
2015 following the end of Conservative governance.
Around the time of the 2006 federal election, Harper’s Arctic agenda was not
going unnoticed by Canadian media. Previously, Harper was criticized for his ties to the
“Calgary School,” a group of politically conservative academics at the University of
Calgary who were viewed as the intellectual basis for Harper’s Western Canadian
political movement that sought to “overturn” perceived centers of power in eastern
Canada.295 As the election neared, critics of the Calgary School began to tie Harper’s
ideological leanings to the much-maligned neoconservative influences of the Bush
administration in the United States.296 Conversely, conservative perspectives, such as
those found in The National Post, were quick to dismiss these views as baseless.297 On
Harper’s proposed Arctic agenda, The Globe and Mail published an editorial from
University of Calgary political scientist and Arctic expert Rob Huebert—who,
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interestingly, appeared to avoid being lumped in with the Calgary School—two weeks
prior to the election. In the editorial, Huebert endorsed a focused Arctic agenda while
also expressing caution over being too optimistic about the Conservatives’ ability to
actually achieve their proposed agenda.298 The timing of this editorial was interesting
given how its message could be read. On the one hand, Huebert expressed a fairly
middle-ground argument regarding the Liberals’ and Conservatives’ respective
competence in providing for Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. On the other hand, the call for
stronger expressions of Arctic sovereignty may have implicitly supported Harper’s
agenda, even though Huebert explicitly criticized the Conservatives’ plans. The
importance of these perspectives is not the fact that they varied on the expected agenda of
the Harper government, but instead that Harper’s language toward Arctic sovereignty was
already being recognized as a looming focal point for the next government.
The controversial Russian flag-planting incident the following year came at a time
in which the Harper government’s Arctic agenda was beginning to take shape in policy
implementation terms. By this point, media organizations would have seemingly
acclimated to the normality of the Arctic sovereignty discussion. So why did this incident
instead bring greater attention to the issue while also helping to drive a public narrative of
growing rivalry? As mentioned in the first chapter, this event took place amidst otherwise
declining relations between Russia and the trans-Atlantic security community. Some
clues could also be found in how media organizations framed the event when first
reporting on it. CBC reported the story with a headline of Russia “staking claim to [the]
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Arctic region,”299 which, while representative of the ongoing scientific missions to build
a case for future legal claims in the region, also communicated a sense of looming
conflict between the Arctic states. The National Post furthered this narrative by injecting
commentary from Arctic legal expert Michael Byers, who saw the incident as
representative of Canada’s inability to effectively enforce its sovereign claims. 300 The
event was thus immediately being viewed in some circles with an alarmist tint, seeing
Canada as helpless in the face of Russian incursions.
CBC’s French-language service struck a milder tone to the unfolding situation—
describing the Canadian government’s position toward the incident as
“unimpressed”301—with its coverage generally objective and non-editorialized.302
Montreal daily Le Devoir took an interesting tack in one of its analyses of the situation:
While soliciting quotes from oft-quoted experts like Huebert and Byers, the newspaper
also sought the opinions of French-Canadian academics Frédéric Lasserre and Joël
Plouffe, who both used the opportunity to criticize the American legal position on the
Northwest Passage as counterproductive and inconsistent.303 Although the Americans’
legal argument on the Northwest Passage and their general refusal to ratify UNCLOS was
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a regular complaint from the Canadians, the inclusion of focused criticisms against the
Americans was an interesting choice given that previous commentaries on the issue had
otherwise presented discomfort with perceived Russian expansionism. These comments
were also not only representative of Canadian tendencies to jab their southern neighbors
when presented with sovereignty concerns, but also of Canadians’ parallel exasperation at
the United States’ differing position that potentially endangered a common continental
position against Russian advances. Although calmer voices ultimately acknowledged that
the Russians did not pose a dire security threat to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, the
continued divergence of the North American positions would continue to be a sore spot
going forward.
The calming effect of experts on the issue did not stop the media from speculating
about potential rivalry in the Arctic even after the initial attention to the flag-planting
incident had subsided. Greater attention to the Arctic region also meant more focus on the
implications of the “economic nationalism” that came with the government’s attempts to
demonstrate that it was serious about protecting sovereign claims to resources. As argued
in the Financial Post,304 the financial-reporting arm of The National Post, the
government’s promotion of Northern development was becoming increasingly
intertwined with the promotion of natural resource extraction in areas that were becoming
noticeably difficult to draw from. This line of thinking saw the government’s agenda as
creating the expectation that corporations would begin investing energy and funds in
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resource extraction rather than viewing the region as a potential opportunity that needed
to be balanced with legitimate environmental and socioeconomic concerns. Certainly,
Harper had set the tone shortly after the Russian event by invoking his “use it or lose it”
line. Even NDP leader Jack Layton, whose party was only the fourth-largest in the House
of Commons at the time, expressed a desire to see greater federal investment in the
region.305 Although Layton’s comments stated that the government needed to focus
investment on the socioeconomic needs of the region, rather than prioritize some broad
notion of sovereignty enforcement to counter foreign interference, these comments from
an otherwise critical source could have been seen as tacitly encouraging to the
government’s Arctic focus.
In November 2007, The Toronto Star published a piece warning of an unprotected
“back door” that was coming into shape as a result of the opening Northwest Passage. 306
The piece included input from Huebert and Byers, who both argued for the need to invest
in more naval assets for the region but disagreed over whether they should be of a
military or civilian coast guard nature. Also included was concerned commentary from
the former head of Canadian military forces in the North. Embedded with the
authoritative comments of these individuals was a handful of disconcerting scenarios,
such as a major environmental disaster or the inability to prevent the passage of a “rogue
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ship” through Canadian waters, which further elevated the argument that Canada was illprepared to defend its Arctic territory.
Although this particular article was actually written as a news piece (rather than
an editorial one), its matter-of-fact description of the Arctic “threat” was demonstrative
of the reality that the Arctic region had indeed become a matter of national security for
Canada. What did this mean for the next few years of Canadian policy? While these
views were certainly in line with how the issue was being presented in other Arctic states,
it was notable that the events of August 2007 had a nearly immediate effect on Canadian
discourse about Arctic security. Whereas the Harper government had first begun the
securitization process during its campaigning in late 2005, the issue had seemingly
become fully securitized two years later. The next question, then, was whether society
(and the media that served as a connection between society and governance) would
continue to accept the threat as the government undertook measures to counter it. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the government faced a multitude of clear difficulties
in implementing its Arctic agenda that were reflected considerably in Canadian media.
Yet a key question would need to result from this: Did society and the media view
the Harper government’s missteps in its Arctic agenda as poor execution in responding to
a legitimate threat, or did they view them as proof that the securitization of the Arctic was
a misguided endeavor in totality? By the time the F-35 controversy began to unfold in
2010, the Harper government had arguably been in power long enough for a full
evaluation of Harper’s policy vision to take place, and it had already survived a snap
election to boot. A lengthy January 2011 profile of Harper in the popular weekly
magazine Maclean’s was particularly representative of the Canadian political climate
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during this time. Depending on one’s perspective when reading the piece, Harper could
either be viewed as politically bold for his strategy of moving a center-left country
rightward, or as an ideologue seeking to implement policies that were anathema to the
country’s progressive values.307 Similarly, there was a mix of perspectives in reference to
the Arctic agenda. One perspective published in Maclean’s in early 2010 continued to
lament the “inability” of Canada to protect its Arctic sovereignty and, interestingly
enough, tied current events to previous instances of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty being
“threatened.”308 Appeals to Canadian sovereignty would be used for the other side of the
argument. A 2012 Ralph Nader editorial published by The Toronto Star warned against
the Harper government’s closeness with the militaristic American security umbrella, and
called for a Canada independent of these pressures.309 The coming tumult of the Arctic
agenda was nonetheless overshadowed in the run-up to the 2011 federal election, which
was more focused on the general problems with the F-35 program and perceptions of a
lack of government transparency.
By 2012, however, the media was beginning to pay greater attention to the
problems encountered in the Arctic. The reporting of massive cost overruns in an Ottawabacked Nunavut housing project, for example, looked all too similar to the F-35
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debacle.310 Although the Government of Nunavut shouldered most of the blame for the
cost overruns in this instance, the event was a microcosm of the budgetary difficulties
that were becoming apparent in Arctic operations. By 2013, Harper’s rhetoric was
looking increasingly empty when juxtaposed with actual policy. As published in The
National Post, it was no longer simply a question of the problems faced by the
government bureaucratically, but also whether the threat of foreign incursions in the
Northwest Passage was overblown in the first place.311 Arctic politics expert Heather
Exner-Pirot referred to Harper’s Arctic policies as “embarrassing” and even referred to
him as the “Putin of the Arctic” due to his aggressive statements about Canadian Arctic
sovereignty.312 Oddly enough, the same media outlets that had willingly published the
hawkish commentaries about the Russian “threat” in 2007 were now turning against the
insinuation that the threat was ever that serious in the first place. Certainly, alarmism was
decried by influential voices prior to this, such as was the case in a 2010 editorial by
Plouffe and Harry Borlase that appeared in Le Devoir.313 Yet despite the 2011 electoral
gains made by the Conservatives, the flaws in the Arctic agenda’s execution were
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becoming clearly apparent. Less charged evaluations, such as that by Arctic historian
Whitney Lackenbauer published in The Globe and Mail, noted the difficulties faced by
the government while also leaving open the possibility that the spirit of the agenda could
be salvaged.314 Still, growing frustration with the costs and difficulties faced by the
government’s various Arctic projects should not be examined in a vacuum. As the Arctic
agenda was heavily security-focused and promised increased military spending, it would
only be logical that the F-35 controversy and the costs incurred in Canada’s participation
in the Afghanistan campaign would extend a general wariness toward Arctic security
spending. Paradoxically, this wariness was met with a doubling-down of military
spending pledges by the government.315 Although the government was clearly
demonstrating rhetorical commitment to its policies—even those outside of the Arctic
space—it was clearly losing ground when the results of these policies were put under the
microscope.
Following a 2015 federal election involving a tight three-way race between
Harper’s Conservatives, Trudeau’s Liberals, and Thomas Mulcair’s NDP right until
election day, the Liberals managed to pull off a surprisingly strong victory that left them
with a majority in the House of Commons and the Canadian prime ministership for the
first time in nearly a decade. Naturally, questions were raised about what Arctic policy
would look like under the new government. With Trudeau not making any particularly
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bold statements about any changes in Arctic policy during the course of the campaign, 316
these commentaries seemingly appeared to turn toward evaluations of Harper’s policies.
Additionally, the reality soon became evident that Trudeau would be inheriting Harper’s
Arctic budgetary woes with ongoing projects.317 Nonetheless, some initial commentaries
following the election also expressed a belief that Trudeau’s government would be more
attentive to the social problems facing the North. An editorial published by CBC argued
that failure of the Conservatives to win any of the three seats from the Northern territories
signaled a protest against Harper’s Arctic policies. The surprising defeat of Leona
Aglukkaq, who had represented Nunavut in the House of Commons and served as a
member of Harper’s cabinet since 2008, in favor of Liberal candidate Hunter Tootoo was
seen as particularly damning. 318 It’s possible that the result in Nunavut was simply
consistent with the national trend favoring the Liberals, especially as the Yukon and
Northwest Territories also flipped to the Liberals from the Conservatives and NDP,
respectively. Aglukkaq was also favored early in the election campaign, 319 which
suggests that there was not festering discontent in the territory toward Harper’s agenda
leading up to the election. In the months that followed, it was not possible to discern if
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major changes were underway in the Arctic under the new government. Although the
Arctic and climate change matters featured during Trudeau’s March 2016 visit to
Washington, commentators saw the visit as positive but unrevealing on Arctic matters. 320
Instead, commentaries in the United States were more focused on the warm welcome
received by Trudeau in Washington, whose youthful, progressive demeanor was painted
as a refreshing tack from the opaque, pessimistic rhetoric of his predecessor.321 It is
apparent, however, that the rhetoric had shifted along these lines. Unlike his predecessor
a decade prior, Trudeau did not expend his earliest breaths as prime minister to make
statements of sovereignty toward Canada’s southern neighbor.
The findings of this analysis, 322 while generally intuitive, nonetheless offer
understandings of how the securitization process aided Stephen Harper’s Arctic agenda
during the life of his government. Although Harper faced many policy and bureaucratic
difficulties in actually implementing the tangible aspects of the agenda, his rhetorical
focus on the issue—and subsequent coverage of this focus within the national media—
arguably raised the profile of Arctic security issues in the public sphere. Public opinion
polls might not have reflected overwhelming support for a stronger Canadian position on
sovereignty matters, but they did demonstrate attention to the idea in the first place. Thus,
the securitization process might not have been successful in making hard security matters
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in the Arctic a public priority, but it did have an impact on creating a measurable level of
support, even if unenthusiastic, for the government’s agenda. The combination of mass
media and public opinion also provides some understandings of the Canadian political
dynamic that can be used for further comparative research. Despite the diversity and
fragmentation of Canada’s political system, strength of secondary political parties at
various points in time, and intertwining of both domestic and foreign policies with a
regular look toward the United States, the political dynamics driving support for the
government’s Arctic policies were remarkably normal. That is, opinions toward the
government’s Arctic agenda appeared to track closely with partisan political beliefs or
day-to-day practical issues (e.g. higher support in the North for the socioeconomic
aspects of Arctic policymaking). Therefore, while the securitization process elevated the
issue to greater resonance in the public mind, the intensity of support for specific
proposals came more from conventional political forces. What, then, can we determine
from tracing the development of Canadian Arctic identity to the present as it relates to the
securitization process? In the next chapter, I will conclude this analysis with several
avenues in which to further evaluate that question.
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Fig. 2: Summarization of public opinion between 2011 and 2015
2011 Poll
Greater public focus in Northern Canada
than Southern Canada on Arctic
socioeconomic matters
More favorability in both Northern and
Southern Canada for “soft” approaches to
Arctic security compared to “hard”
security measures
Greater support in Southern Canada for
increasing hard security footprint in
Arctic

2015 Poll
Southern understandings of Northern
Canada low despite government
securitization campaign
Decreased support in both North and
South for increasing military presence in
North
Southern understandings of Arctic
Council low despite Canadian
chairmanship of the organization from
2013-15
General decrease in Southern Canada of
attention to Arctic issues 2013-15

Highest support among Southern
Canadians for increasing Arctic military
presence shown in Alberta, lowest support
in Quebec
Support for various Arctic security
Decreased support for Arctic issues likely
measures appeared to track with domestic influenced by general public turn against
political dynamics
Harper’s government, though other factors
in play as well
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In August 2008, Parks Canada’s Underwater Archeology Service (UAS) began an
expedition that would take on political significance in the coming years. While Ottawa’s
redoubling of Arctic sovereignty was in full swing, UAS was seeking to find some of the
earliest inspirations of Canadian Arctic identity: the remains of Sir John Franklin’s illfated expedition.323 Although some details of the expedition’s fate had been determined
over time, the remains of Franklin’s ships Erebus and Terror had actually never been
found. Robert Grenier, the UAS archaeologist tasked with leading the expedition, had
also led a mission to find the ships in the 1990s.324 Rather than being a routine scientific
expedition that might have otherwise received little attention outside of academic circles,
however, the 2008 mission was declared to be an assertion of Canadian sovereignty. This
declaration was not made by Grenier or the scientific team, but instead by Environment
Minister (and future Foreign Minister) John Baird, who was present to announce the
expedition. Noting the significance of Franklin’s mission to Canadian history, Baird also
stated, “We certainly think that by establishing our long-standing presence in the Arctic,
that can enhance issues of sovereignty.” 325 Although the mission’s timing tracked with
the timeline of the government’s progressing Arctic agenda, it also so happened that the
Russian scientific mission that had brought greater public attention to Arctic sovereignty
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matters occurred the previous August. East-West relations were also at perhaps their
lowest point in the post-Cold War era following the Russian invasion of Georgia a week
prior to the announcement. These coincidences were likely outweighed by the
practicalities of such an expedition, not least of which being the necessity of operating
such a mission during the summer months to reduce difficulties in operating in the Arctic
climate. Much as it had during Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s expeditions a century prior, the
Canadian government was nonetheless sending a message: No opportunity to assert
Canadian Arctic sovereignty is too small.
After pursuing the ships for six more summers, researchers finally discovered the
remains of Erebus in September 2014.326 For Harper, the moment was more than a piece
of his Arctic agenda: Some commentators went so far as to note that he seemed
personally obsessed with finding the expedition’s remains.327 Others noted Harper’s
desire to leave a lasting legacy on the Canadian conception of the North that would push
future prime ministers to prioritize the Arctic as a key component of national
sovereignty.328 The discovery was announced with much fanfare by the government, with
Harper declaring the find as a key victory for the Canadian case on the extent of its Arctic
sovereignty. Although the tone of the announcement was to be expected by this point, the
seemingly vindicated manner in which Harper tied the expedition to Canadian
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sovereignty was nonetheless puzzling to observers.329 With other aspects of the Arctic
agenda visibly facing problems, Harper was nonetheless relishing the moment.
The point of this anecdote is not just to provide further evidence of the extent of
the Harper government’s securitization campaign, but also to demonstrate the way in
which it tried to paint the Canadian Arctic as a timeless representation of national
identity. In the course of this analysis, I have traced a linear pattern of national identity to
demonstrate that the conception Harper spoke of was based in historical precedence. In
light of this, the discovery of Erebus came at an interesting time. Whereas Harper would
have trumpeted the discovery even if it had come at an earlier time during his
government’s reign, the issues facing the government’s Arctic policy at this time made
this a new reminder of Arctic sovereignty essential to the government’s message. From
the government’s standpoint, it was necessary to regularly re-emphasize Arctic
sovereignty in order to maintain continuance of the securitization process.
But given the visible problems that the government was facing in defending this
message, could this have actually decreased the effectiveness of the government’s
message and actually made it seem more overbearing? From what we saw in the previous
chapter, the strength of the government’s message on Arctic sovereignty indeed saw a
decline in public opinion around this time. There was also a looming trend of declining
support for the government in general which, as shown in previously cited research, had
an effect on support for the government’s policies. This study of the Harper government’s
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Arctic policies therefore showed that while the securitization process itself was
successful insofar as the Canadian population generally recognized Arctic sovereignty
challenges as a security issue—not to mention the growing recognition of Arctic security
issues globally—the ability of the government to sustain the bureaucratic inertia of its
Arctic agenda nonetheless fluttered after a period of time. This certainly occurred due to
several aforementioned factors that are expected in democratic governance, but also
raised a number of interesting questions about the problems of connecting securitization
processes to demonstrable government action.
While we can certainly point to the successes of the government in developing
Arctic security on a discursive level, does it really mean much if the rhetoric was not
ultimately matched by actual policy? Cases such as this do demonstrate some of the
limits of securitization theory, but also present new opportunities in connecting theory to
political practice. For all of the discussion of convincing the populace of a given threat as
part of the securitization process, there is little discussion of how to convince those
within government of the weight of the issue, particularly within the realm of
parliamentary democracy. In some ways, the securitization process is almost anathema to
the actual nature of parliamentary operations. With the rhetorical emphasis that the
Harper government put on increasing spending on hard security measures in the Arctic, it
would be expected that the parliamentary opposition would not look favorably upon the
government’s proposals simply due to ideological and party-line disagreements. This
does not, however, rule out the effect that the securitization process could have in raising
the issue generally. That is, if the parliamentary opposition instituted counter-proposals
that recognized some form of Arctic security response, but had a different definition of
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what “Arctic security” actually meant, could we nonetheless see that as a representation
of an effective securitization process? In this particularly case, the political opposition,
particularly the Liberal Party, was not too far removed from accepting the Arctic security
issue in the first place. As discussed by Petra Dolata, the shift from Liberal to
Conservative governance in 2006, which was arguably an important spark in the Arctic
sovereignty and security discussion on a rhetorical level, did not result in a momentous
change in actual policy. 330 In essence, the rhetorical change was representing alreadyoccurring changes in policy that had been happening under Liberal governance.
The resulting analysis of this case has demonstrated that securitization processes
undertaken by the Canadian government toward the Arctic from 2006-2015 were not
solely endemic to that point in time. Instead, these processes actually built upon
longstanding factors within the Canadian national identity that fueled a noticeable pattern
of responses to perceived infringements to Canadian Arctic sovereignty. From this study,
we have derived some interesting conclusions. First, securitizing moves by the
government were often met with some sort of policy response, be it through new
legislation or increased resources to the Arctic region. The tangible effects of these
responses, however, were mixed and often depended on domestic political dynamics at a
given time. A second finding is that gaps continue to exist between our understandings of
the securitization process and actual policy implementation. Further research on this
specific aspect of the securitization process beyond existing research on the formation of
securitizing rhetoric may yield more interesting conclusions for how governments
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manage both the rhetorical and governance processes. These conclusions can be plugged
into existing research on securitization theory which is moving in this direction.
What does this research mean for understandings about securitization?
Some perspectives have noted how Canadian rhetoric toward the issue, while
raising the profile of the Arctic globally, also created a false narrative of how to approach
Arctic security issues. Keskitalo discusses the gap that exists when comparing nationallevel discourse about the Arctic with discourse when viewing the region as a whole. For
Keskitalo, Canadian rhetoric toward the Arctic still viewed the region in frontier terms,
which created an inaccurate image of the problems that faced both the Canadian and
global Arctic.331 This perspective identifies an interesting problem. Although the Arctic
region as a whole faces common issues across national borders, it is ultimately national
governments which must set a policy agenda to address these issues. As such, there is not
only duplication of work in addressing the region’s issues, but also little coordination that
could better suit the needs of the Arctic in totality. 332 Conceptions of “otherness” that
create differences between Northern and Southern Canada are also less pronounced in the
Nordic countries, which hinder true Canadian understandings of the region. 333
This perspective also notes some difficulty in identifying the referent objects in
the securitization process. By securitizing the Arctic space, was the Canadian government
actually only talking about the Canadian Arctic rather than the region as a whole? Going

E. Carina Keskitalo, “Setting the Agenda on the Arctic: Whose Policy Frames the Region?” Brown
Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 (Fall/Winter 2012), p. 162-63.
331

332

Ibid., p. 161.

333

Ibid., p. 159.

153

by Keskitalo’s line of thinking, this seems likely. Although Canadian securitization of its
Arctic space inherently involved conceptions of the international dynamic, it did not
address the threats to the Northern environment or populations globally. Instead, it
involved constructing a foreign threat to Canadian Arctic interests when the threats to the
total Arctic space were actually contained within the region. This sub-regional
securitization thus created a world within a world when the threat actually required buyins from all of the Arctic states. Lacking sufficient clarity on where and to whom the
securitization processes were actually occurring may have contributed to an overly
ambitious Arctic policy strategy that was based more on a reactive feeling to counter a
broad notion of “threat” rather than first identifying the origin of the actual threat.
This creates a new question: Do securitization efforts actually follow wellestablished policy processes such that the government already has sufficient inertia to
convince the population of a given threat? In other words, does the general population
accept that a threat exists simply because a competent authority says so, even though
democratic processes would theoretically provide the capability for pushing back against
that decision? This is an interesting framework to understand where the securitization
process actually begins, and is one that could potentially use further exploration.
However, it is also inherently couched in one of the difficulties of securitization literature
in that securitization is tied only to the speech acts of the government. As discussed in the
previous chapter, I noted the possibility of other actors—namely the media—in furthering
the securitization process. Securitization literature is not devoid of the roles that nongovernmental organizations and other actors play, particularly in areas such as the Arctic
where the threat is transnational. The difficulty, however, is actually defining the picture
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in the region as containing “threats” rather than undergoing a time-specific period of
politicization.334
As seen in the discussion on the role of public opinion, the national government’s
rhetoric has less resonance in Northern Canada. When measuring this dynamic in this
particular case, we must also consider how the population is connected to the governing
authorities. It is also notable that the authoritative body undertaking a securitization
process, even if it is a government body, might not necessarily be the national
government. Whereas Northern Canadians have a relatively low level of representation
in national politics, social cohesion would be expectedly higher at the local level than in
more populated areas of Canada. Thus, the ability of Northerners to “set the agenda”
through embedded social factors results in less need to convince the population of a given
agenda after the policy process has been set in motion. This particular factor may not
apply so much to security matters, however, as even “soft” aspects of security policy
receive backing and direction from the federal government. This may be the difficulty in
attempting to view securitization processes across multiple layers of government insofar
as the national authority tends to control security policy. Though this does not give the
government the monopoly on security matters, it does centralize the number of voices
who are attempting to shape security policies.
Further difficulty in defining the securitization of the Arctic space involves
recognizing how the Arctic is a region that crosses other widely recognized regions.
Although I noted the work of Buzan and Waever in using the Arctic space as a “security
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constellation” to connect regions in the first chapter, other perspectives see regional
construction differently. For Powers and Goertz, regions are constructed based on
institutional economic linkages,335 which may have application to this case. In this
conception, these economic linkages serve as a foundation for other areas of regionbuilding in the social and political spheres, to include security issues. 336 This argument is
not significantly different from Buzan and Waever’s per se, although it does build on that
work’s particular definitions of regions. The interesting question raised here is the
institutional aspect of forming a region. While it was not necessary to form the Arctic
Council in order to view the Arctic as a coherent region, it did give weight to the idea that
the Arctic was a region with a particular set of needs that needed to be addressed by a
specialized, multinational body. Previously, issues facing the Arctic on a multilateral
level were conducted in a more ad hoc fashion that did not create much continuity in
speaking to the region’s particular needs. There was additionally the issue of where best
to find areas of practical cooperation between Arctic states. As the Arctic Council was
formed only a few years after the end of the Cold War, economic issues seemed to be the
easiest foundation for cooperation to avoid lingering political differences between East
and West. Nonetheless, the economic issues facing the Arctic regions in the Nordic
countries were of greater relevance to respective national political discourses than in the
United States or Canada. Discourses that emanated across the Arctic were therefore
influenced by discourses endemic to the Nordic region, but the North American
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viewpoints toward the Arctic were less influential in institutional discussions. This is
likely due to more North American rhetoric about sovereignty and hard security matters
than in the Nordic countries, even despite the Arctic’s similar relevance to Nordic
defense policies.337
Thus, the images influencing a collective Arctic identity are actually
representative of certain national-level identities that managed to rise to the top of issue
prioritization. Because of the “regions within a region” nature of the Arctic, transnational
regional linkages are likely best served on a continental level. For Nordic states, this has
been easier to achieve through institutional means due to shared borders and connections
between indigenous groups across these borders.338 The Arctic has also served as a
particularly enriching source of post-Cold War cooperation between Norway and Russia,
owing to both a long-history of cross-border relations prior to the Cold War period as
well as common economic interests in the Barents Sea. 339
A visualization of such a dynamic is harder to imagine in North America,
however, due to multiple factors. First, the area near the US-Canadian Arctic border is
more remote than that in the Nordic region, making it difficult for the two countries to
maintain a regular working relationship over shared territory. Second, the two countries
are engaged in an ongoing dispute over the demarcation of the maritime border. Settling
of this issue would likely help to bring about the possibility of greater cooperation
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between the two countries in the region, although disagreements over ceding fishing
resources near the border have not left much room for hopeful resolution in the near
future.340 Finally, intertwined cooperation with the United States in the Arctic would only
occur following a massive shift in historical Canadian thinking regarding its Arctic
sovereignty. Although the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident may have altered the
direction of modern Arctic security discourse in the West, the fact remains that many of
the “sovereignty emergencies” that Canada previously faced emanated from concerns
over American encroachment in the Arctic. Close cross-border relations similar to those
present along the main US-Canadian border would therefore represent an undoing of how
the region has historically fit into Canadian identity. For such a scenario to occur, the
negative effects of climate change on the natural environment would need to reach a
point at which the two sides were forced to engage in shared management of the region to
prevent further degradation.
Such a development would also represent a significant change in the regional
order such that even closely intertwined relations—like those currently seen in the Nordic
countries—would not be sufficient to address climate change. This does not mean that the
two countries cannot have friendly, cooperative relations in the region, but instead that
lingering identity and political factors prevent either side from submitting to a truly joint,
regional space.
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A further outcome of studying this case was showing the limits of securitization
theory, even despite the acknowledged usefulness of the approach as an analytical
foundation. Arguably, this particular case demonstrates instances in which the theory is
superfluous to cases in which security is more embedded within a given political
situation.341 While this does make securitization theory more apt to describing an
emerging security situation such as that in the Arctic region, it also represent a potential
empirical problem. If securitization theory can only apply to certain cases, then what is
the value of using a securitization-influenced case to develop further principles for
understanding political behavior? The value in this case is the manner in which
securitization theory is seen as the vehicle for understanding the power of the rhetorical
process but doesn’t necessarily act as proof of the theory’s validity. Instead, the dynamics
observed here give considerable weight to the idea that rhetorical processes can influence
a population on the constitution of threat, but also that the ability to constitute the threat
in the first place stems from an existing set of identity factors. In the case of the Canadian
Arctic, we see that these identity factors helped to reify the concept of threats to national
sovereignty at given points in time. The fact that these identity factors maintain
continuity in a non-obvious manner—that is, the Harper government’s highlighting of
them was seen as actually being contrary to an understood set of identities by a fair
portion of the population—is an even more interesting finding from the course of this
research. It may be this factor, namely the strength of identity factors “in the background”
of day-to-day political operations, that deserves further research.
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In the end, standalone identity factors were not enough to create a successful,
broadly accepted Arctic agenda. In this, the Harper government may have missed an
opportunity to implement its agenda more gradually. Arguably, the basic securitization
process of threat constitution was sufficient to allow the government to set the terms for
an Arctic security agenda. Had the government dialed down its rhetorical emphasis on
sovereignty and implemented its agenda more gradually, it might have been able to
achieve successful results given the political limitations. This raises the question of where
the securitization process actually ends. For the Harper government, the process was an
integral part of its Arctic security agenda, rather than the precursor to win further public
support. This, in many ways, was problematic from a policymaking standpoint, but also
revealed that the level of commitment to the process might not have been necessary in the
first place. Whereas previous instances of Canadian unease over its Arctic territory were
marked by responses to singular instances—such as the Manhattan or Polar Sea
incidents—the process under the Harper government was more fluid. Even having noted
the significance that the 2007 Russian flag incident had on the securitization process, this
incident acted to bring existing processes to light rather than create them. The fact that
this was indeed a fluid process might have motivated the government to regularly inject
its policies with significant rhetorical backing.
What is interesting about this case is that it shows an instance in which the
government’s effective securitization process actually became oversaturated. As the
government built expectations for the level of threat, it also increased the expectation for
actions to meet that threat. When difficulties in implementing an effective set of policies
to meet the threat became apparent, the existence of the threat itself was questioned. In
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this way, the government began to lose its authoritative “linguistic competence” on the
issue.342 As the federal government is the authority tasked with ensuring security over its
territory, however, there were no actors who could step to fill in the authority void.
Inasmuch as the government maintained a consistent rhetorical message regarding Arctic
sovereignty, the conceptual threat remained. By default, the lack of any other potential
competent authority on the issue that could seriously challenge the federal government’s
rhetoric allowed it to hold, even despite the enduring practical issues of Arctic security
policy.
The future of Arctic security
What if we consider the possibility that the Canadian government’s current policy
difficulties may not matter so long as they are corrected in the long-term? That is, if we
accept that rhetoric about Arctic security matters has been set as a constant in Canadian
political discourse, would it not follow that policymakers would put more energy into
overcoming the difficulties of operating in the Arctic? Firstly, what we believe to be the
“short-term” in this case could very well be a decade given budgetary commitments that
have already been set in motion by the Harper government. We are also assuming that no
significant disruption to the relatively harmonious dynamic currently in place in the
Arctic region will occur during this time. A change in this dynamic, however unlikely,
could result in further rhetorical escalation that would potentially create a new set of
financially straining policies. What is instead needed is a re-imagination of the Arctic
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space from the Canadian perspective. Having examined historical responses to perceived
threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, it is clear that policies to address perceived threats
to sovereignty were reactive and focused on the short-term.
In previous cases, this did not necessarily result in negative consequences: As
other instances discussed here were generally focused on perceived threats from the
United States, the Canadian response was generally sufficient to satisfy sovereignty
concerns within the bilateral relationship. Current realities present a different set of
challenges for Canadian policymakers, however. In contrast to the actions taken by the
Canadian government in the early and mid-20th century regarding perceived threats to
security, climate change has brought about a serious threat to Canadian territory.
Canadian policy must therefore address both geopolitical balancing of Arctic sovereignty
while also providing for legitimate responses to the effects of climate change on
Canadian Arctic communities. This would seemingly imply that sovereignty concerns in
the traditional sense should be de-prioritized in favor of multilateral cooperation to deal
with the effects of climate change. The ability of the Canadian government to take this
stance is difficult, however, due to continued Western tensions with Russia, as well as
lingering disputes over legal claims to various areas of the Arctic space. This does have a
negative effect on Arctic cooperation efforts, even if that aspect of the East-West
relationship has been generally positive. The simple solution is to simply drop insistence
on these claims, though management of the Arctic space ultimately falls back to
individual governments agreeing to work collectively. Even among Western Arctic states,
this is not so easy.
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How, then, are we supposed to view the Arctic space in light of what we’ve come
to understand about the securitization processes that have occurred in the region over the
past decade? Firstly, the timeline of this particular securitization process suggests that it
may be completed in basic terms, although what the future holds is still up for debate.
The fact that the basic securitization process has occurred does not prevent the possibility
of new rounds of securitization to address particular threats that will arise in the Arctic
space. There is also the problem of how new threats are being created by the failure of
cohesive security policies among the Arctic states: That is, the lack of interconnected
cooperation on security matters between states, even among the NATO members,
potentially creates a negative feedback loop in actually securing against the threat. This
largely has to do with domestic retrenchment on security matters in Canada and Norway
or, in the case of Denmark and the United States, lacking consistent policy salience on
Arctic issues. In the latter countries, a greater push for recognition of the challenges
facing the Arctic would likely have a positive benefit on the space as a whole, and would
encourage more focused cooperation from other Arctic states. Unfortunately,
significantly increased engagement on the parts of Denmark and the United States is
unlikely due to the lack of enduring identity factors in the two countries that activate
Arctic securitization processes. For more cohesive policies to occur, the agenda would
need to be set by players who have a greater stake in the region within their national
politics, which would naturally be Canada or Norway. Russia could potentially activate
this process as well, though this would require a significant change in its greater strategic
outlook that is also very unlikely in the near future.
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The second issue is that securitization processes, while effective in creating
greater focus on the fact that there are indeed security issues in the Arctic, also created a
series of competing narratives as to where the threat actually emanated from. The most
prominent “threat” involved infringements on sovereignty over newly discovered natural
resources. Although this threat may have garnered the most attention in the public sphere,
it also did not capture the full threat picture that included threats from the natural
environment. The question is whether this was a natural tendency based upon traditional
notions of security or whether this was a result of the language used by authoritative
voices. Based upon the analysis presented here, it would appear that authoritative voices
specifically crafted rhetoric based upon hard security concerns, although it would also be
fair to say that such an approach was heavily influenced by previous conceptions of
security. While it is possible to create understandings of threat from the natural
environment, the discursive manner of doing so can result in conflation of what the
public understands to be security. As seen in the previous chapter, the public is not
ignorant to the idea of environmental matters falling within the realm of security, but also
have not naturally engrained the idea of security-through-environmental-protection into
the collective consciousness. The result of this, as evidenced by this case, is the ease that
the government had in continually tying Arctic security to sovereignty matters due to the
lack of a coherent voice offering an alternative version of regional security. Because of
this, there was conscious recognition of the environmental aspects of Arctic security that
were nonetheless not powerful enough to be enveloped in the actual securitization
process. As a result, hard security matters that only made up part of the region’s security
dominated the focus of the securitization process.
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Finally, there is a certain irony in the fact that the region that will be directly
impacted by the effects of climate change was less targeted by securitization rhetoric.
With the Canadian government having to speak to the majority of its population that lives
in “Southern” Canada, the securitization of the public in the North was functionally
unnecessary. This could, however, result in a negative feedback loop for the practical
aspects of the securitization process that go beyond political fallout in Northern
communities. With the difficulties of operating in the Northern climates now evident,
Southern Canadians’ appetite for continued investment in the region may very well
decrease to a point of undoing stated government commitments to Northern issues. This
would have a detrimental effect on progress made on better understandings of the
socioeconomic issues facing the North, regardless of the difficulties encountered in recent
policymaking. Taking into account the previously advanced argument regarding Harper’s
personal view of Arctic security, such a scenario is one that even future governments
would want to avoid. This also adds further to the idea that the securitization process
toward the Arctic is non-continuous, and that a new securitization process may be
necessary in the future for the government to continue to justify devoting resources to
Arctic issues. Future securitization processes, however, would be unlikely to target
rhetoric toward Northern Canadians for the same reasons as before. These securitization
processes would also likely encounter more pushback from public opinion as the
underlying identity factors that drove the recent securitization process were revealed and
the rhetoric was diversified. By this I am referring to the fact that the inherent
authoritative power held by the government was diluted by other actors having the ability
to comment on the securitization process over an extended period of time. For a new
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securitization process to be successful, the level of threat would need to be in response to
a clear flashpoint in the region beyond what has previously occurred. This would either
need to be a clear violation of national sovereignty on the part of one of the Arctic states,
or more likely, greater public outcry over the physical consequences of climate change in
Northern communities.
What is not entirely evident is whether the urgency of addressing Arctic security
issues has changed in the last decade as a result of greater awareness of the issues facing
the region. Part of the problem is continued recognition of Arctic issues as an aspect of
larger climate change concerns rather than on their own face. The achievement of the
Paris Agreement to much acclaim in December 2015 was representative of this problem,
as Arctic community leaders noted that the region received little attention in the course of
international climate change negotiations.343 Although the Arctic did feature prominently
on the agenda of the Nordic countries’ visit to Washington in May 2016, 344 which
matched its place during Justin Trudeau’s visit to the city earlier that year, the Arctic is
inherently at a disadvantage when it comes to international climate discussions. Because
of the small number of countries with a direct stake in the Arctic, the region generally
takes second billing to the problems faced by the more numerous, lesser-developed
countries located in warmer climates. Conceivably, the direct interests of Russia and the
United States, not to mention growing indirect interest from China, could be enough to
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push the Arctic to a more prominent position in global climate discussions. The current
reality, however, is that those countries have not exercised their full abilities in agendasetting on climate policy matters. While the Nordic countries do have both a direct
interest in the region and agenda-setting ability in international discussions, their low
relative power in the international system may hinder their ability to truly influence
lasting recognition of Arctic issues.
The definition of “Arctic security” has also not moved considerably despite more
attention to the issue. Although media reporting of Arctic-focused military exercises
continue, public perceptions of the level of security in the region have still not quite
caught up to reality. A 2015 piece in the Toronto Star noted that public perceptions of
undefended Canadian Arctic sovereignty continued despite studies showing that the
Canadian military was beginning to adjust positively to the difficulties it initially faced
while operating in the region.345 For the time being, the Trudeau government and military
have also appeared to continue operations initiated by the previous government, 346 be it
for continuity reasons or the current government not having yet unveiled a new Arctic
strategy. Continued media attention to Arctic military operations does help to illuminate
ongoing security issues in the region, but it may also create misconceptions about the
origins of the threat. If the public continues to operate under a decade-old narrative
concerning the threat of outside interference in national sovereignty, then continued
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coverage of Arctic military operations will likely allow perceptions of state-based threats
to continue. As previously discussed, the previous government did take steps to dismiss
the notion of state-to-state conflict in official strategy documents. This was a departure
from the government’s general rhetoric on the subject, however, which allowed the idea
to persist. If future government rhetoric does not move to change this narrative, then
regional security will likely be unable to move to a new frame of reference. Continuing to
view Arctic security in hard security terms distracts from the threats that are most likely
to persist in the region in the coming years.
A possible change to this view could come through the changing economic
situation in the region. Adding to the difficulties of operating in the Arctic region was the
fall of global energy prices in 2014. Facing an expected loss of revenues, many energy
corporations scaled back or suspended Arctic energy exploration in North America as the
region yielded little short-term return on investment.347 The most curious case of this
trend involved the efforts of Shell Oil to secure leasing rights in Alaska. Shell had
suspended its operations in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas in 2013 following an accident
involving two drilling ships, which resulted in a review from U.S. federal regulators.348
Following a review of internal safety procedures, Shell re-applied for federal approval to
resume drilling in the Chukchi Sea in 2015. After a process that faced heavy criticism
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from environmental groups, the U.S. government granted Shell conditional approval to
resume drilling in July 2015.349 The consternation from Shell’s opponents was shortlived, however, as Shell announced that it was abandoning the Chukchi drilling project
due to disappointing discoveries.350 Although Shell’s departure came at the end of an
ongoing trend of corporations re-assessing their commitment to the Arctic, Shell’s quick
departure after a hard-fought process to obtain regulatory approval for its Chukchi wells
demonstrated the degree to which the Arctic region had become unpalatable for energy
exploration activities. This trend was less apparent in Norway, whose offshore Arctic
drilling activities are less affected by climatological and logistical difficulties than in
North America, although the global decline of oil was having a significant effect on
Norway’s large oil economy. 351 Russian energy exploration activities also faced
significant difficulties, though for different reasons. As a result of Russia’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine, Western countries imposed heavy sanctions on Russian energy exploration
activities that effectively canceled several ongoing consortia of Western and Russian oil
exploration. The barring of Western expertise from Russian exploration activities was
particularly damaging to operations in the Arctic, where Russian corporations were
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reliant on outside technology to overcome the difficulties of extraction in the region.352 In
the Russian case, oddly enough, outside geopolitical events rather than events within the
Arctic itself had managed to affect energy exploration.
Although the global energy market is subject to speculative prediction, near-term
predictions of global energy prices do not see an expected return to the price levels seen a
decade ago. This creates a re-focusing of how the Arctic fits into the global economic
picture, which was a large part of how the region drew increased global attention in the
first place. If the Arctic’s energy potential is not determined to be economically feasible
to extract, the region is less likely to be the focus of future securitization processes. While
an expected increase in maritime transits through opening waterways presents a frame of
reference for sovereignty-based securitization processes, such possibilities are of a
rhetorically benign character compared to the prospect of foreign actors extracting energy
resources. If energy resources are deemed to be de-prioritized compared to extraction in
other areas of the world, then how would the Arctic region remain as a recognized
priority in the minds of public opinion? The silver lining to this option would be the
potential result of less interference of national organs in local affairs. This would also
potentially bring less outside economic interests that are pushed at the behest of national
government agendas, which would lower the chances of further environmental damage
from natural resource extraction activities.
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The unavoidable reality, however, is that Northern regions are still very
dependent on such outside forces for subsidizing basic needs such as education,
healthcare, food supplies, and housing. In order for greater local autonomy to become the
reality, Northern regions would need to determine how to address these shortfalls. Such a
dynamic is particularly difficult to change in Canada where Northern regions are only
connected year-round by airplane. Given the declining state of the natural environment in
the region, economic activities that supported the community in the past will likely be
unfeasible in the future. Progress in other aspects of the region’s standard of living has
indeed come at a price.
Having previously discussed the difficulties of developing a regional Arctic
identity, what is the value, if any, of promoting an “Arctic identity” in the Canadian
national context? If Southern Canadians cannot truly value the issues that Northern
Canadians face, is a national Arctic identity really anything more than one of many
symbols used to represent the Canadian image? Furthermore, what does continued
promotion of Canadian Arctic heritage actually do in practical terms for Canadian
interests in the Arctic? Lisa Williams has argued that the Canadian Arctic identity
actually complements Arctic regional identity in the sense that Canadian national
interests are served by promoting a rules-based order in addressing concerns facing the
whole Arctic space.353 While this is true on its face, it is also representative of the root
problem that continues to hamper Arctic policy at the national level. Canada’s rule-based
approach to the region may comport with international norms and modernity, but it also
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often drifts into a paternalistic mindset that is too rooted in 19 th and early 20th century
views of the region. Such attitudes have arguably been bolstered by Ottawa’s recent
attempts to undertake a more proactive agenda in the Arctic. Regardless of the fact that
the region can be reached in a short time by air or instantaneously by internet
communication, attempts to improve infrastructure or undertake extensive economic
activities could not avoid the age-old problem of the region’s uniquely forbidding
character. At some point, would Southern Canadians eventually give up the idea of
investing in the region for this reason?
Such is the puzzle that faces the Canadian nation in addition to demonstrating the
potential limits of identity power in decision-making. While identity factors may weigh
significantly in driving public opinion in favor of government sovereignty-defense
actions, continued public support may also only hold if there is a continued perception of
urgency in the government taking these actions. Another potential drawback from the
government’s perspective is the ability of the public to remain informed of the progress
of government investment and action in the region. In years past, direct media from the
region was sparse, if not non-existent, which favored the government’s ability to steer the
narrative in a direction positive to its interests. Now, it is difficult for the government to
conceal the difficulties of operating in the region while facing increased scrutiny in doing
so. The presence of the Soviet threat against the Canadian Arctic during the Cold War
allowed the government to maintain a security posture in the Arctic regardless of other
perceived infringements on sovereignty. While threats remain against the Arctic region in
the form of climate change, the justification for an extended security posture in the
current era is more difficult to defend to the public. Instead, measures to combat climate
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change are enacted through climate policy in national decision-making. Even if the
government attempts to frame an enhanced security posture as a deterrent to threats
against sovereignty by outside actors, it becomes difficult to defend this position in the
long-term absent noticeable interference from foreign actors. Although such interference
cannot be ruled out in the future, the events of the past decade make it difficult to argue
that an elevated level of concern on the matter is justifiable for an extended period of
time, especially considering the need to focus resources toward mitigating the effects of
climate change. Given current conditions, continued securitization of the Arctic space on
sovereignty matters may have approached a point of exhaustion.
That does not mean that hope is lost for a positive security dynamic in the Arctic
space, nor does it mean that our understandings of Arctic security have reached an apex.
Although the Arctic’s forbidding conditions are inherent to how much of the globe views
the region, Arctic states ironically did not give enough attention to the true ramifications
of this reality when planning for greater human activity in the region in the coming
decades. Interestingly, recognition of the region’s changing climate in the near future did
not recognize that current conditions were still unduly harsh and unique. While many
difficult lessons have been learned about what the future holds for the Arctic, these
lessons must also be viewed as benchmarks for positive action going forward. On a
geopolitical level, conditions are amenable to such a possibility. The difficulties thus lie
within states themselves, particularly in those where the Arctic and more populated
portions of the country are separated by a great distance. Because of this, national
governments have difficulty understanding the scope of the problems faced by Northern
communities day-to-day, with this lacking understanding also being shared by much of
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the national population. The result of this, as seen in Canada, is an increasingly
threatened Arctic territory being governed by a national entity that does not understand it,
all-the-while using the region as a means to boost national pride.
Where, then, does positive action begin for Canada and its Arctic territory?
Greater political devolution to Northern communities has its strengths and weaknesses,
although it is probably not feasible to give these regions a significant share of power visà-vis national governance due to dependence on federal subsidies to support the
difficulties of living in the Arctic. Realization of the costs of resource development may
help to positively change struggles faced in the federal-local dynamic. With an eagerness
to rapidly seize natural resources in the region now abated (perhaps only temporarily,
however), there can be more attention to sustainable options for economic growth in the
region. Such options can be exercised by the local communities themselves with federal
organs providing assistance as needed, be it in areas such as healthcare and education or
through more investment in search-and-rescue capabilities. Building this positive future
requires a change in mindset, however. No longer is the Arctic the forbidden frontier that
vexed explorers searching for the world’s ends. Instead, it became an intrinsic part of the
Canadian national fabric, one that now needs to be viewed on more equal footing with the
rest of the national territory.
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